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Summarv
This study, which was commissioned from
Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, by the
African Development Bank (ADB), contains
the findings and recommendations of an
evaluation of the Social Development Fund
(SDF) in Zimbabwe over 1990-95, the
period of the Economic Structural
Adjustment Programme. The study reviews
the initial SDF programme design and the
mandate of the SDF. It evaluates the
performance first of the social welfare and
other non-lending components of the SDF
programme, then of the small enterprise
lending and training components of the
SDF. It proceeds to review the design of the
more broadly conceived Poverty Alleviation
Action Plan, its relationship with the SDF
during the programme period and future
options for its integration with the SDF. The
study conc1udes with an assessment of the
available options for the future development
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and recommendations on possible forms of
follow-up intervention by the ADB.
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PREFACE
This study forms part of the output of a eonsultaney on Soeial Development Funds in Zimbabwe and
Malawi commissioned from Chr Michelsen Institute by the Afriean Development Bank. The
evaluation of the Social Development Fund in Zimbabwe was earried out by a team eomprising
Richard Moorsom, CMI projeet leader, and two national eonsultants, Lloyd Saehikonye, senior
researcher at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe, and Joe Matanga,
finaneial analyst, eontraeted through Imani Development, Harare. The study was written by Richard
Moorsom ineorporating working drafts on partieular topies writlen by the team members.
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OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The SDF Programmes
1. This study eontains the findings and reeommendations of an evaluation of the Soeial
Development Fund (SDF) in Zimbabwe.
2. The SDF was established in 1991 within the broader framework of Zimbabwe's Soeial
Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) programme, whieh formed an integral part of the five-year
Eeonomie Struetural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) launched in 1990. It was designed as
the delivery vehiele for the two principal programmes aimed at mitigating transitional soeial
hardships expeeted to arise under ESAP from the introduetion of user fees for social
serviees and from retrenehments in formal sector employment:
. The Soeial Welfare Programme (SWP) eompensated the poor for new or inereased
user eharges in edueation and health and higher deregulated maize priees. It eovered
payments for
exemptions from school and examination fees for households with ineomes below
Z$400 per month;
exemptions from health fees for households with ineomes below Z$400 per
month; and
a per capita cash food benefit of Z$4 per month for urban households earning
less than Z$200 per month, intended to eompensate them for the higher
deregulated priee of maize.
. The Employment and Training Programme (ETP) provided assistanee to those made
redundant from both the private and the public sectors as a result of ESAP. It offered:
an introduetory one-week training eourse in how to start up a new business;
loans for small enterprise startups.
3. The SDF was finaneed mainly from annual budgetary alloeations. In addition, the eredit
scheme drew on a FUA5 millon (US$6.3 millon) Afriean Development Fund loan approved
in December 1991. The purpose of the loan was to cover the eapital and raw material eost
of approved projeet proposals submitted by retrenehees under the ETP.
4, The SDF was established as a speeial fund first under the Ministry of Finanee and later,
from early 1995, under the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare
(MPSLSW). A Coordination Unit was set up in MPSLSW to aet as seeretariat to the SDF's
Advisory Board and to eoordinate and administer its two programmes in conjunetion with
other departments:
. SWP: While the Coordination Unit prepared payment eheques centrally, the main
burden of assessing and administering individual elaims was assumed by the
ministry's Department of Soeial Welfare, together with school prineipals (school and
examination fees) and the main hospitals and urban elinies (health eharges).
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. ETP: The introduetory training, assistanee with preparing projeet proposals and
appraisal of the proposals were farmed out to private sector eonsultants. The
Coordination Unit servieed an interdepartmental Loans and Grants Alloeation
Committee (LOGAC), whieh deeided on loan applications, and administered the loan
seheme.
Organisation of the Study
5. The ETP's eredit seheme forms the central foeus of this study and is examined in depth in
ehapter 4 of the main report. The non-enterprise eomponents of the SDF's mandate,
prineipally the SWP's three safety nets, are reviewed eomprehensively but in less detail in
ehapter 3. The study also assesses in ehapter 5 the integration of the SDF with the Povert
Alleviation Action Plan (PMP), whieh the Zimbabwe Government launehed midway through
the ESAP period to address issues of long term povert alleviation and whieh assigned
major new funding and eoordinating funetions to the SDF.
6. The conclusions and reeommendations of the study are presented in chapter 6 of the main
report and speeifie reeommendations for African Development Bank follow-up in ehapter
7. The main report is preeeded by a summary and followed by tables and a set of annexes.
The remainder of this overview presents in condensed form the study's principal findings
and reeommendations.
Safety Nets Outcomes
7. The SDF's safety nets had mixed outcomes. Edueation and health assistanee aehieved
generally satisfaetory performanee towards the end of the programme period. After delays
in implementation and a slow startup, take-up reaehed moderate levels by the end of 1994
whieh eontinued on a rising trend into 1995. The cash food benefit, however, never reaehed
more than a, small proportion of its target group and take-up fell away rapidly in 1995,
mainly because of the benefits very low per capita value.
8. The outreaeh of the safety nets nevertheless remained limited. The great majority of
qualifying poor households remained outside the programme and were thus exposed to th~
user eharges. The failure to raise the ineome thresholds in line with the high rate of inflation
shrank the pool of eligible households and the purehasing power of the food benefit.
9. The pre-emptive sereening of applieants was intended to shield the poor from the impaet
of the edueation and health fees introdueed as part of the ESAP reform paekage. It did,
however, raise high proeedural barriers whieh effeetively exeluded most of the poor. It also
imposed heavy administrative overheads, overstretehing the delivery system.
10. Strategie confusion eompromised health and edueation assistanee from the outset. They
were designed as eonventional targeted soeial seeurity benefits to eompensate for
permanent ehanges in user eharges for state serviees. Yet within the SDA framework they
were temporary subsidies to be phased out. Thus on the one hand, PMP projeeted rising
expenditure on them well beyond the end of ESAP as part of long term poverty alleviation,
while on the other, the SDF's budget was cut sharply for FY 1995/96, forcing the abrupt
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suspension of safety net payments in mid-1995. Furthermore, plaeing the safety nets under
the SDF divided line responsibility for a major extension of the welfare system between the
Coordination Unit and the Department of Soeial Welfare, separated its budget line from the
regular welfare vote and failed to equip the Department with adequate planning, staffng and
training for its effeetive implementation.
Credit Scheme Outcomes
11. The SDF's eredit scheme made an innovative eontribution towards the mitigation of
hardships imposed by ESAP:
. The introduetory business training aehieved extensive outreaeh, approximately a third
of all private and public sector retrenehees eompleting the eourse before its
suspensjon in August 1995.
. The approval of 1,88910ans worth Z$153 milion (US$16 millon) within the three years
to January 1996 is a creditable achievement.
. The employment creation indicated in the projeet proposals totalled 7,424 by January
1996, ineluding as well as the retrenehees some 5,500 additional jobs.
12. The average loan size of Z$81 ,000 (US$9,250 in early 1996) positioned the SDF eredit
seheme firmly in the small formal sector. It was of little djreet relevanee to microenterprise
financing in the informal sector, but this was in part a benign oütcome since it ereated new
jobs and largely avoided subjeeting existing NGO programmes to eompetition with its
subsidised terms of lending. By financing high-risk small scale enterprise (SSE) startups,
often with little eollateral, it established a niehe operation alongside other eredit sehemes.
13. Nevertheless, staff shortages and laek of effeient proeedures in the Coordination Unit
allowed a large backlog of nearly 7,000 project proposals to build up by mid-1995 with the
potential to ereate some 25-30,000 jobs. In programme implementation, there was a strong
gender imbalanee amongst trainees and approved loans, a marked urban bias in projeet
locations, and uneertainty over how many promised jobs were aetually, ereated and
sustained.
14. There was a laek of professional business and finaneial expertise at all levels and in
partieular no microlending experienee. Despite an, inherent eonfliet of interest, the sub-
contracting of appraisals to the consultants worked adequately on the whole and the
eonsisteney eheeking by Coordination Unit staff weeded out the weakest proposals. But
LOGAC approved nearly all the projeets it considered and the seheme took on the
eharacter of an entitlement programme.
15. The Coordination Unit proved far more effeetive at disbursing loans than eolleeting
repayments. The aeeounting seetion was severely understaffed for most of the period and
the aeeounting system was weak. A debtor's eontrol system was not put in plaee. The
information management system was wholly inadequate to the task of managing a large
loan portoljo. A monitoring and reeovery seetion was not set up until mid-1995 and had
neither staffng nor systems to funetion effectively. Few elients or project sites had ever
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been visited by Coordination Unit staff. The first invoiees were only dispatched in late 1995
and few clients had been given repayment sehedules.
16. By late 1995 the repayment rate remained very low at around 5 per cent of prineipal and
interest due. As aresult, when the budget subvention to the SDF was severely reduced for
FY 1995/96, the eredit seheme had very little ineome to fall back on. Drawing down the
remainder of the AOF loa n became its on ly source of new capita!. By February 1996
LOGAC had been obliged to suspend approvals for laek of funds.
17. The eredit scheme was set up with the general intention that it should aehieve areasonable
payback of loans advanced. Sueeess in this objective would raise the question of how the
proeeeds are to be utilsed. One option, although not elaborated, would be to reeyele the
ineome on a revolving fund basis so as to plaee the seheme on a sustainable footing.
Allowing for the subsidised interest rate of 10 per cent a year, arrears and a substantial
default rate, the existing loan portolio eould, with moderate loan reeoveries, yield an inflow
suffieient to finanee reiending at a redueed level of around Z$20 million per annum by
1997 -98.
Recommendations
18. The SWP safety nets:
. Whatever the immediate fate of the SWP, to the extent that individual user fees are
eharged for basic social serviees sereening is unavoidable if the poorare to be spared.
Education and health assistanee should be funded within a long term povert
alleviation framework rather than SDA, as proposed in the PMP strategy.
. Edueation and health assistanee should be transferred from the SDF to the regular
budget of MPSLSW and their administration fully integrated into its line funetions.
. If the cash food benefit has not already terminated, self-targeting alternatives should
be considered such as a subsidy to small hammer mills on straight run maize.
19. The existing SDF eredit seheme:
. Any remaining funds under the AOF loan should be disbursed as rapidly as possible,
concentrating on the existing backlog of loan applieations.
. Any further eapitalisation of the seheme should be eonditional upon putting in plaee
adequate arrangements for wholesaling eredit funds to retail finaneial institutions for
onlending to elients.
. Now that the ESAP period is eompleted and the SDF's transitional objeetives have
been partly aehieved, the loan portolio, including ownership of the assets, should be
transferred at the earliest opportunity to one or more finaneial institutions providing
SSE eredit so as to seeure its lon g term sustainability. Commereial as well as
parastatal institutions should be evaluated.
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. In preparation for a transfer, a eomprehensive evaluation of the present loa n portolio
should be undertaken, including site visits, to arrive at arealistie asses$ment of
repayment prospeets, bad debts and needs for extension assistance or refinaneing.
. Onee transferred, the SDF projeets should be integrated into the normal operations of
the existing institutions and new projeets finaneed out of the repayments should be
appraised by standard SSE eriteria. However, the terms of transfer might inelude
agreement on speeial targeting in order to ensure eontinued aeeess for eategories of
elients sueh as retrenehees.
20. Future targeted small seale eredit with SDA objeetives and mieroeredit geared to long term
povert reduetion objeetives:
. Speeial credit programmes with SDA targeting can prove effeetive. Loan finanee
should, however, be wholesaled to established frontline ageneies. Priority should go
to those with proven traek reCords in SSE eredit serving the small formal sector and
mieroeredit serving the informal sector. Both parastatal and private sector finaneial
institutions and microfinanee NGOs should be considered.
. SDA loan agreements should inelude short term client targeting according to
government priorities. The long term aim shouldbe to plough back loan repayments
into the institutions' regular lending programmes.
. Loan agreements for mieroenterprise lènding should be wholesaled primarily to
established mierofinanee NGOs. Parastatal and private sector finaneial institutions
should be considered in order to balanee any gaps in the NGO's national outreaeh,
espeeially in the rural areas.
. Loan agreements should leave the retail institutions free to set their own terms of
onlending. Any wholesale subsidies should be eoneentrated on transaction and
extension service eosts against transparent performanee targets.
. In any future SDA context resulting in redundaneies, the provision of credit to
retrenehees should form part of a paekage whieh also offers alternative options,
ineluding job plaeement, retraining and a strengthened short business eourse.
21. Grant finanee for ineome generating and community based projeets:
. If the SDF mandate to provide grant finanee to small projeets is to be aetivated, a
separate dedieated agency should be established along the lines of a Soeial Action
Fund (SAF) and geared to quick disbursement, primarily through loeal NGOs and
community based organisations.
. In line with PMP emphasis on deeentralisation and community partieipation, the SAF
should funetion primarily to faeilitate loeal initiative and implementation through distriet
and loeal state and community institutions. It should funetion autonomously outside '
ministry struetures and with a small professional staff while aeeounting to the
responsible ministry or alternatively through a reeonstituted SDF.
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22. Analysis, coordination and monitoring:
. After its existing administrative funetions are transferred, the Coordination Units
conneetions with the SDF should beended. It should be reeonstituted as the
Seeretariat of the national PMP Management Committee with enhaneed eapaeity to
eoordinate government-wide efforts on povert alleviation and reduetion. It would
service and monitor policy formulation as well as eoordinating and initiating povert
monitoring, data-gathering, researeh, information and teehnieal assistanee to
implementing institutions.
23. The Soeial Development Fund:
. The SDF should be eonverted into an independent foundation or apex financing
organisation, whieh wil assist in diversifying the sourees of finanee and redueing
dependenee on the governmentbudget. Governanee should be through a partnership
of stakeholders, expressed through representation in its board of central and local
government, business, private and parastatal finaneial institutions, NGOs and
independents.
. The SDF's mandate should be dedieated to long term povert reduction goals, with
provision for the alleviation of adverse impaets arising from struetural adjustment and
other temporary causes.
. The SDF should function exelusively as a wholesale disbursement ehannel for grant
and eredit funds earmarked for miero and small scale projects. It would not beeome
direetly involved in projeet administration and would also not ehannel welfare funds.
Finaneial resourees would be mobilsed from government, donors and the private
sector and disbursed under agreements with partner organisations, whieh eould be
NGOs, a SAF, parastatals, or finaneial institutions.
24. Follow-up Afriean Development Bank interventions:
. If the existing ADF loan has not yet been fully disbursed to the SDF and on lent to
elients, the ADB should be prepared to strengthen its supervision in order to assist the
SDF in meeting its original objeetives.
. Additional loan finanee should not be provided to the SDF in its present form. Any
future funding should be channelled only through institutions established
autonomously outside ministry struetures. An independent SDF eould provide such a
channel. Alternatively, the established financial parastatals eould be considered both
in their own right and as wholesale ehannels to mierofinanee NGOs; and an
autonomous SAF for grant funding of eommunity-based projeets.
. Teehnical assistanee may be required for:
transferring the present loan portolio to one or more eredit institutions;
assisting the eomprehensive stoektaking of the business and financial status of
SDF projeets;
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eontributing to the redesign of the SDF as an independent funding body serving
both long term povert reduetion and short term povert and hardship alleviation
objeetives; and
eontributing to the design of an autonomous SAF.
. Furtherfinaneial assistanee may be needed and feasible in four fields:
additional small seale eredit for SDA purposes should the Government proeeed
with another round of structural adjustment, in whieh case a prineipal adverse
impaet is likely to be public sector retrenchments;
SSE eredit serving the objeetives of povert reduetion, economic empowerment
or expanding the entrepreneurial base;
informal sector mieroeredit targeted explieitly on the poor with targeting priority
for rural women; and
grant funding for small community and ineome-generating projeets.
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SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
This report eontains the findings and reeommendations of an evaluation of the Soeial Development
Fund (SDF) in Zimbabwe.
1. Programme Design
1.1 Zimbabwe's first five-year Eeonomie Struetural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) , was
inaugurated during the second half of 1990. Transitional hardships were antieipated for substantial
seetions of the population and from the outset SDA perspeetives were ineorporated into the ESAP
policy framework. The twin eoncerns with employment ereation and,hardship alleviation beeame the
main foeus of SDA initiatives through the SDF. The Government viewed adverse impaets as partial
and temporary and in general expeeted the poor to benefit substantially. The FUA5 million ADF loan
to the SDF was part of a wider paekage of finaneial support to ESAP from the ADB, the World Bank
and the IMF.
1.2 The ADB's programme design set out four key areas of SDA foeus whieh the SDF was to
finanee: mieroenterprises and povert alleviation programmes; povert assessment and monitoring;
training and institutional strengthening; and action-oriented policy research. The first area of foeus
was to cover a broad range of activities whieh under the SDF were grouped under two programmes:
the Soeial Welfare Proaramme, covering soeial eompensation for hardships attributable to ESAP
(exemptions from edueation and health user fees for those earning under Z$400 a month; food
subsidies; and retrenchment paekages); and the Emoloyment and Training Programme, covering
mieroenterprises to assist 'the poor and the vulnerable groups' into' employment and ineome
generating activities. The speeifie purpose of the ADF loan was to alleviate transitional struetural
adjustment impaets through the provision of eredit to small seale enterprises for eapital and raw
material eosts.
1.3 The ADB design envisaged that the SDF would funetion as the Governments SDA funding
vehicle; disburse both soeial and eredit finanee; and ehannel fund ing from the Government, the ADF
and other donors. The SDF was to have a poliey-making SDA Advisorv Board whieh would draw
broad representation from NGOs and business as well as the public sector. Implementation would
be assigned to the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Soeial Welfare (MPSLSW) whieh would
establish an interdepartmental Loans and Grants Alloeation Committee (LOGAC) at senior offieial
level and a Coordination Unit (CU) to administer the SDF. As well as administration, the CU was to
undertake three main funetions: projeet proeessing, projeet monitoring and evaluation, and outreaeh
and extension. Basic training and projeet appraisal would be eontraeted out.
1.4 Several potential diffeulties of imolementation were built into the original design of the SDF
programme. The SDF was designated sole ehannel for SDA funding, opening it as a vehicle for
programmes ofwidely differing objeetives and thereby eomplieating its management eoherenee. The
inclusion of both welfare and eredit programmes made the SDF responsible for programmes with
ineompatible objeetives and differing conditions of implementation. The SDF's mueh wider range
of activities left it unelear how the Governments eommitment of Z$20 million a year was to be
utilised. Targeting was vaguely defined. Responsibility for projeet appraisal was not elearly
indieated. Finally, the status and legal powers of the SDF were not defined, in partieular in relation
to loan assets.
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1.5 The Governments SDA programme doeument differed from the ADB design in a number
of respeets, several of them signifieant. Up to early1995 the division of implementation responsibility
between the CU in MPSLSW and the Monitoring and Implementation Unit (MIU) in the Ministry of
Finanee weakened programme management. The restrietion of SDF loan disbursements to
interrrediary institutions was missing, leaving the way open to pay out to individuals direetly. Povert
assessment and monitoring was not explieitly ineluded either as an SDF objeetive or as a funding
eategory .
1.6 The SDF constitution retained the programme's broad definition of objeetives but with
targeting restrieted to those direetly affeeted by ESAP. The social safety nets objeetives eovered
grants for medieal eare, school fees and food. Under employment and training, loan funds were '
geared to ereating employment for the same target group, and eligibility was extended to 'approved
small sea le enterprises, cooperatives and public works projeets'. Training grants were, however,
restrieted to retrenehees. Also eovered were 'assoeiations undertaking income generating projeets',
whose projeets the 1995 revision stipulated should be exeeuted through Community Based
Organisations (CBOs).
2. Financing the SDF
2.1 To finanee the SDF, the Zimbabwe Government alloeated Z$20 million in the fiseal year
1992/93 and Z$150 milion, Z$100 milion and Z$50 milion in the three years following, to whieh the
ADB loan and other small-scale donor funding was additional. These reduetions were not signalled
in the presentation of the Povert Alleviation Action Plan (PMP) in late 1994, whieh projeeted a rise
to Z$210 million in both 1995/96 and 1996/97. The delayed gearing up of PMP stalled the new
PMP initiatives and left the established SDF programmes largely dependent on the mueh redueed
domestie budget subventions.
2.2 Within the framework of the SDF the soeial welfare requirements were to be funded wholly
out of domestie resourees and the mieroenterprise eomponent by a mix of public and external
funding. The sole finaneial partner was the ADB. Other eommitments have not been fortheoming
apart from limited teehnieal and institutional assistanee. The AOF loan was to be drawn down in five
tranches of FUA 1 million on a replenishment basis.
2.3 As atthe end of September 1995, the latest period forwhieh eomparable data is available,
cumulative disbursements to elients amounted to Z$161.5 millon under the SWP and to Z$133.5
millon (45 per cent) under the ETP, making a total of Z$295 million disbursed to elients through the
SDF approximately within the timeframe of ESAP.
3. Review of the Social Welfare Programme
3.1 The Social Welfare Programme was designed as a set of short term soeial safety nets to
eater for the needs of the poor and other vulnerable groups direetly and adversely affeeted by the
impaet of ESAP. It exempted seeondary and urban primary pupils from paying school and
examination fees and individuals from health eharges (in both cases if earning under Z$400 per
month), and provided a small food subsidy of Z$4 per capita to urban households (if earning under
Z$200 per month). The health sehemeeombined individual targeting at the urban in-patient hospitals
with self-targeting through a 20 per cent subsidy on attendanees at urban elinies. Rural primary
schools and health faeilities were effeetively exempt fromuser eharges.
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3.2 Implementation of all three benefits started late - edueation assistanee in September 1992,
food money in Mareh 1993 and health assistanee in January 1994. The programme's outreaeh is
eharaeterised by delays in launehina and slow startuD leading to aeeeleratina take-uD. While the
food subsidy failed to make a signifieant impaet, the school and examination fee exemptions
aehieved a moderate level of outreaeh by 1994 and take-up eontinued on a rising trend through
1995. School fee exemptions aeeounted for about 16-17 per cent of the affeeted school population
in 1994 and 1995 and examination fees about 14 and 20 per cent respeetively. In respeet of both
school and examination fee exemptions there is evidenee of a gen der bi as against airis, who made
up 43 and 44 per cent respeetively between January and mid-May 1995.
3.3 Within the limitations of their design and targeting, the edueation and health safety nets sub-
programmes have on the whole performed ereditably, the food subsidy less so. However, the
maiority of qualifying poor households were still outside the seheme by the end of the period.
Furthermore, the funds alloeated to the SWP were far smaller than the net impact of ESAP in terms
of sharply redueed real soeial expenditure.Real per capita expenditure on social welfare dropped
by about 32 per cent over the four year period 1990/91-1994/95, on health by 39 per cent, by 32 per
een on primary edueation and by 34per cent on seeondary education.
3.4 Maior confusion surrounds the SDF timeframe with ESAP ending in 1995 but PMP
extending well beyond into 1997. In partieular, the health and edueation subsidies were designed
to eompensate for permanent ehanges in user eharges for state serviees. As sueh, they werè
designed along the lines of eonventional targeted soeial seeurity benefits, not temporary SDA
subsidies to be phased out. The PMP strategy envisaged their lon g term extension, but the SDF
budgetary alloeations appeared to treat them as redueing SDA eompensation.
3~5 The financing of the three SWP benefits was subjeet to short-term budgeting constraints
and uneertainties, ineluding a laek of c1ear guidelines for the division of funds between the SWP and
the ETP, little eorrespondenee between voted alloeations and aetual eosting of the programme's
needs, and treasury elawbaek of SDF funds.
3.6 The SWP's targetingstrategy resulted in a mueh narrower programme fòeus and adelinking
from broad povert impaets, but also in a elearer identifieation of potential benefieiaries, who were
by definition limited to users of the services or subsidies in question. It laeked balanee in respeet of
urban bias, in not taking aeeount of household size(edueation and health assistance) and in
confusion arising from two different ineome thresholds.
3.7 Relianee on the pre-emptive sereening of applieants, a centrepieee of the SWP's design,
raised high entry barriers. Individual sereening is an intrinsieally pa per-intensive approaeh to
delivering sodal subsidies and ineurs heavy administrative and training overheads. In situations of
mass povert, it invites perverse outcomes: either a low take-up rate saves overheads but has
marginal impaet; or suecessful outreaeh overstretehes the delivery system.
3.8 The failure to adiust the ineome thresholds for inflation has allowed inflation ereep toerode
their value, by 61 per cent over the four-year period to December 1995 and by 71 per cent in
respeet of food. This has progressively redueed the pool of eligible households and exposed
inereasing numbers to the eost reeovery measures. Some evidenee of ESAP-related negative
outcomes has been found in the school and edueation seetors.
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3.9 In general, by the second half of 1994 and 1995 the SWP had ironed out its teethinQ
diffeulties and was funetioninQ moderately well within the boundaries of its constraints. I n 1992 the
slow startup can in large measure be attributed to the impaet of the drought emergeney, whose
operational burden fell heavily on the DSW. Stopgap measures and overtime working sueeeeded
in overeoming a serious payments backlog in late 1993 and subsequent proeessing delays have,
on the whole, not been attributable to administrative holdups. Health and welfare assistanee were
moderately well established with the respeetive elient groups although the food subsidy was notably
less sueeessful.
3.10 Nonetheless, operational oroblems beset the SWP in five main areas: laek of information
to faeilitate outreaeh to those who were eligible, partieularly those outside the main urban areas;
insuffeient staffng at central and provineiallevels; eumbersome applieation proeedures and the laek
of eommon applieation forms; over-eentralisation in proeessing payments; and inadequate inter-
departmental coordination and unelear assignments of finaneial and operational funetions.
3.11 The operational limitations of the SWP aeeentuated further the narrowinQ of the
programme's outreaeh inherent in its design. Many poor households residing at some distanee from
the nearest distriet DSW offee eould not afford the time and expense to eomplete an applieation
proeedure that might require several long journeys, even overnight stays, and lengthy waits for
attention. In the case of sehools some prineipals applied arbitrary eriteria in deeiding whieh
households to refer to the DSW, in some eases sending all applieants but more eommonly blocking
eligible households. Delays in issuing payments redueed theineome of sehools and non-
government health institutions and henee their confidenee in the SWP. In mid-1995 some faeed
legal action byereditors as aresult.
3.12 The origins of many of the problems with the SWP lie, with minor exceptions, not in staff
performanee but in the design and ooeration of the programme itself. A major permanent expansion
of the soeial welfare system was introdueed in the guise of a temporary seheme addressing short-
term hardships. The DSW workload was greatly extended with little extra budgetary provision for
either staff or supplies. Little attention was devoted to adapting the struetures, line funetions,
procedures and staff eompetenees of the central and regional DSW offiees to the demanding new
responsibilities they were expeeted to exeeute. Within the CU, a parallei administrative eapacity was
set up alongside the DSW within the SDF whieh had little to do with the latter's eoordination funetion.
The channeIling of SDA welfare payments through the separate SDF aeeount divided finaneial
aceountability and separated SWP from other welfare expenditure.
3.13 The future operation of the education and health assistanee sub-programmes in their
present forms wil depend on financing doser to the level proposed for PMP and maybe somewhat
above it. If not sustainable at this level, the terms of the benefits would have to be altered.
Alternatively, budgetary eaps in this demand-Ied programme will enforee arbitrary eut-ciffs, as in
1995. If SDA objeetives are to be aehieved, the soeial safetv nets need to be seeured within a long
term poliev framework.
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4. Review of the Mieroenterprise Credit Programme
Lending Activities
4.1 In praetiee, the seope of most activities under the ETP has been eonfined to training
retrenchees in basic methods of business management and also imparting basic entrepreneurial
skils; and the provision of eredit to business proposals submitted by the retrenehees. The SDF's
eredit seheme was built from serateh and eonstituted a new venture into business development.
4.2 Three distinet ohases of lending aetivity are apparent: a slow start lasting from late 1992 to
mid-1993, a rapid esealation during the second half of 1993 leading to a main phase lasting from
December 1993 to Mareh 1995, and a disrupted late phase from April 1995 onwards when
approvals virtually dried up in mid-1995, resumed over the last four months of 1995 before dropping
to a standstill by early February 1996.
4.3 The system of block allocations to the SDF introdueed budgeting and seheduling problems
for the ETP, like its SWP eounterpart. Both programmes were demand driven and either could
unpredietably hit the budget eeiling and be obliged to suspend operations. The delays in
disbursement of the AOF loan, attributable mainly to laek of administrative capaeity in the CU, also
deprived the SDF of loan funds.
4.4 Laek of published reports and gaos and ineonsisteneies in internal data eomoilations have
obseured the assessment of the status of the loan seheme. There is an absenee of up-to-date
ineome and expense statements, and no repayments statisties, annual reports, balanee sheets or
audited aeeounts have been published to date.
4.5 The 1992 SDF eonstitution failed to provide at all for the administrative eosts of the SDF.
'Ineidental' expenses are now allowed, but the overheads of the eredit seheme remain partly hidden
in deoartmental aeeounts and there is no direet means of ealeulating all its administrative eosts.
Targeting and Beneficiaries
4.6 At startup, the eredit seheme was restrieted exclusively to retrenehees. In early 1994 the
Advisory Board extended it to include those taking early or voluntary retirement or retrenehed due
to ill health and a litte later also to the unemployed disabled.
4.7 The targeting of a single and easily identifiable grouD, retrenehees, gave the SDF eredit
seheme a streng programme foeus, on whieh was also direetly eoncerned with transitional impaets
and SDA objeetives. Although there was noway of distinguishing redundaneies attributable to ESAP
from the eonsequenees of normal business restrueturing, most applieants were retrenehed during
the main impaet of ESAP during 1992-94.
4.8 Not all retrenehees eould be expected to possess the neeessary skiIIs and motivation to
sueceed as small entrepreneurs. The diffeulty is not that they were offered a credit programme, but
that it was the onfv option they were offered. F~rther, sereeningmight have helped prioritise poorer
retrenehees and also identify those with entrepreneurial or requisite teehnieal ski lis.
4.9 There is some evidenee of abuse leading to leakage bu it is nevertheless unlikely that sueh
abuse was widespread.
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,4.10 By the end of the ESAP period the SDF eredit seheme had attraeted the interest of a
substantial orooortion of its prineipal taraet grouD, retrenehees. The proportion of retrenehees
submitting projeet proposals, at roughly 23-24 per cent, refleets a satisfaetory level of outreaeh. The
CU's cumulative summary gives a total of 1889 projects and Z$152.9 millon in loans approved by
the end of January 1996, by whieh time approximately 8,500 retrenehees had applied for SDF loans.
The take-up rate of 80-85 per cent amongst those completing the introduetory training eourse was
high.
4.11 The delivery of loans was less satisfactory. Only about 24 per cent of applieants had
reeeived deeisions on their applieations by June 1995, when the back log of loan applieations on file
was reported as 6,693 with a total value of Z$803 milion (approx. US$94 million). Roughly 4-5 per
cent of private sector retrenehees, 10 per cent of parastatal retrenehees and 9 per cent of eivil
service retrenehees had by then obtained SDF loans.
4.12 The total number of jobs eontained in approved project proposals was 7,424 by January
1996 aeeording to CU figures, a modest but signifieant' eontribution to alleviating ESAP-related
unemployment. Nevertheless, it is highly imorobable that all the oromised ¡obs were aetually
ereated.
4.13 The seetoral distribution of loans did not maximise effeieney in ¡ob ereation. The average
number of jobs per projeet was 3.9 but wide seetoral variations are evident. A broad speetrum is
also evident in co st per job around the mean of Z$20,593 (US$2,200).
4.14 The seetoral distribution of projeets exposes a strong bias towards the service seetors.
More partieularly, there was a high eoneentration of resourees on a narrow range of oroieet types:
welding, eattle pen fattening, small retail outlets, eommuter omnibuses and grinding mills. In respeet
of the last two, this investment had signifieant imoaet on two sub-seetors adiusting rapidly under
ESAP.
4.15 Aeeess to the seheme in terms of loan approvals appears to have been signifieantlv lower
for retrenehees from the private sector than for those from the public sector. There was a very
strong gender bias and only 9 per cent of benefieiaries were women. Only 34 beneficiaries were
disabled. Two-thirds of borrowers were in the middle age bands between 30 and 49 years old and
most had a high school edueation.
4.16 The geographieal distribution of approved projeets can serve as one measure of national
outreaeh. There was a strong urban bias: 53 per cent of projeets and 62 per cent of jobs were
elassified as urban. This distribution is the reverse of the 1992 population census (31 per cent
urban, 69 per cent rural). By provinee, the further from Harare, the lower the ratio of projeets to
population with Matabeleland North and South returning espeeially low ratios.
Loan Amounts and Terms
4.17 The eredit terms offered to borrowers were a required eontribution of 10 per cent of the
projeet eost, a standard interest rate of 10 per cent, a graee period of usually 4-6 months and a
repayment period of 4-5 years.
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4.18 The initial maximum size of loan was set at Z$80,000 and raised in May 1994 to Z$120,OOO,
at whieh level it has remained sinee. The mean loa n size of Z$81,OOO or US$9,250 (early 1996)
plaees the SDFloan portolio firmly at the lower end of the formal small business sector. The SDF
eredit seheme has established a niehe field of operations by targeting a seleetive elient base -
retrenehees - having little aeeess to other sourees of eredit; by financing high-risk startups by
operators with no previous traek reeord, little training and little or no collateral; and by restrieting the
size of loans to the lower end of the SME finaneial market and for the most part not offering second
or topup loans.
4.19 The SDF loan seheme has therefore been of little relevanee to informal sector development.
This, however, may have been a benign outcome sinee it has reduced to a minimum direet
competition with established microcredit sehemes.
4.20 The heavily subsidised interest rate has been more damaging at the SME level, not by
diverting elients sinee the SDF seheme was restrieted to retrenehees, but by affording a substantial
eompetitive advantage over small businesses relying on commereial eredit. The impaet was
exaeerbated by its eoineidenee through 1994-95 with the even more heavily subsidised SME eredit
provided by the CGC.
4.21 Subsidised interest has been a prineipal ooint of disagreement between leadina
microlending NGOs and the CU, whieh has eontemplated for some time onlending SDF funds
through reputable NGOs. This has delayed even further the fulfilment of the original ADB and SDA
to provide SDF resourees to frontline finaneial institutions.
4.22 A serious diffeulty arose from the restrietion of the loan to eaoitãl eosts when the borrower's
need for working eapital in the initial stag es of operation was often aeute. Other problems ineluded
the discouragement of eo-finaneing and, although diseretionary, the upper eap on the loa n size,
especially in the transport sector.
Non-financial Services
4.23 The training programme had extensive outreaeh. Probably more than a third of the target
group eompleted the basic training eourse. But only 15 per cent of those trained were women and
a strong gender bias is evident.
4.24 The content was generally satisfaetory as a basic introduetion and to assist trainees prepare
projeet proposals. It was, however, insuffieient to develoD entreoreneurial ski lis. Many of the
consultants running the eourses used partieipatory methods of training, had adequate training
faeilities adequate exeept in Harare and well qualified for the job.
4.25 The most eonspieuous defieieney is the eomplete absenee of an extension service. The laek
of support to a eadre of inexperieneed operators starting first-time ventures was likely to prove
amongst the most important faetors in subsequent poor projeet performanee and failure. Yet as of
Mareh 1996 most planning and implementation remained on paper.
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Operational Mechanisms
4.26 Adeauate management information systems are not in plaee for the day to day monitoring
of the mieroenterprise financing programme. The CU is currently operating without a full set of
aeeoi.nting reeords. The bank deposit system has not operated effeiently as SDF does not eonduet
a bank reeoneiliation regularly. The cash book does not separate details of grants and loans. The
true reeord of the finaneial position of the programme cannot be ascertained.
4.27 The requirement in the ADB design that an independent annual audit be earried out by a
private firm and submitted to the ADB within six months does not aooear ever to have been earried
out. Apart from a eouple of summary tables, no auarterly or annual reoorts have been submitted to
the Advisory Board.
4.28 There is no c1ient traekinçi system in plaee, henee arrears can go undeteeted for a very long
time. There is no elear method of reeording arrears and no seheduling of work to manage elient
aeeounts. The 'eomputerised management information and aeeounting system' preseribed in the
ADB design was only in early 1996 reaehing the planning stage.
4.29 From the outset there has been a erueial ambiguity as to who eould submit proDosais and
how loans were to be disbursed. As implemented, the SDF related exclusively to individuals as
proposers and benefieiaries, eontrary to the ADB design. This uneertainty between a wholesaling
and retailing strategy beeame a eritieal facto r affeeting the performanee of the SDF eredit seheme.
4.30 The skeietal strueture and limited staffng and resourees eould not eope with the esealating
applieation baeklogs. In praetiee the 45-day deadline for a projeet deeision was unrealistie and
hardly ever aehieved. The mean gap between projeet submission and approval widened from 3-4
months before September 1994 to more than 14 months by late 1995. Very few applieations
submitted after January 1995 have as yet been presented to LOGAC. By contrast, the gao between
aooroval and disbursement has generallv been minimaL. The ADB design's stipulation that loans
should not be disbursed in a single payment was adhered to, but the ADB guidelines linking
disbursement to implementation were never put into praetiee.
4.31 There are no systems in plaee to monitor and manage loa n reeovery. The reeovery
problems stem from poor aeeounting and reeord-keeping systems and the absenee of an effeient
repayments eolleetion system. As of mid-1995, even basic proeedures sueh as invoieing clients for
repayments due were missing; the first eomplete set of invoiees was only issued in late 1995.
Relianee on an ineomplete manual aeeounting proeedure and the absenee of automated billng for
a portolio of some 2000 elients in conditions of repeated staff shortage has been a major bottleneek
in mobilising an effeetive repayments system.
4.32 Although the need for projeet monitoring was envisaged at the ineeption of the programme,
staffng and the neeessary equipment were not orovided at the start. The Advisory Board proposed
that DEED offees should undertake the monitoring and vehicles have been bought for this purpose.
But the laek of operational funds has so far kept the new service grounded.
4.33 An appropriate legal status for the SDF to enable it to enforee repayments has long been
under review without a definite outcome. No formal steos have vet been taken towards
ineorooration. The standard loan agreements that all SDF borrowers sign inelude a spaee for
eollateral, but in many eases the details provided would be too brief to follow up for enforcement.
Summary Page ix,
4.34 In mid 1995 the SDF sought permission to engage attorneys to reeover the repayments.
But only 17 files had been handed over by September 1995 to the lawyers for action. Thisexereise
is bound to be eostly and contrasts with the growing use of debt eolleetion agen eies by parastatals
sueh as SEDCO. It will in any case not bear fruit unless a proDer monitoring svstem is implemented.
Risk Management Procedures
4.35 The SDF operation was designed to disburse the entire amount as quicklyas possible and
avoid any eontinuing relationship with the clients exeept to enforee repayment. The larae loan size
and laek of further finaneial indueements inereased the risk of default.
4.36 The CU's loan appraisal funetions were limited to eheeking that the proieet applieation was
consistent with the basic policy guidelines despite bearing all the risk. For a percentage of the
approved loan amount projeet appraisals were delegated to the eonsultants, who thus took no risk
on projeet viability. Yet the same consultants played a major role in generating projeet proposals,
eommonly both training and assisting the clients with their proposals and finally motivating them at
meetings of LOGAC. Two ootential confliets of interest arose. First, the more projeets they got
approved, the more the consultants earned in fees, sinee their formal responsibilties ended with the
approval. Likewise, the higher the loan amount, the higher their fee.
4.37 In praetiee, as the CU projeet offcers gained experienee they were able to apply a eertian
deçiree of regulation by applying eonsisteney eheeks and validating data. Yet projeet offcers had
limited eaoaeity to perform validations, being restrieted mainly to telephone eheeks with central,
provineial and distriet government offees. Client interviews and site eheeking were generallynot
feasible, especially outside Harare, although the assistanee of DEED offees eould on oeeasion be
invoked.
4.38 Onee submitted, LOGAC approved almost all the applications it considered; although a
minority were deferred for further information or c1arifieation, they were most ly approved in the end.
The SDF eredit programme is thus demand driven. The implieit assumption is that there is money
for retrenehees and all those who apply should get it. This outcome has given the eredit programme
a streng welfare charaeter: retrenehees are entitled to loans and reeeive them so long as they can
present a plausible projeet.
4.39 The pace of projeet approvals was regulated by institutional capacity, whieh improved over
time, but from mid-1995 availabilitv of funds became the deeisive faetor. In effect, LOGAC would
eontinue proeessing until funds ran out, then suspended sittngs.
Incentives for Service Delivery
4.40 CU staff at head offiee and DSW frontline offeers have eommonly shouldered heavy
additional workloads. often in conditions of staff shortage and seareity of resourees. Their
aehievements under diffeult eireumstances are' eommendable. However, there is no ineentive
system direetly related to SDF loan results, of partieular importanee for case offeers. Indeed, good
performanee has generally been aeeompanied by depreeiating real ineome. Nor is there a eareer
path specifieally eonneeted to the loan seheme. The laek of an ineentive and eareer strueture affeets
not only staff produetivity but also the setting of task priorities. The loeation of the CU inside a large
welfare ministry has also largely hindered the buildinçi of a eoroorate eulture amongst staff.
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4.41 The CU has faeed resouree eonstraints arising from the faet that its staff salaries and
operational eosts are merged in the oarent ministrv's budaet and do not have a separate bUdget
line. The administrative expenses of the CU are part of the ministry aeeounfs, subjeeting it to co st
eonstraints outside its eontrol, arising at short notiee and with unpredietable timing.
4.42 A erueial missing link between the quality of projeet preparation and later loa n performanee
was the seoaration of the consultants from anv resoonsibility for outcomes. Indeed a disineentive
operated sinee the consultants were not paid for any aftereare support they voluntarily afforded to
projeets they had earlier assisted.
Cost-effectiveness
4.43 The failure to synchronise the pace of training with loa n proeessing therefore resulted in
mueh higher unit training eosts than neeessary. The training of retrenchees was treated as demand-
led, a service to which retrenehees were entitled as soon as possible after registration. As sueh, it
had the benign effeet that for the large numbers on the loan application waiting list, the skiIIs gained
eould in the meantime be out to other ineome-generating uses. However, as a charge on the credit
seheme it made little sense to allow the numbers trained to run so far ahead of loa n approvais. From
this standpoint the suspension of training in August 1995 was a sensible eost-eutting measure sinee
at the prevailing rate of loa n proeessing the backlog of trained applieants would suffee for several
years to come.
4.44 In general, the contracting out system, whieh was part of the original ADB design, seems
to have worked fairly well on co st as well as aualitv eriteria. A per capita training eost of Z$250-300
was low for the professional serviees it purehased. However, the lengthening delays have imoosed
an unfair charge on the eonsultants,who had already eompleted their elient assistanee and
appraisal work prior to submission. By mid-1995 they eould expeet to have to wait for years before
payment.
4.45 The mueh higher co st of projeet preparation and appraisal was a neeessary charge for
professional faeilitation whieh supplied a vital service to elients having Iittle if any business
experienee and venturing into the high-risk domain of new business startups. It sueeeeded in
inieeting eommereial skills into a oublie sector seheme at aeeeptable and manageable eost.
4.46 The overhead of roughly 10 per cent attributable to the loan seheme, although not covering
hidden administrative eosts, left around 90 per cent of grant resourees, not eounting interest and
repayments, for disbursement. Thus a high orooortion of SDFgrant funds has gone direet to elients.
Organisational Structure and Functions
4.47 The SDF has funetioned as a simple disbursement vehiele for grant funds donated by the
Government and the ADB. The SDF eredit seheme has had the virtue of simolieity: elients,
administrators and poliey-makers alike have had no diffeulty in understanding its targeting and
lending strategy.
4.48 The seheme's limitations of seooe have nevertheless been a source of diffieulty for its
elients, in partieular the laek of aeeess to workin9 eapital, the ban on eo-finaneing, the exelusion
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under most eireumstanees of top-up or follow-on lending, and the eomplete absenee of any
extension services. The open aceess to the introduetory training eourse indueed an expeetation of
open aecess to loans as well, whieh the high rate of approva\s eneouraged. The laek of supervision
and monitoring eontributed to an expeetation that loa n reeovery was not seriously intended and thus
to a very low rate of repayment.
4.49 The CU has operated from the outset under the wing öf its parent ministiy and laeks
effeetive autonomy of any kind. It also has no legal standing to aet on its own behalf in enforeing
contraets and reeovering loans.
4.50 Staff shortages have hampered the CU from the outset. However, the restrietions of public
service proeedures and the eounter-pressures during a period of public sector redundaneies under
ESAP made a timely response diffeult to aehieve in praetiee. The integration of the CU into the
ministerial struetures thus imposed an inflexibilty whieh seriously jeopai"dised the prineipal SDA
programmes from their ineeption.
4.51 The laek of monitoring ca pa city is a eritieal faetor in the failure to establish the eredit seheme
as a revolvina fund. It has not put in place a proper monitoring system of finaneed projeets, neither
has it developed an extension programme. Only training and projeet appraisal were sub-eontraeted
and the outreaeh and extension functions were never put in plaee. The staff of the provineial offees
of DEED have neither the time nor the expertise for effeetive projeet monitoring and do not have
extension or outreaeh serviees. The Aeeounts and Administration Section also remains greatly
u nderstaffed , whieh has seriously impeded aeeounting and reeord keeping.
4.52 There was from the outset a large majority of ministry offeials in the Advisory Board, a verv
Iimited NGO oarticioation and in partieular an almost eomolete absenee of the orivate sector.
Membership was overwhelmingly from central offees and Harare-based. Participation from other
regions was more or less eoineidental. Membership of LOGAC was eonfined to ministry offeials.
There was no external input of professional finaneial or business expertise into its proeeedings
exeept in an ad hoc manner through the partieipation of consultants motivating their projeets. The
laek of business experienee and finaneial expertise amongst their memberships was bound to have
a serious impaet on the setting of priorities, the decision'-making and the operations of the Advisory
Board and LOGAC.
4.53 There are no direetlinkages and no proeedural relationships with NGOs or private sector
organisations. But relationships with donor agencies, especially sueh international institutions as the
UNDP, ILO and UNICEF, have been reasonably strong. It would appearnevertheless that the ADB
inout has been less aetive than originallv indieated in the Appraisal Report.
Programme Performance and Sustainabílty
4.54 The ETP's outreaeh has been substantial: the approval of around 2,000 loans within 30
months is a substantial aehievement for an entirely new lending programme. With the first ESAP
now eompleted, ¡ts future deoends on the Governments future intentions in the field of eeonomie
reform, as there 'appears to be no eurrent int.ention to expand eligibility to other groups of direet
beneficiaries. If further downsizing of public sector organisations is to be pursued, a new wave of
redundancies may follow, albeit on a smaller seale than during 1991-94. If not, a sizeable pool of
earlier retrenehees remains with a preferential eall on any new loa n finanee made available.
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4.55 The CU's present plans do not appear to envisage transferring any of its existing loa n
portolio to other institutions. The existing eredit seheme and its target grouo would thus remain a
distinet oDeration whatever other loan faeilities are initiated under SDF auspiees.
4.56 The recovery rate on the SDF ¡oans is low. Over the 15 month period to September 1995,
total repayments due, including pre-July 1994 projeets, were Z$31.8 millon, giving an aetual
reeovery rate of around 5.0 per cent. Total repayments during this period should have been
equivalent to about 36 per cent of the amount of loan approvais; instead they coveredless than 2
per cent. Nevertheless, one recent estimate was that at least half of the microenterprises were
operational and eould service their loans if an effeient reeovery system was instituted.
4.57 The hypothetieal projeetions of future repayments of principal and interest suggest that §
strong repayment rate eould generate a sizeable inflow of funds for reiending despite the subsidised
interest rate. On redueed expeetationsi1J, the projeeted return from repayments of prineipal and
interest could reaeh Z$25-28 millon annually through 1997-1999 and total Z$125 millon by the end
of 2001, or around Z$35 million at constant (late 1992) priees. On this projeetion the eventual
returns would be worth a fraetion of the constant priee value of the loan portolio. They eould
nevertheless sustain a modest reiending programme of around Z$20 milion a year if well managed
on a revolving fund basis at near to eommereial terms. The SDF's very low reeovery rate is thus
threatening the survival of the programme.
5. The Integration of SDF Programmes with PMP
5.1 During 1993, mid-way through ESAP, the Zimbabwe Government drew up a Poverty
Alleviation Action Plan (PMP). The plan sought to build on the SDF programme as well as to
ineorporate it into a broader set of objeetives and seope of activities. This radical realignment of SDA
orientation was based on a eritique of the soeial eonsequenees of the first three years of struetural
adjustment. The SDF had been eoneeived primarilyas a top-down, centrally administered
programme of temporary remedial measures. PMP, on the other hand, stressed bottom-up
approaehes in projeet design and implementation, a partieipatory planning method and the
empowerment of benefieiaries.
5.2 The alloeation of programme resourees indieated that the ETP and SWP were to eontinue
in mueh their present oDerational form as the prineipal eomponents of PMP but with a timespan
well beyond the end of ESAP in 1995. The two main new programme eomponents, microcredit
faeilities for women and youth and labour-intensive public works, were designed to redress the
strong SDA urban bias by targeting poor rural eommunities..
5.3 The national povert study, one of the key preparatory projeets under PMP, got under way
during 1995 but the first results were not expeeted until April 1996 and the eompleted report not until
September 1996, two years after the launehing of the PMP programme. Delay to the finalising and
startup of a number of PMP activities has been inevitable and few of the planned initiatives had got
off the çiround before the conclusion of ESAP at the end of1995. PMP might better be regarded
therefore as the potential sueeessor to the first SDA programme rather than its replaeement during
the latter stages of ESAP.
1. 50 per cent default, no assets recovered, ave rage arrears of one year, 15 per cent inflation, ave rage 3 per cent
positive interest rate on deposits (see table 31),
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5.4 The institutional meehanism for the delivery and administration of PMP remains
ambiguous. It is unclear whether the executive authority of the programme lies with the National
PMP Management Committee or with CU or with MPSLSW generally. The dispersion of authority,
responsibility and resourees between the various committees and government ministries eould be
a reeipe for bureaucratie rivalry, inertia and confusion.
5.5 The SDF itself was to aet as the disbursement vehicle for all government and donor funds
eommitted to PMP. The extra responsibilities implied a major expansion of the CU's operational
eapaeity. The realism of the expeetations plaeed upon it must be doubted, espeeially in view of the
eonstraints under whieh the CU is likely to eontinue operating in the foreseeable future.
6. Conclusions and Reeommendations
Scope and Mandate of the SDF
6.1 The position of the SDF has been complicated by ehangina expeetations of its mandate and
role. On the one hand, it has funetioned as a tailor-made meehanism for channeIlng budgeted funds
to two speeifie SDA programmes with identified target groups and a Iimited timeframe. On the other,
it was expeeted under PMP to act as a general funding vehiele for a wide and somewhat open-
ended range of povert reduetion activities of varying duration, many foeussing on long term
struetural issues. It is expeeted to aet as both a funding ehannel and an executing agency. The
extent of its role in supporting funetions has also been ambiguous, ranging from policy and
institutional eoordination through povert monitoring and researeh 10 technieal assistanee to
implementing agen eies as envisaged by PMP.
6.2 Four aeneral issues seem to require further elarifieation. The first is how open-ended the
SDF's mandate is to be. There is a risk that the SDF may tend to be used as a eonveniently
available vehiele for any speeial programme in the field of soeial policy that fails to find a loeation
within the regular planning framework, disturbing its eoherenee of purpose. The second is the
degree of vertieal integration in the SDF's modalities of operation. The third is the autonomy to be
exereised by the SDF. The fourth is the institutional positioning of social programmes of sharply
differing charaeter.
Social Welfare
6.3 It is commonly argued that self-targeting approaehes have advantages over the individual
targeting or sereening of benefieiaries in respeet of broadening outreaeh and reducing administrative
overheads. Nonetheless, if individual user eharges are applied, some form ot sereening is
unavoidable if the poor and vulnerable aroups are to be compensated. To that extent the issue will
remain on the povert alleviation agenda whatever the immediate fate of the SWP itself.
6.4 For praetieal purposes the fuure of the SWP may already have been foreelosed. The SDF
funding erisis of mid-1995. This outcome points to a basic Doliey dilemma over the status of the
safety nets programme, whieh has been sustained as providing proteetion to the poor from the
impaet of the new permanent user eharges. Its objeetives have thus borne little direet relation to the
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usual SDA goals, but rather, fit squarely into the framework of lon g term struetural povert
alleviation, in the form of eonventional means-tested soeial seeurity benefits. The mixed outcomes
of the health and education safety nets are partly attributable to this underlying strategie confusion.
6.5 . To the extent that the SWP is continued or similar targeted safety nets introdueed in the
future, it is reeommended that for soeial benefits of a long term charaeter, sueh as education and
health assistanee, budgetary alloeations be made direet to the DSW or other imolementing ageneies
and not through the SDF. For SDA or short termsoeial benefits, sueh as the food money, budqetary
alloeations should be made oreferentially throuçih line budgets wherever feasible and otherwise
through a speeial aeeount opened under SDF auspices for that purpose. Both long and short term
targeted benefits should be delivered through existinq line struetures, reorganised and temporarily
strengthened as neeessary, and not through parallei struetures sueh as the CU. If a separate fund
is deemed appropriate to ehannel targeted safety nets resourees, the fund should be established
in its own right exelusively for that purpose and not eonjoined to funding for other purposes.
6.6 A number of reeommendations for reform of the existinçisafety nets seheme f10w from this
and previous studies. They include taking aeeount of household size in determining eligibility; a
single ineome threshold for all means-tested benefits; an annual review of the income eligibility
threshold; eombining repeating transactions to cover longer periods; using a common applieation
form; standard ising the set of required supporting doeuments; proeessing an applieant for all
relevant benefis and exemptions at the same sitting; using mobile offces to deliver serviees and
payments in the remoter rural areas; evaluating self-targeting meehanisms alongside sereening
wherever feasible.
Repositioning the SDF's Microenterprise Programme
6.7 The SDF's eredit operations are presently at a erossroads from whieh their fuure evolution
eould take a number of direetions. There appear to be three basic ootions for the eontinuation of the
SDF eredit seheme: ciosing its lending operations and concentrating on recoveries (Option A);
eontinuing the programme with the same objeetives but geared to a long term poverty reduetion
perspeetive as outlined in PMP (Option B); and redesigning the programme to deliver different
forms of eredit or to serve other target groups (Option C).
6.8 There is a danger that an unehançied eontinuation of the oresent seheme will çienerate a
result similar to Ootion A more or less by default. If Option B is needed under a further round of
struetural adjustment, the eredit seheme eould serve as a niehe eomponent of a support package,
eomplementing miero and SSE eredit programmes aimed at other target groups, in order to open
an enterprise alternative to other employment creating options for retrenehees. However, a chief
weakness of the SDF eredit seheme during ESAP was that it constituted the only assistanee on
offer. A balaneed aooroaeh to emoloyment ereation for retrenehees is therefore more aporooriate.
6.9 Any further reeapitalisation of the seheme without a major upgrading would be very likely
to do no more than postpone an outcome similar to Option A. The essential preeondition for
improving the quality of projeet proposals and of subsequent enterprise performanee is that
aoolicants and proieets be assessed by normal business standards and no longer on çirounds of
entitlement. It is a preeondition of Option Ameeting its target of Options B and C even getting off
the ground that loan supervision and extension serviees be expanded and thoroughly overhauled.
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6.10 Option C opens the question of revising the seheme's targeting or finaneial serviees or both.
There are a number of possible alternatives but in praetiee many are eonstrained bot 
h by risk of
duplieation and by the partieular eharaeter of the present seheme. In the finaneial, eommereial and
NGO seetors there are already a number of established institutions and programmes with whieh the
SDF would come into direet eompetition if it broadened its SSE outreach. If new groups are
targeted, sueh as rural women or CBOs, it would be preferable to desian a new mierofinanee faeilitv
from serateh than try to adapt an existing institution il suited to the task.
6.11 All three options would require major ehanges in the way the seheme is presently run. Three
prineioal institutional arrangements can be considered: reorganisation and strengthening of the CU;
contracting out partieular funetions, sueh as reeoveries or extension serviees; and transferring the
entire seheme to one or more eommereial or parastatal organisations.
6.12 The second type of institutional arrangement, contracting out partieular funetions or
serviees, is already a tried and tested solution under the SDF eredit programme. The tasks are,
however, altogether more demanding than running a packaged short eourse or condueting largely
offce-based projeet preparation and appraisal. They require a national infrastrueture. a dedicated
and experieneed field staff and strong information and finaneial management systems. The
argument for contracting out eould be extended to the eore funetion of oroeessing loan aoolieations.
6.13 The third type of institutional arrangement is likely therefore to prove the most sustainable
in the long run: transferring the existing eredit seheme in its entirety to one or more established
finaneial institutions having a SSE eredit traek reeord and the neeessary eapaeity to administer it
effeetively. The SDF eredit seheme's very poor repayment reeord and its origins in a welfare
entitlement programme are likely to deter professional finaneial institutions from taking it on. The
prineipal inducement is the potential ineome flow from even limited reeoveries on what is nominally
a sizeable loa n portolio.
6.14 An urgent task, one whieh has to be completed in partieular before any serious negotiations
can be eonducted on a possible transfer of the loa n portfolio, is a systematie census of all SDF
proieets to establish their existenee, their status, their needs and their eurrent prospeets. Onee the
transfer is eompleted the SDF projeets would be integrated into the normal oDerations of the
administerinQ institutions, as originally proposed by both the SDA and ADB doeuments.
6.15 An issue of concern is theapplieations backlog. One way to deal with the problem would
be to eonduet a rapid evaluation of the oroposals so as to seleet a small number with the best
prosoeets of sueeess, then to interview the proposers to establish their present status. Priority for
new loans would the n go to those retrenchees still genuinely unemployed.
New Microfinance Initiatives
6.16 If the SDF is to be established on a long term basis and to play a role in povert reduetion
programmes, it is Iikely that the Government will wish to use it as a ehannel for new initiatives in the
field of small and mieroenterprise finanee. Three strategie issues have emerged in considering the
fuure role of the SDF in mierofinance initiatives. The first is programme overlap. In general, the
finaneial NGO view is that demand is far greater than the resourees they can supply. In addition,
even the larger national NGOs have far from even nationwide coverage. Spaee thus exists for state-
supported initiatives in this field. It is essential, however, that they be carefully planned and
eoordinated with the established organisations already on the ground.
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6.17 The second strategie issue is the ehoiee between financial wholesaling and retailing. It is
reeommended that as a matter of policy the SDF adoots an exclusivelv wholesale finaneial strategy
and exeludes a retail function from any fuure credit sehemes it initiates or supports.
6.18 The third strategie issue is terms of eredit. Whatever the general case for and against
eoneessionary retailcredit terms for small enterprise lending, providing subsidised interest rates to
the same elient base can prove highly disruptive, whether through established institutions or a new
faeility, leading both to unequal eompetition between different schemes and to redueed elient
eonfidenee. In general, the SDF is likely to aehieve more substantiallong term results in terms of
eeonomie empowerment by investing in oroven traek reeords. leaving the NGOs to set their own
lending ooliey. Subsidised eredit may prove more effeetive at the wholesale than the retail stage,
partieularly by subsidising the high transaction eosts and other overheads of maintaíning astrong
elient monitoring and extension service in the field.
6.19 The reeommendations of the reeent UNDP eonsultaney that the SDF be reorganised as an
'Apex Financing Organisation' for NGOs engaged in povert-foeussed lending programmes are
supported. Sueh reorganisation would require a maior shift in the SDF's eredit orientation, in
partieular exclusive targeting of the poor; the establiShment of the SDF as an independent
foundation with majority representation on its board from NGOs and the voluntary sector; and the
provision of wholesale finanee to partner NGOs and a elose working relationship with them in
programme implementation.
6.20 If similar SDA interventions are needed, an alternative to ereating a separate SDA
instrument would be to integrate SDA and oovert reduetion strategies by wholesaling eredit funds
but with SDA targeting. Speeial funds would be earmarked for SDA target groups, sueh as
retrenehees. The funds would be wholesaled on negotiated terms to existing credit institutions, for
example to assist retrenehees entering informal sector activities (qualifying as poor), and to
enterprise promotion ageneies to assist retrenehees starting small businesses (qualifying as
eommereially via ble projeets). Other options would also be available to retrenehees not entering self-
employment, such as a job plaeement service, retraining and temporary public works.
Community Based Projects
6.21 Any new initiative under SDF auspiees would therefore, like PMP, take shape within a lon g 
term oovert reduetion framework. The question arises to what extent the SDF eould form part of
povert reduetion efforts. By implieation, the PMP strategy would require the CU to set up a facility
along the lines of a Soeial Action Fund, designed for quick disbursement of small grants to
community projeets.
6.22 While the PMP strategy plaees weleome emphasis on a partieipatory approaeh, the various
roles it assians to the CU and the delivery struetures it proposes to ereate are generally too eomplex
and eostly. If a SAF is established, the CU itself does not provide an appropriate instrument. It would
be preferable to establish an SAF as a smalL. autonomous agency outside the ministry environment
and aeeountable direetly to an independent SDF. The SAF's mandate should be foeussed on the
task in hand and not be diluted with other assignments. Projeet proposals should probably be
centrally approved in order to avoid loeal politieal pressures, ensure balaneed national coverage and
speed up proeessing. But in line with the emphasis on deeentralisation and community partieipation,
loeal state and NGO struetures should be involvedas elosely as possible. In general, the setting of
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priorities for SAF projeet funding is best left as far as possible to community decision within a f1exible
framework.
Analysis, Coordination and Monitoring
6.23 Compared to the SDF eonstitution, under PMP a mueh broader role in eoordination is
envisaged for the CU, whieh would be tasked with eoordinating, monitoring and evaluation of the
programme, researeh and training as well as administering a teehn'ical cooperation programme. In
the context of government-wide povert programming and of eoordinating initiatives aeross a
complex array of types and levels of government, eivie and commercial institutions, the eoordination
mandate is eomplex and demanding.
Institutional Mechanisms
6.24 Drawing together the institutional imolieations of the preeeding sections, the principal
reeommendations are firstly that the safety nets sub-programmes be transferred to the DSW. Any
future safety nets would be implemented direetly through line seetions of ministries and regular
budgets rather than a speeial fund. Second, the eredit seheme should be transferred on negotiated
terms to established SSE finaneial institutions. Third, the SDF should be eonverted into an
independent foundation geared to long term povert reduetion but also covering SDA projeet-
oriented funding. Fourth, community based projeets should be implemented through a SAF and
distriet and loeal struetures. Fifth, policy eoordination, povert monitoring and teehnieal assistanee
should be loeated in a revamped CU.
6.25 The SDF's autonomy should extend to authority to hire and fire staff. determine their terms
of service. own assets in its own name. and have legal oersonality. Finaneial transfers from the
Treasury need to be on a planned basis and exeeuted through block grants. Autonomy would also
establish the full aeeountability of the agency to government and other donors for its disbursements
and performance.
6.26 Reeonstituting the SDF as a foundation would offer a more durable lon g term institutional
framework geared to povert reduetion strategies. Its eonstitution would set ooverty reduetion as
the orineipal goal and temoorarv assistanee to the poor and vulnerable groups as a subsidiary goal
if consistent with other objectives, covering both struetural adjustment stresses and other short-term
adverse impaets sueh as drought. It would only fund projeets at the small and miero leveis. Training
would be funded only in direet support of projeets.lt would provide funds as eredit for small and
mieroenterorises and as grants for community and ineome-generating proieets, disbursed
exelusively through partner organisations.Consideration of individual projeets would be explieitly
ruled out. Its governanee would be exereised through a oartnershio of stakeholders. Its staffng
would be small, of strong professional ealibre and aeeountable direetly to the Board and its
executive eommittee.
6.27 If funding is to be provided to rural mieroenterprise development, an independent SDF
would be an approoriate funding ehannel. P~rt of the funds eould be disbursed through existing
NGOs and CBOs as proposed in the PMP programme doeument. If a new faeility is to be
established, its design and targeting should be elosely eoordinated with existing mierofinanee
institutions 50 as to harmonise efforts.
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6.28 If grant funding is to be provided to community projeets, it eould also be ehannelled through
an indeoendent SDF and disbursed through a small autonomous SAF whieh reports to a designated
ministry. A part of the funds might be disbursed direetly through implementing NGOs. The SAF
would have both a projeet proeessing and a programme eoordinating role.
6.29 The coordination of government-wide efforts on povert alleviation and reduetion is a major
and strategie responsibility. It would be aoprooriate for the CU to assume that responsibility as its
'exelusive task onee its present administrative tasks have been divested. The CU would serve as
Seeretariat to the national PMP Management Committee as proposed in the PMP strateg y
doeument and would shed its eonneetions with the SDF altogether. It would also have strengthened
eapaeity to perform the monitoring, data-gathering, researeh and information functions.
7. Follow-up ADB Interventions
7.1 If not already eompleted, every assistanee should be given to faeilitating a rapid
disbursement. In partieular, until the loan is fully disbursed the ADB should be prepared to
strengthen its suoervision in order to assist in removing bottleneeks. This study has coneluded that
the eredit seheme is not and is unlikely to beeome self-sustaining within its present institutional form.
In this context, the short term priority should be to faeilitate the soeedv allocation of the remaining
eredit funds to c1ients in line with the original programme objeetives.
7.2 At the same time a eomprehensive redesign effort will be needed in two prineipal areas:
placing the existing loa n portolio on a professional revolving fund basis; and establishingthe SDF
as an independent foundation. Technieal assistanee might be reauired to assist the transfer of the
seheme to the seleeted institutions but they and the private finaneial institutions in general have
eompetent local expertise to eall on for an exercise of this kind.
7.3 Establishing the SDF on a long term footing eould provide the basis for further assistanee
under ADF ausoiees. A conclusion of this study is that no further eredit-based interventions
additional to the present AOF loan should be made through the present SDF institutional setup,
whether the partieular administrative and proeedural systems of the CU are reformed or not. It would
be possible instead to eonclude loan agreements direetly with small enterprise finaneial institutions
for onlending to c1ients, serving either SDA or povert reduetion objeetives. But betler seeurity for
effeetive targeting, c1ient satisfaetion and eonformity to policy guidelines may be gained by
ehannellina the funds throuÇlh a well established wholesalinÇl institution in whieh all maior
stakeholders are reoresented. An independent SDF eould fulfil sueh an institutional role.
7.4 Four types of followup intervention seem possible in the present Zimbabwean context. The
first is additionallending on SDA eriteria, should the Government proeeed with a further phase of
struetural adjustment. In this case one of the strongest adverse impaets is likely to be retrenehments
in the public sector. The second is lending to SSE startuDs along similar lines to the present
seheme, as part of long term efforts to taekle unemployment and diversify the entrepreneurial base.
The third is informal sector mieroeredit geared explicitly the needs of the poor and targeted primarily
on rural women. The fourth is finanee for grants to eommunitv-based and ineome aenerating
proieets, mainly in the rural areas. Although the government would bear the eventual co st of sueh
grant finanee, the first three types of intervention, if well designed and professionally implemented,
eould be expeeted to generate satisfaetory if not fully self-sustaining rates of repayment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Baekground to the Study
1.1.1 This report, forming part of the output of a study eommissioned from Chr Michelsen
Institute, Bergen, by the Afriean Development Bank (ADB), eontains the findings and
reeommendations of an evaluation of the Social Development Fund (SDF) in Zimbabwe.
1.1.2 The ADB has identified mieroenterprise financing as a probable focus for fuure
interventions through the Afriean Development Fund (ADF) and within the wider framework of the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP)(21. However, before expanding the seale of sueh
intervention an assessment of experienee gained to date with existing SDF and SAF programmes
was considered important. Aceordingly(3l,
in September 1993 in Oslo Norway, the Povert Working Group of the Special
Programme of Assistanee for Afriea (SPA) requested the ADB to undertake the
evaluation of SDFs. By September 1994, a methodologieal framework had
already been prepared and was presented to the Povert Working Group of the
SPA. On the basis of this framework, a pilot study will be undertaken to test the
methodology.
Two eountries, Zimbabwe and Malawi, were seleeted for the pilot study.
1.1.3 The baekground to the study is the present context of Soeial Dimensions of Adjustment
(SDA) programmes in Afriea. The widespread implementation of Struetural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs) in many Afriean eountries during the 19805 brought a reeognition that their short-term impaet
on the living standards and welfare of many poor and vulnerable groups was negative. This concern
has strengthened in reeent years as SAPs have frequently been extended far beyond their originally
intended lifespan and as povert alleviation has assumed greater prominenee in the development
assistanee policy agenda.
1.1.4 Responding to these coneerns, a SDA programme was launched in 1987 as a joint
initiative of the World Bank, UNDP and the Afriean Development Bank. As SDA programme
experience developed, Social Development or Action Funds (SDFs and SAFs) emerged as prineipal
instruments for channeIling assistanee to poor and vulnerable groups, ineluding retrenehed
government employees, in eountries undergoing struetural adjustment proeesses.
1.1.5 The size and seope of partieular SDFs and SAFs has varied widely. They range from small
pilot projeets to multimodal programmes. Their target groups have been narrowly defined or
extended to the majority of the population. Their programme instruments have included any
eombination of soeial welfare subsidies, direet food provision, public works employment, soeial
infrastrueture projeets, training, institutional eapaeity-building, soft loans to NGOs and credit
provision to miero- and small-seale enterprises.
1.1.6 The lengthening of struetural adjustment proeesses and the heightened prominenee of
povert alleviation objeetives has raised the question whether SDFs and SAFs, although originally ,
2. See Annex 5: Terms of Reference, para 1.4.
3. See Annex 5: Terms of Reference, para 1.5.
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eoneeived as short-term mitigating instruments, could beeome suitable meehanisms for longe r term
assistance to povert reduetion, in partieular for direet intervention at the grassroots or community
level and for empowerment of the poor towards more effeetive partieipation in development
proeesses. Where lending to microenterprises forms part of their programme, a related issue is the
fuure disposition of the loan fund if repayments are ploughed back into a revolving fund.
1.2 SDA as a Comoonent of Struetural Adiustment in Zimbabwe
1.2.1 Zimbabwe's first Eeonomie Struetural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was inaugurated
during the second half of 1990 and was seheduled to run for a five year term ending in mid-1995.
It was antieipated that the struetural adjustment programme would result in transitional hardships
for substantial seetions of the population. The adverse effeets would arise principally through relative
priee inereases, sharp cutbacks in edueation and health services, eoupled with co st reeovery, and
higher unemployment.
1.2.2 From the outset SDA perspectives were ineorporated into the policy framework of struetural
adjustment in Zimbabwe. Delivering the first government policy statement of July 1990 the Minister
of Finanee aeknowledged that 'struetural adjustment programmes are usually aeeompanied by
soeial problems, espeeially to the vulnerable segments of the society sueh as the poor and
unemployed'. He undertook that 'Government will therefore take measures to eushion the poor
against sueh possible adjustment effects' and identified two main priorities for action, the first being
'measures to reduee unemployment sueh as ineentives for 'small investors' to expand their labour-
forces and promotion of the 'informal sector' , the second being 'targeted subsidies... to alleviate the
hardships affeeting vulnerable groups'. These twin eoneerns with employment creation and
transitional hardship alleviation beeame the main foeus of SDA initiatives through the SDF.
1.2.3 The Governments detailed strategy statement of January 1991 (4) plaeed primary emphasis
on higher eeonomic growth during the period of struetural adjustment as the main means of
improving real ineomes, reducing employment and sustaining soeial programmes within aredueing
share of government expenditure in GDP. 'Poorer groups' would gain more speeifieally from small
seale enterprise (SSE) expansion, domestie deregulation and skils development. Adverse impaets
were thus seen as partial and temporary while 'the poor as a whole will benefit substantially'.
1.2.4 Speeifie SDA measures proposed in the doeument to 'shield disadvantaged or vulnerable
groups from declines in welfare arising from restrueturing or stabilization measures' were
nonetheless limited in form and seope. Identified as probable short term victims of eeonomie reform
were the rural poor, the urban unskilled and unemployed, and women as disproportionately
represented in both these categories. Three main eategories of adverse impacts were speeified:
. 'Transitional' or 'frietional' unemployment, tentatively projeeted at 10,000 eivil service
redundaneies, 2,000 from parastatals and 20,000 from the formal private sector, making
32,000 in all or about 2.5 per cent of the total formal sector labour force. The prineipal
remedial initiative was to be support for retraining, for whieh in the case of the eivil service
35 per cent of saved salaries was to be eommitted to the retraining eosts of those
retrenehed.
4. Zimbabwe Government, Zimbabwe: a Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95), 1991.
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. Short term inflationary food priees, to be eompensated by food subsidies for 'poor and
vulnerable groups' eoming from 30 per cent of the savings derived from redueed subsidies
to the Grain Marketing Board.
. Inereased co st reeovery in the health and edueation seetors, for whieh the only speeifie
measure proposed was a seholarship fund.
1.2.5 A teehnieal annex to the strategy statement added further details of proposed
eompensatory measures, ineluding:
. Expansion and more effeetive utilisation of teehnieal and voeational training resourees with
provision in partieular for retrenehees. 35 per cent of salaries saved would be ploughed
back into retraining for eivil service retrenchees.
. Expanded eredit 'to assist retrenehed workers interested in establishing their own small-
scale businesses, as well as existing and emerging entrepreneurs'. The main ehannels
would be the eommereial banking system, assisted by a widening of the Credit Guarantee
Company's outreaeh to cover the informal sector.
. Training of staff and exemption eards to assist in proteeting the unemployed from more
rigorous efforts to eolleet health eharges.
1.3 Terms of Reference
1.3.1 The terms of reference for the study are set out in three doeuments, the texts of whieh are
atlaehed as Annex 1:
. Terms of Reference for Consultaney Serviees to Evaluate Soeial Development Funds in
Afriea (hereafter TOR);
. Suggested Methodology for the Proposed Study to Evaluate Social Development Funds,
whieh was attached to the TOR (hereafter Suggested Methodology);
. Terms of Reference for the Consultants to Review the Zimbabwe SDA Programme, whieh
was supplied as a separate supplementary TOR (hereafter Zimbabwe TOR).
1.3.2 As set out by the TOR:
The objeetive of this pilot phase is to test the methodology of evaluating the SDF
program using two seleeted case studies in two RMCs (Malawi and Zimbabwe).
The study wil attempt to identify weaknesses and strengths of the SDF programs
and propose ways for improving the performanee of the programs.
1.3.3 The study was thus to serve both as a. pilot study for a general evaluation methodology and
as evaluations of the two country programmes. The Suggested Methodology itself provides a
eomprehensive and detailed framework for assessing the experienee of SDF mieroenterprise
programmes in terms of produets, technology and organisational strueture and institutional
performanee.
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1.3.4 The TOR list five tasks for the study, the first three of which set the seope of the country
ease-studies. Applying them to the context of Zimbabwe and ineorporating the Zimbabwe TOR the
tasks are:
a) To review the SDF programme 'in its totality', the mai n aim being to identify successes for
replication,problem areas, and ways of resolving the problems.
b) To review the Povert Alleviation Action Plan, determining how best it can be integrated
with the eurrent SDF programmes.
c) To determine ways of aeeelerating the utilisation of SDF resourees and the strueture and
form of follow-up interventions by the ADB.
d) To review 'the strueture, the administrative system, the staffng, the funding, the logistie
support and the funetioning of the programme'; and 'to design a system for projeet follow-
up and monitoring, a system for loa n repayments, a computer system for data entry and
retrieval, and a computer system for the aeeounting system'.
e) 'To assist the management of the SDF in any other area in whieh it may require your
assistanee' .
1.3.5 The study wascarried out by a four-person team of CM' and national consultants and
finalised at CMI. The main period of fieldwork took plaee during September and Oetober 1995 and
eoneluded with a workshop eonvened for briefing and eonsultation of the SDF Advisory Board. A
first draft of the report was submitted in December 1995. Following reeeipt of eomments from the
ADB, a follow-up field vis it was made during late Mareh/early April 1996, during and following whieh
teehnieal assistanee was also given to the upgrading of the SDF's projeets database (see Annex
2).
1.3.6 This country report reviews the prineipal SDA programme in Zimbabwe, the Soeial
Development Fund ($DF). As wil be diseussed in seetion 3.1, the SDF's mandate ineluded a major
social welfare eomponent in addition to the eredit seheme. This programme is reviewed in terms of
para 1.3.6(a) above but in lesser detaiL. The SDF is further set in the context of the Poverty
Alleviation Action Plan (PMP) which has been in its preparatory and launeh phases over the last
two years.
1.4 Methodology. Data Sourees and Doeumentation
1.4.1 The TOR specify that in addition to colleeting finaneial information on the eredit
eomponents of the SDF programme, interview and survey teehniques were to be employed covering
both elients and managers of the programme. The Suggested Methodology plaees considerable
emphasís both on colleeting information on c1ients and on Client eonsultation. The detailed outline
of tasks requires information on:
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. Borrower's business operations, ineluding eashflow requirements (para 1 a);
. Borrowers' evaluation of the programme's loan (1b) and deposit-taking (1d) serviees, the
effeetiveness of peer group pressure in sustaining group lending (1d) and the types of
business benefis gained (3.2.B.d);
. Alternativeinformalloan ( 1 b) and non-finaneial ( 1 h) serviees;
. The effeetiveness of programme targeting, as well as other soeio-eeonomie indicators
relating to programme performanee.
1.4.2 Two pilot field surveys were undertaken with partial overlap of questionnaire categories,
the first concentrating on client pereeptions of the SDF eredit programme, and the second on
financial and operational aspeets of elients businesses. The prineipal aim of the surveys was to test
the field conditions for undertaking elient surveys of this type rather than to generate a full and
representative set of survey data. The survey questionnaires and details of the methodology
employed appear in Annex 6.
1.4.3 Complementing the field surveys, systematic information held on individual loans and
projeets was obtained and analysed. The prineipal source was the SDF projeets database, whose
contents were integrated and upgraded from meeting reeords. A teehnieal note on the proeedures
and methods followed in this exercise is ineluded as Annex 2.
1.4.4 Administrative projeet files were utilsed to supply baekground information for the field
surveys and finaneial data for the construetion of an arrears matrix. Out of the total population of
approximately 1491 projeets approved at the time, a sample of 143 or close to 10 per cent clients'
files was polled. Seleetion was random within a predetermined number set for eaeh of the eeonomie
seetors ¡nto whieh all projeets were elassified.
1.4.5 The survey and administrative data were eomplemented by interviewing and consultation
with offeials of ministries, parastatals and NGOs (for a full list of persons eonsulted see Annex 7).
As broad a range of doeumentation as possible was colleeted in the form of administrative reeords
and forms,eonsultaney reports, annual reports, government publieations, and independent surveys '
and studies (the literature is listed under 'Referenees' at the end of the study).
1.5 Outline of the Study
1.5.1 The organisation of the report follows as closely as feasible the outline of the Suggested
Methodology in its central seetion on the SDF eredit programme. Other seetions review the parallei
welfare eomponents of the SDF, assess the policy and eeonomie environment within whieh its,
performanee must be assessed, and draw conclusions and reeommendations on its fuure outcome.
1.5.2 The report is organised into the following seetions:
. Chapter 2 reviews the initial SDF programme design and the mandate of the SDF (para
1.3.4(a) above).
. Chapter 3 evaluates the performanee of. the soeial welfare and other non-lending
eomponents of the SDF programme (para 1.3.4(a) above).
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. Chapter 4 evaluates the performance of the small enterprise lending and training
eomponents of the SDF, covering programme produets, technology, and organisational
strueture and institutional performanee (paras 1.3.4(a) & (d) above).
. Chapter 5 reviews the design of PMP, its relationship with the SDF during the programme
period andJuture options for its integration with the SDF (para 1.3.4(b) above).
. Chapter 6 assesses the available options for the fuure development of the SDF's welfare
and eredit programmes (para 1.3.4(e) above).
. Chapter 7 makes reeommendations on possible forms of follow-up interventions by the
ADB (para 1.3.4(c) above).
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2. THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND
2.1 Initial Programme Design
2.1.1 The ADB's Appraisal Report eonstituted the basis of approval in December 1991 of an
Afriean Development Fund (AOF) loan to the Government of ZimbabweIS). The Report set out 'four
key areas of SDA foeus' whieh the SDF was to finanee (paras 4.2.1-5):
. Mieroenterprises and povert alleviation programmes;
. Povert assessment and monitoring;
. Training and institutional strengthening; and
. Action-oriented policy researeh.
2.1.2 The first area of foeus was to cover a broad range of activities whieh can be divided into
two categories:
. Soeial eompensation for hardships attributable to ESAP (free education and health
serviees for those earning under Z$400 a month; food subsidies; and retrenehment
paekages); and
. Mieroenterprises to assist 'the poor and the vulnerable groups' into employment and
ineome generating activities.
2.1.3 Povert assessment and monitoring was to start alongside the mieroenterprise programme
and later extend to general SDA household surveys.
2.1.4 Training and skiIIs development was to be eoncentrated on 'the poor and vulnerable
groups'. Institutional strengthening was to eoneentrate on NGOs partieipating in SDA activities.
2.1.5 Policy researeh would be eommissioned mainly from national researehers to assess the
soeial and eeonomie impaets of ESAP and to 'enhanee national eapaeity to betler design
development strategies that eombine eeonomie growth with poverty reduetion'.
2.1.6 The Report envisaged that the SDF would be established to
. Funetion as the Governments SDA funding vehicle (para 4.3.2);
. Disburse both soeial and eredit finanee (paras 4.2.2 & 4.4.2);
. Channel funding from the Government, the AOF and other donors (para 4.3.2).
5. African Development Bank, Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of Zimbabwe, Structural Adjustment Prograinme,
(Abidjan, Oelober 1991), prineipally Chapter 4 and Annex 5.
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2.1.7 The SDF was to have a poliey-making body in the form of an SDA Advisory Board whieh
would report to the overallinter-Ministerial Committee for Monitoring and Implementation of ESAP
(MIG) and whieh would draw broad representation from NGOs and the private sector as well ås the
public sector (para 4.3.1).
2.1.8 Implementation would be assigned to the Mjnistry of Public Service, Labour and Soeial
Welfare (MPSLSW)whieh would establish:
. A six-person interdepartmental Loans and Grants Alloeation Committee (LOGAC) at senior
offeiallevel;
. A Coordination Unit (CU) to administer the SDF, headed by a Coordinator reporting direetly
to the Permanent Seeretary.
2.1.9 LOGAC's responsibilities were to extend well beyond approving projeets to identifying
target groups, ensuring the SDA eharacter of submitted projeets (small, simple, self-designed),
looking to replieation potentials, establishing an effeetive projeet eyele, reeommending sueeessful
projeets and pilot schemes for integration into log-term programmes, and approving funding for
programmes as well as projeets (para 4.3.4)(6J.
2.1.10 As well as administration, the CU was to undertake three mai n funetions: projeet
proeessing, projeet monitoring and evaluatiori, and outreaeh and extension. Projeet appraisal would
be eontraeted out (para 4.3.5).
2.1.11 A preeise projeet proeessing proeedure was speeified (paras 4.4.1-4):
. Projeets eould be submitted either by individuals or through intermediaries sueh as
parastatals and NGOs. Projeets eould have either a social eharacter suited to grant funding
or an enterprise eharaeter suited to microcredit.
. The CU would eheek submitted projeets for eonsisteney with SDF objeetives and verify the
existenee of the pro poser, referring those presented direet by individuals to an appropriate
body for teehnieal eheeking, then submit them to LOGAC with brief summaries. LOGAC
would meet onee a month to decide projeet approvals.
. Once approved, a projeet loan would be assigned to an administering' institution on
standard terms agreed with the Ministry of Finanee, whieh would issue the requisite
eheque to the institution. A projeet grant would be issued to the implementing agency
serving the benefieiary eommunity(7.
. Performanee benehmarks were laid down: a projeet proposer should expeet notifieation
of a LOGAC deeision within 45 days and eontraet signature within two weeks of approval.
2.1.12 Startup financing of the eredit faeility was to come in the form of an ADF loan in the amount
of FUA5 milion, then equivalent to BUA 4.61 milion (US$6.3 milion) and a Zimbabwe Government
eommitment of Z$20 million (US$3.9 milion) with further deposits of at least the same amount
6. At another point (para 5.3.3) LOGAG is said to report directly to MIG and have policy-making responsibility.
7. Implied but not explicitly stated in the Report.
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annually over the five years of ESAP, thus a minimum of Z$100 millon (US$19.7 million). The AOF
loan would be disbursed in FUA 1 milion tranches on a replenishment basis requiring evidenee that
the previous tranehe had been 'fully and satisfaetorily utilised'. The total eredit funding available over
five years would therefore total some US$26 milion (Z$132 million) atthe early 1992 exehange rate
(paras 4.5.1, 5.2.3, 5.3.8)181.
2.1.13 The specifie purpose of the AOF loan was to alleviate transitional struetural adjustment
impaets on 'the poor and the vulnerable groups' through support to retraining and eredit to small
seale enterprises. Its uses were more narrowly defined as fínaneing 'items sueh as small
maehineries, tools, spare parts and raw materials for mieroenterprises', in other words capital eosts
excluding working eapital and training (paras 5.1.2 & 5.3.5).
2.1.14 Responsibility for supervision was assigned to the ADB Resident Mission in Harare,
reinforeed by missions from headquarters and a mid-term review to be jointly eonducted with the
World Bank (para 5.3.13).
2.1.15 The SDF programme was a timely intervention by the ADB within the SDA policy
framework and an appropriate aetivation by the Zimbabwe Government of its eommitment to take
aeeount of the adverse impaets of struetural adjustment and to integrate SDA perspeetives into its
reform programme. The outlined programme established a clear commitment to assist the poor and
the vulnerable groups and set down simplified proeedures suitable for quick disbursement of small
Joans and grants to self-designed projeets from the target groups.
2.1.16 Nevertheless several potential diffeulties of implementation were built into the original
design of the SDF programme:
. The SDF was designated sole ehannel for SDA funding, opening it as a vehiele for
programmes of widely differing objeetives and thereby eomplieating its management
eoherenee.
. Both welfare and eredit programmes were combined under one umbrella in the SDF. By
implieation, the Advisory Board and CU would be responsible for programmes with
ineompatible objeetives and differing conditions of implementation. The outcomes are
explored in ehapters 3 and 4.
. While the purposes of the ADF loan were explieitly stated, the SDF itself was to finanee
a mueh wider range of activities, leaving it unelear how the Governments eommitment of
Z$20 million a year was to be utilised.
. Targeting was left vaguely defined. There was no mention of retrenehees.
. Responsibility for projeet appraisal was not elearly indieated. It would in effect be split
between the CU and other teehnieal agen eies or eonsultants.
. The eombination of loa n and grant proeessing funetions under the same staff and
proeedLire was likely to confuse elarity of foeus on ereditworthiness assessments.
8, FUA and BUA conversions as at October 1991; for US$ to Z$ the rate prevailng in January 1992, when the loa n
agreement was signed, is preferred in view of the sharp depreciation of the Zimbabwean currency in late 1991.
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. Although described as 'eoordination', the administrative functions of the CU were in faet
to be extensive.
. The status and legal powers of the SDF were not indicated, in particular over loan assets.
Similarly the authority of its management was uneertain.
2.2 Establishment and Mandate of the SDF
2.2.1 Also in late 1991, the Zimbabwe Government published its SDA programme framework
eontaining most of the above eomponents of the SDF programmef9J. The SDA doeument similarly
plaeed safety nets eompensation, training and mieroeredit under the single umbrella of the SDF,
organising them into a Soeial Welfare Programme (SWP) and an Employment and Training
Programme (ETP).
2.2.2 The SDA doeument also differed from the ADB Report in a number of respeets, several
of them signifieant:
. Monitoring and evaluation was assigned to the Monitoring and Implementation Unit (MIU)
in the Ministry of Finanee. So too was the chairing of LOGAC, thereby dividing
implementation responsibility with the CU in MPSLSW. Not until Mareh 1995 was the
formal responsibility reassigned to MPSLSW.
. The ETP's 'action strategy' was broadly defined and ineluded urban and rural public works
and land resettlement as well as guidanee and eounselling.
. In several areas the definition of target groups and timescale went well beyond the SDA
framework.
. The limitation of SDF loan disbursement to intermediary institutions was missing, leaving
the way opel) to pay out to individuals direetly.
. Povert assessment and monitoring was notexplieitly included either as an SDF objeetive
or as a funding eategory. Nor was there an indieation as to how the monitoring output was
to feed ¡nto the policy review or programme management proeesses.
. SDA and poverty related researeh was not mentioned at all.
2.2.3 The 1991 SDA programme remained the overall guiding framework throughout the five-
year ESAP period for both SDA programmes generally and for the SDF, although it was partly
superseded during 1994-95 by the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (PMP). The eonstitution of the
SDF, promulgated in 1992 under Seetion 30 of the Audit and Exehequer Act, retained the
programme's broad definition of objeetives but with more restrietive targeting closer to those in the
ADB Report, whieh with one exeeption was left unehanged in the 1995 revision:
9. Zimbabwe Government, Social Dimensions of Adjustment: a Programme to Mitigate the Social Costs of
Adjustment, 1991.
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. The soeial safety nets objeetives covered grants for medieal eare, school fees and food,
but defined benefieiaries as those 'having been direetly affeeted by' ESAP and in the case
of the food subsidy, by its 'short-term effeets'.
. Under employment and training, loan funds were geared to ereating employment for the
same target group, thus in theory not only retrenehees, and eligibility was extended to
'approved small sealeenterprises, eooperatives and public works projeets', whieh again
in theory need not themselves suffer the short-term effeets so long as they provided
employment for those who did. Training grants were, however, restrieted to retrenehees.
. Also eovered were 'assoeiations undertaking ineome generating projeets', which eould
reeeive not only teehnieal and managerial support but also 'financial... assistance'. The
1995 revision of the eonstitution tightened the targeting to 'those adversely affected by the
short term effeets of ESAP' and stipulated that projeets should be exeeuted through
Community Based Organisations (CBOs).
2.3 SDF Resourees and the AOF Loan
2.3.1 To finanee the SDF, the Zimbabwe Government alloeated Z$20 milion in the fiscal year
1992/93. The alloeation inereased eonsiderably in FY 1993/94 when it reaehed Z$150 millon, but
deelined to Z$100 milion in FY 1994/95 and to Z$50 milion in FY 1995/96. These figures represent
domestie funding to whieh the ADB loan and other donor funding is additional.
2.3.2 These reduetions were not signalled in the presentation of PMP in late 1994, whieh did
antieipate the reduetion in the SDF budget to Z$1 00 milion in the next fiseal year but projected a
rise to Z$210 millon in both 1995/96 and 1996/97. The sharply lower resoureing of the SDF can be
only partly associated with dependenee on donor eommitments to PMP because the projeeted
domestie eontributions for 1995/96 and 1996/97 were mueh higher than the amount aetually
budgeted for FY 1995/96.
2.3.3 The delayed gearing up of PMP stalled the new PMP initiatives and left the established
SDF programmes largely dependent on the mueh redueed domestie budget subventions, the ADF
loan and small-seale additional support from several donors. The support ineluded, the hiring of
temporary staff in late 1994 to speed up the proeessing of safety net c1aims and the provision of
vehieles to the provineial offees of the Departmentof Employment and Employment Development
(DEED) toenable its offeers to undertake monitoring of borrowers on behalf of the SDF.
2.3.4 Within the framework of the SDF as originally eoneeived the soeial welfare requirements
were to be funded wholly out of domestie resourees. The launehing of PMP brought a major
revision: more than half the funding for revamped and expanded safety nets programme were to be
requested from donors. However, the SWP remained an entirely domestieally funded programme
during the lifetime of ESAP.
2.3.5 For the mieroenterprise component of the ETP, a mix of public and external funding was
envisaged. The first and still sole finaneial partner was the ADB, whieh approved the AOF loan of
FUA5 million on 16 December 1991. Other commitments have not been fortheoming apart from
limited teehnieal and institutional assistanee.
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2.3.6 The terms of the loan agreement, signed on 20 January 1992, required a prior eommitment
on the part of Zimbabwe Government that the loan 'shall be alloeated exelusively to miero-
enterprises'. Several other prior conditions were laid down, ineluding:
. Establishment of the SDF itself and the opening of la speeial SDF foreign exehange
aeeount into whieh the proeeeds of the Fund loan shall be disbursed;
. Payment of the initial Zimbabwean eontribution of Z$20 millon into the SDF aeeount, an
amount whieh was expeeted to be matehed or exeeeded in eaeh subsequent year of
ESAP.
. Adoption ofpolieies and proeedures for the SDF's implementation and the appointment of
its eoordinator and key staff.
2.3.7 Once the initial tranehe of FUA 1 million had been made, the loan was to be drawn down
on a replenishment basis, upon submission of a progress report on the utilisation of previously
deposited amounts and giving evidenee that lsatisfaetory progress has been made on the
implementation of the SDA programme'. The ciosing date was set for the end of 1996.
2.3.8 As at the end of September 1995, the latest period for which eomparable data is available,
eumulative elient expenditure on the SWP amounted to Z$161.5 millon and on the ETP to Z$133.5
million (45 per cent), making a total of Z$295 million disbursed to clients through the SDF
approximately within the timeframe of ESAP. This compares with Z$270 milion budgeted for the
SDF to June 1995, redueed, however, by apparent realloeations of Z$62 millon from the SDF
aeeount. To be added are approximately another Z$16.5 million from the first two ADF tranches (if
treated as additional funds), interest on cash balanees and investments and small amounts of loan
repayments. Not ineluded in these totals is expenditure on SDF serviees sueh as the ETP's small
business training eourse and on administrative and equipment overheads under departmental
aeeounts.
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3. REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE NON-ENTERPRISE COMPONENTS OF THE SDF
3.1 The Soeial Welfare Proaramme
3.1.1 Proaramme Products
Findings
3.1.1.1 The Soeial Welfare Programme was designed as a set of short term soeial safety nets to
eater for the needs of the poor and other vulnerable groups direetly and adversely affeeted by the
impaet of ESAP. It exempted qualifying individuals or households from paying edueation fees and
health eharges and provided a small food subsidy.
3.1.1.2 Food money was provided to households with an ineome of Z$200 per month or less at
the rate of Z$4 per person per month. Implementation of the seheme started in September 1992.
3.1.1.3 School fees, already in plaee for seeondary sehools nationwide, were extended to urban
primary sehools in January 1992. The SDF's edueation assistanee seheme eame into operation only
in Oetober 1992 'because of administrative problems' and has continued in the same form sinee
then. It exempted all households with ineomes of Z$400 or less from paying school and examination
fees and also in eertain ca ses boarding fees.
3.1.1.4 Public health service eharges had also been in plaee for many years. However, after
independenee the rural population in effeet did not pay for health care and eollection rates in towns
were low. The revised fee sehedule introdueed in 1985 was also eomplieated to administer. Fee
eollection was implemented more vigorously from December 1991. It was not unti mid 1992 that
the ineome exemption threshold was raised from Z$150 to Z$400 per month and January 1994 that
a new streamlined and mueh higher fee seale was introdueed together with the SDF health benefi
seheme.
3.1.1.5 The health safety net was more eomplex than theother two and took an extended period
to formulate and negotiate. It eomprised:
. A graduated fee seale designed to reinforce the referral system, in other words to relieve
pressure on central hospitals by eneouraging patients to go first to lower order faeilities.
. SDF payments in respeet of
sereened patients earning Z$400 a monthor less and appropriately referred to urban
hospitals with inpatient faeilties, prineipally Parirenyatwa Hospital in Harare;
20 per cent of all outpatients attending urban c1inies.
. A blanket Government subsidy to all other, mainly rural health faeilities in respeet of
patients below the ineome threshold.
3.1.1.6 Although eomplieated by ineomplete and ineonsistent data (see table ), a broad pieture of
the programme's outreaeh emerges whieh is eharaeterised by delays in launehing and slow startup
leading to aeeelerating take-up:
Main Report: Chapter 3 Page 14
. Food money: Starting in Mareh 1993, around 75,000 per capita payments were issued by
the end of the year, 140,000 in 1994 and 41,000 in the first eight months of 1995. Sinee
payments were monthly, the average number issued per mo nth was roughly 8,000 in 1993,
12,000 in 1994 and 5,000 in 1995. Allowing for a probable high turnover of elients, the
number of people involved would have been rather greater. Assuming an average urban
household size of 4(10J, the average number of householdspartieipating in any one mo nth
would have been roughly 2,000 in 1993, 3,000 in 1994 and 1,250 in 1995(11). By mid-1995,
take-up was fallng rapidly.
. School fees: From 22,000 in the final months of 1992, the number of assisted pupils rose
steadily to 132,000 in 1993, 188,000 in 1994 and 197,000 in the first nine months of 1995.
The number of households assisted would have been very approximately half as many(12J.
. Examination fees: The number of assisted pupils rose from 4,000 in 1992 and 15,000 in
1993 to 53,000 in 1994 and 77,000 in the first nine months of 1995.
. Health charges: 132,000 people were exempted in 1994 and 182,000 in the first nine
months of 1995. A breakdown for January-May 1995 revealed that Parirenyatwa Hospital
aeeounted for 32 per cent of assisted patients, while the remaining two-thirds would
eomprise mainly the 20 per cent elinie outpatient quotas elaimed by the local authorities.
3.1.1.7 Aetual SWP expenditures follow a similar pattern. Whereas a total of Z$80 million was
spent on the SWP up to the end of 1994, another Z$81 millon was committed in the next nine
months to September 1995. This represented a turnaround in the previous inability of the SWP to
utilise the funds alloeated to the SDF. The total of Z$52.3 milion spent up to July 1994 represented
less than a fifth of the total of Z$270 millon voted to the SDF up to that point. By contrast, the Z$81
millon committed over January-September well exeeeded the total SDF subvention of Z$50 millon
for the whole of FY 1995/96.
3.1.1.8 Little eompiled data is to hand on the geographieal distribution of SWP expenditure but an
early provineial breakdown of school fees for the first full year, 1993, sheds some light:
. The amount disbursed per pupil was within the 25 per cent limit above or below the
national mean of Z$123 in all provinees exeept Mashonaland Central and East (Z$225 and
Z$181) and Mashonaland West (Z$76).
. The ratio of the termly average of pupils assisted to 1992 school population varied quite
widely around the national mean of 4.4 per cent, eoming out highest in Matabeleland North
and South (5.4 and 6.9 per cent) and lowest in Mashonaland Central and West (3.2 and
2.9 per cent). It must be borne in mind that the ratios include rural primary pupils who did
not pay fees.
10. Close to the 1992 census urban mean of 4.1.
11. These figures, it must be stressed, are highly tentative since the source data are far too inconsistent to construct
areliable time-series. Other analysts have encountered similar problems (eg P. Gibbon, Structural Adjustment
in Zimbabwe, 1991-94).
12. Using as a rough indicator the national average of 2.0 members at school per household having three or more
members.
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3.1.1.9 Taking 1993 school enrolments and exeluding rural primary pupils, the national ratio of the
132,000 pupils receiving assistanee to the total school population of 1.1 million was 12 per cent.
Extrapolating the school population, the ratios for 1994 and 1995 were in the region of 16-17 per
cent(131.
3.1.1.10 No breakdown is available of the type of examination fees exempted. The total number of
pupils taking examinations in 1993 was very roughly 365,000(141, giving a ratio of 4 per cent of pupils
assisted. On the same assumptions as for school fees, the ratios for 1994 and 1995 were roughly
14 and 20 per cent.
3.1.1.11 In the case of health fee exemptions data is insuffcient even to make a rough assessment
of outreaeh. Hospital admissions totalled 0.55 million in 1994 and hospital outpatient attendances
4.86 millon, but the average number of attendanees by the 132,000 people assisted by the SDF in
1994 is not known and in any case loeal authority elaims for urban elinies are also ineluded.
3.1.1.12 Data on gen der are searee but a breakdown of edueational assistance between January
and mid-May 1995 revealed that girls made up 43 per cent of school fee exemptions and 44 per
cent of examination fee exemptions.
Re vie w of Problem Areas
3.1.1.13 Within the limitations of their design and targeting, the edueation and health safety nets
sub-programmes have on the whole performed ereditably, the food subsidy less so. After early
delays and a slow start, the SWP gathered momentum to the extent that by the final year of ESAP
the health and edueation assistanee were beeoming established as a reÇlular eomoonent of the
welfare system. Take-up rates of edueation and health assistanee were rising, the programme was
operating fairly smoothly despite the extra workload on DSW staff in partieular, and its serviees were
well known to its target groups. Take-up of the food subsidy was rapidly declining, but this outcome
was in line with ¡ts design as a temporary intervention.
3.1.1.14 The funds alloeated to the SWP were, however, far smaller than the net impaet of ESAP
in terms of sharply redueed real soeial exoenditure. Real per capita expenditure on soeial welfare
dropped by about 32 per cent over the four year period 1990/91-1994/95, on health by 39 per cent,
by 32 per een on primary edueation and by 34 per cent on seeondary edueation. Because health
and edueation sector jobs were proteeted from the ESAP public sector redundaney programme,
mueh of the eost has been absorbed in depreeiating salaries and shrinking operational budgets.
Amongst the knock-on effects have been a deteriorating quality of service as both resourees and
staff morale have deelined and a leakage out of the sectors of the best qualified person neI.
3.1.1.15 Major confusion surrounds the SDF timeframe. The original SDA strateg y of 1991 was
firmly eommitted to addressing temporary effeets and to phasing out at the conclusion of ESAP in
1995. But the mid-term PMP reformulation in 1994 envisaged SDA social spending extending up
to two years beyond ESAP and at a high level of expenditure into the final year (1997) of its three-
year sehedule, thereafter being integrated into regular line operations. The programme period was
thereby extended by up to two years and temp'orary SDA compensation translated into permanent
13. Enrolmenls from World Bank, The Public Sector and Poverly Reduction Options, table A.1.5. 1995 = January-
September, assumes standslill in last three months.
14. Calculated from World Bank, The Public Sector, Annex 1.
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soeial seeurity benefis. However, the redueing level of aetual budget provision is consistent with the
SDA rather than the PMP perspeetive. Similarly, the SDF eonstitution, ineluding ¡ts 1995 revision,
remains dedieated to alleviating 'temporary' impaets.
3.1.1.16 Similarly, confusion between soeial seeurity and develoomental goals is inherent in the
ehoiee of a 'Soeial Development Fund' to del iver soda i eompensation for adverse impacts. Unlike
the small loans seheme, safety net payments have only the most tenuous association with
development objeetives.
3.1.1.17 Contradietory SDA obieetives eompromised the design of the SWP sub-programmes:
. The food subsidy was in itself a eoherent response to a speeifie transitional problem -
temporarily higher grain priees as price eontrols were progressively removed. It is therefore
surprising that the PMP sub-programme projeetions antieipated a eontinuation of the food
subsidy well beyond the conclusion of ESAP and at a rising level of provision, converting
SDA eompensation into a permanent subsidy for impoverished households.
. The health and education subsidies, on the other hand, were designed to eompensate for
permanent ehanges in user charges for state serviees. As sueh, they were designed along
the lines of eonventional targeted soeial seeurity benefis, not temporary SDA subsidies
to be phased out. The PMP strategy envisaged their long term extension, but the SDF
budgetary alloeations appeared to treat them as redueing SDA eompensation.
3.1.1.18 The financing of the three SWP benefits was provided entirely out of the budgetary
subventions to the SDF and was subjeet to short-term budgeting eonstraints whieh led to several
financial uneertainties:
. No c1ear guidelines were laid down as to the division of the subventions between the SWP
and the ETP. When, for instanee, the SDF was found in mid-1995 to be overdrawn, it had
to be reeommended that disbursements to loans be suspended in order to meet
outstanding liabilities to the SWP.
. There was little apparent linkage between the needs of the programme and the size of the
subventions aetually alloeated to the SDF. These appear rather to have been globally
determined block grants whieh were raised or lowered arbitrarily eaeh year in steps of
Z$50 million at a time.
. Exeept for the rough estimates presented in the 1994 PMP sub-programmes, there is little
evidenee of eosting of this demand-Ied entitlement programme on the basis of target group
size and take-up rates. The amount of Z$50 milion aetually alloeated for FY 1995/96 was
well below the projeeted PMP requirement of Z$140 million and the bid of Z$200 million,
with the likely result that funds would expire early in the finaneial year.
. From SDF reeords it appears that the SDF has lost resourees through realloeation of voted
funds to the tune of Z$50 million in 1993/94 because of underspending and Z$12 million
in ,1994/95 by unannouneed reassignment by the Ministry of Finanee. Partlyas a result of
the latter transfer, the SWP had Iiabilities of Z$62 million in mid-1995 whieh would more
than absorb the severely pruned FY 1995/96 subvention of Z$50 million.
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3.1.1.19 In line with the SDA emphasis on temporary impaets and targeted interventions, the three
SWP subsidies were direeted not at the general impaets of ESAP in the soeial seetors but rather at
adverse impaets from speeific ehanges in state service provision, in partieular the removal of
subsidies and the introduetion or extension of user eharges. This strategy resulted in a mueh
narrower proaramme foeus and a del in king from broad povert impacts, but also in a elearer
identifieation of ootential benefieiaries, who were by definitionlimited to users of the serviees or
subsidies in question.
3.1.1.20 Nevertheless the SWP's targeting strategy laeked balanee and preeision in several
respeets:
. It had in the first place a distinet urban bias. The food subsidy was, for example, restrieted
to the towns and the often mueh longer distanees to the nearest DSW offce, whieh all
SWP elaimants had to visit at least onee, was also a greater obstacle for rural households.
· The ineome thresholds of eligibility did not take aeeount of household size in the case of
the health and education benefits. The food subsidy, by contrast, was paid to households
on a per capita basis.
· The differenees in the threshold ineome levels for eligibility were a source of confusion and
required separate ineome assessments for eaeh benefit.
· The single step threshold entailed a degree of inequity for households just above the line,
who were not eligible at all. A family with, for example, three schoolehildren and an ineome
just above Z$400 per month and therefore paying three fees would be signifieantly worse
off than an exempted family of similar size earning just below Z$400.
3.1.1.21 Relianee on the pre-emptive sereening of applieants, a centrepieee of the SWP's design,
raised high entry barriers:
· Sereening was consonant with the SDA priority of Dreventing leakage beyond the intended
target groups and has probably sueeeeded fairly well in that aim.
· Individual means-testing led to exclusion of all those not entering the applieation proeess.
As one report observedl15J:
By employing an exelusive targeting approaeh designed largely to exelude
ineligible applieants from gaining benefits, thesoeial welfare eomponent of
SDF raised sueh high barriers to entry that most of the eligible population did
not benefi either. SDF is not designed to seek out potential benefieiaries and
invite them to partieipate. Rather, SDF is a passive mechanism that waited
for potential benefieiaries to come forward to apply for benefits. This
approaeh in itself effeetively (though inadvertently) excludes many of the
poorest and most vulnerable members of the target population.
· The introduetion of sereening under what was eoneeived as a temporary safety nets
seheme ore-emoted adeauate preoaration for implementing what amounted to a major and
15. M. Chisvo & L.. Munro, SDA: a Review of Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Zimbabwe, 1994, p,19-20.
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permanent reform of the Zimbabwean welfare system, whieh had hitherto relied on a
mixture of fee exemptions and the provision of last-resort public assistanee to the indigent.
. The laek of preparation was eompounded by hiving off the administration of the new
benefits to an entirely new finaneial aeeount and administrative strueture, thereby delaying
their integration into the line funetions of the DSW.
3.1.1.22 Individual sereening is an intrinsieally paper-intensive approaeh to delivering social
subsidies and ineurs heavy administrative and training overheads. In situations of mass povert, it
invites perverse outcomes: either a low take-up rate saves overheads but has marginal impaet; or
sueeessful outreaeh overstretehes the delivery system.
3.1.1.23 The food benefit must be judged to have failed to aehieve its SDA objeetive:
. Take-up was minimal, never reaehing more than a few thousand urban households. This
is largely attributable to the low value of the benefit itself, amounting to Z$16 per monthfor
an average urban family size of four, and the high cost of eollection, involving sometimes
long journeys and queueing at the DSW offees every month. In May 1995, for example,
more than 7 per cent of elaimants did not turn up to eolleet their eheques.
. Sinee the Z$4 per person value was not raised, its erosion by inflation, by over 40 per cent
between January 1993 and mid-1995, rendered it inereasinaly marginal in poor
households' food budgets. This facto r combining with the rising co st of transport probably
aeeounted in large measure for the fall-off in c1ients during 1995.
. It is not c1ear that the benefit operated in praetice as a 'food subsidy' rather than a general
cash ineome supplement usable for any purpose, espeeially sinee men were more Iikely
to eolleet it than women. As a cash handout, it is likely to have been a poor poverty
alleviation instrument.
3.1.1.24 The SWP has been eritieised for not taking into aeeount other education and health eosts
faeed by benefieiaries, espeeially the unoffeial eosts associated with sehools. Such eritieism is
misplaeed if direeted to the form of the sehemes themselves since their objeetives.were to go no
further than alleviate the eosts of the newcost reeovery measures. However, if the sehemes are to
beeome a permanent part of the sodal seeurity system their design needs to extend beyond the
original narrow SDA objeetives to take aeeountof the mix of eosts faeed by eligible households.
3.1.1.25 An assessment of the numbers assisted by the SWP benefits is eomplicated by seanty and
ineonsistent statisties. No published data se ri es are available on the SWP sub-programmes and the
CU's internal data eompilations are ad hoc, ineomplete and beset by anomalies and problems of
definition.
3.1.1.26 Although realistie estimates must await the results of the national povert survey, the
figures in the PMP sub-programme presentations may underestimate the sizes of the SWP's target
groups and also suffer from unelear definition and obseure basis of ealeulation:
. School fees: maximum 300,000, either households or pupils; if households, about 20 per
cent of all households.
. Health eharges: maximum 200,000, presumably individuals.
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. Food benefit: maximum 300,000 urban households, but budgeted to reaeh only a third of
that number, or 15 per cent of the national total.
3.1.1.27 While the food subsidy failed to make a signifieant impaet, the school and examination fee
exemptions aehieved a moderate level of outreaeh by 1994 and take-up eontinued on a rising trend
through 1995. It is probable, however, that the maiority of qualifying ooor households were still
outside the seheme by the end of the period.
3.1.1.28 There is evidence of a slight but definite gender bias aaainst girls in both school and
examination fee exemptions.
3.1.1.29 Until the results of the national povert survey are available it is diffcult to estimate how
c10sely the SWP's exemption threshold levels match the real needs of poor households. The new
ineome threshold of Z$400 introdueed in 1992 was equivalent to about 18 per cent of GDP per
capita, whieh was Z$2261 in 1992. Since then, the failure to adiust the ineome thresholds for
inflation has allowed inflation ereep to erode their value, by 61 per cent over the four-year period to
December 1995 and by 71 per cent in respeet of food, whieh aceounts for a mueh larger proportion
of the expenditure of poor households. This has orogressively redueed the 0001 of eligible
households and exposed inereasing numbers to the eost reeovery measures. By 1994 the Z$400
limit was worth only 11 per cent of GDP per capita.
3.1.1.30 It is generally not easy to differentiate speeifie impaets Iinked to the eost reeovery
measures from overall trends in the social sector, from ehanges brought aboutby ESAP and also
from other faetors unrelated to ESAP, not least the devastating drought of 1992. But some evidence
of negative outcomes has been found:
. In health, two studies reported a signifieant apparent fall (17-18 per cent) in outpatient
aUendanees in 1992 following the enforeement of health eharges, although a slight
reeovery was evident towards the end of 1992.
. Asimilar deeliiie in antenatal aUendanees coineided with a rise in niaternity admissions
and unbooked deliveries, implying that 'elients cut down on what they thought were
unneeessary serviees, only to come later with more serious eonditions'(161.
. In edueation, the available statisties show few elear trends, buL. monitoring survey results
in 1993 reported that 'finaneial eonstraints' aeeounted for two-thirds of reasons advaneed
why non-attenders aged 5-20 had left sehool(17J.
16. Gibbon, Sfrucfural Adjusfmenf, citing Hongoro & Chadiwana 1994, p.13.
17. CSD, Indicafor Moniforing Survey 1993, table 2.6.
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3.1.2 Operational Mechanisms and Oraanisational Structures
Findings
3.1.2.1 Eaeh of the SWP sehemes was administered through the DSWand had its own proeedure:
. Food moriey: elaimants applied direetly at a DSW offiee and eolleeted their payments by
eheque monthly.
. Health eharges: during 1992-93 public health faeilities referred claimants to the nearest
DSW offee to obtain a letter of exemption. Under the revised system introdueed in January
1994, urban loeal authority offces submitted monthly elaims for 20 per cent of their
outpatients through distriet offees to the DSW head offce for SDF payment, while the
inpatient hospitals, prineipally Parirenyatwa, sereened patients individually and forwarded
their elaims for SDF repayment. The SDF thus repaidthe aeeounts of the institutions.
. School and examination fees: school principals assessed applieants and referred those
they considered eligible to the DSW offee for further screening. The SDF repaid state
sehools through the Ministry of Edueation and non-government sehools direetly.
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3.1.2.2 In general, by the second half of 1994 and 1995 the SWP had ironed out its teething
diffeulties and was funetioning moderately well within the boundaries of its eonstraints. In 1992 the
slow startup can in large measure be attributed to the impaet of the drought emergeney, whose
operational burden fell heavily on the DSW. Stopgap measures and overtime working sueeeeded
in overeoming a serious payments backlog in late 1993 and subsequent proeessing delays have,
on the whole, not been aUributable to administrative holdups. Health and welfare assistanee were
well established with the respeetive elient groups although the food subsidy was notably less
sueeessful.
3.1.2.3 Nonetheless a number of operational problems beset the SWP. They relate to five main
areas:
· Laek of information to faeilitate outreaeh to those who were eligible, partieularly those
outside the main urban areas.
. Insuffieient staffng at central and provinciallevels.
. Cumbersome applieation proeedures, and the laek of eommon applieation forms for
various eomponents of social welfare.
· Over-eentralisation in proeessing payments.
. Inadequate inter-departmental eoordination and unelear assignments of finaneial and
operational funetions.
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3.1.2.4 Implementation of the SWP was hindered by inadequate information, partieularly in the
early stag es:
. Awareness of the SDF as sueh was far from universaL. The fourth 'Sentinel' survey taken
in late 1993 found that 60-70 per cent of respondents had heard of the education and
health assistanee, but only 4 and 5 per cent respeetively had yet been assured of
education assistanee. The figure for health was mueh higher at 24 per cent, refleeting the
longstanding operation of the exemption system. Only 44 per cent of urban households
had heard of the food benefi and only 2 per cent had'aecessed it. Generally, 'Iaek of
knowledge' (40 per cent) was the eommonest reason eited for not obtaining assistance,
ahead of 'not eligible' (35 per cent). The higher take-up rates of 1994 and 1995 point in
part to improving information amongst elient groups.
. Some frontline agents were insuffeiently or ineonsistently briefed on eligibility eriteria and
operational proeedures, in partieular school principals, hospital administrators and distriet
DSW offcers, who would often reeeive verbal rather than written instruetions.
3.1.2.5 Laek of interdepartmental eoordination oeeurred at several points in the eomplieated ehain
of implementation, partieularly in the early stages:
. Between DSW and the Ministryof Health and Child We Ifa re , prolonging the delay in
implementing the SDF health benefit and partially obstrueting the interim exemption
arrangements.
. Between DSW and the Ministry of Edueation and Culture over the barring of pupils
awaiting SDF payments.
3.1.2.6 Unelear lines of authority and aecountability affeeted the relationship between the SDF and
the DSWand between frontline sta ff.
. Staff proeessing payments eame from both sides and in addition temporary staff were
drafted in at various times.
. The proeessing of payments eontinued irrespeetive of whether funds were aetually
available because the CU requested payments from the Ministry of Finanee via the SDF
on the basis of DSW referrals. At least until reeently problems did not usually arise sinee
the rate of payments was well within the SDF provision; however, payments were
suspended for a time in mid-1993 for laek of funds.
. The edueation benefit required two means tests, a first appraisal by the school prineipal
and then, if referred, by a distriet DSW offieer. In some areas both left the assessment to
the other; in others, arbitrary differences in interpretation obstrueted elient aeeess.
3.1.2.7 Insuffieient staffing was evident at most stages of the SWP:
. Only a 'handful of extra c1erieal staff were engaged at DSW head offiee and none at
provincial and distriet offee level to administer a major addition to welfare serviees.
Temporary staff drafted into DSWand CU operationshelped elear headquarters backlogs
at several points but provided only a stopgap solution. The payments bottleneek was
eased in 1995 by ending the manual writing of cheques in MPSLSW and transferring to
, Main Report: Chapter 3 Page22
automated payments by the Central Payments Offee (CPO), but some delays were still
reported.
. The inereased workload made it diffeult for welfare offeers not only to eomplete their
normal professional tasks but also from handling the SDF ease-Ioad, in partieular ruling out
home visits in many eases. This eroded the effeetiveness of screening.
3.1.2.8 Ineomolete operational budqeting hampered DSWexecution of SDF responsibilities:
. Because the first SDF eonstitution did not permit administrative costs to be eovered out of
the fund, the extra duties were added to existing workloads with no additional budget
provision. In several eases, temporary staff eould only be hired with donor funds. The
revised eonstitution of 1995 added a elause allowing ineidental expenses subjeet to
approval by LOGAC.
. Forms and stationery were not co sted for this paper-intensive programme and were
sometimes in short supply, blocking f10ws of information and aeeess to elients at the distriet
level. Transport, already eonstrained, was often not available for extra SDF funetions.
3.1.2.9 Cumbersome applieation proeedures raised a series of barriers for SWP applieants:
. Eaeh of the three sehemes required a separate applieation using a separate form, even
where the same applieant ws eligible for more than one benefit.
. The applieation forms were lengthy and differed for eaeh benefit.
. Completing the proeedures was time-eonsuming and expensive, requiring at least one and
sometimes several visits to distriet DSW offees and time queueing for interviews. Journeys
were often long and eostly for many rural applieants and some urban applieants as well.
. Providing evidenee in support of an applieation demanded a range of supporting
doeuments, different for eaeh benefit.
3.1.2.10 The SWP's eomplieated system of internal financial transfers substantially raised the risk
of breakdown at various points in the ehain at the expense of elients:
. The separate administration of eaeh seheme extended both the time spent on proeessing
applieations by welfare offeers and the paperwork involved.
. While food money was paid direetly to elaimants, schools were refunded by the SDF and
on ly after applieations from those they referred had been approved by distriet DSW offees,
eheeked at provineiallevel, notified to the CU and proeessed for payment, either direet to
non-government sehools or to the Ministry of Edueation in respeet of state sehools. Any
delays in this ehain would deprive the school of ineome for the interim. Hospitals and local
authorities had to eompile their elaims and similarly wait for the payments proeessing to
eomplete, both sourees of reported delay that eould run to months.
· The eentralisation of payments proeessing inereased the risk of bottleneeks. A slow
computer system and manual signing of eheques retarded the issuing of payments,
although the transfer to the CPO speeded up the proeess somewhat.
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3.1.2.11 The operational limitations of the SWP aecentuated further the narrowing of the
programme's outreaeh inherent in its design:
. Many poor households residing at some distanee from the nearest distriet DSW offee
eould not afford the time and expense to eomplete an applieation proeedure that might
requireseverallong journeys, even overnight stays, and lengthy waits for attention. For
some areas the food subsidy turned out to be worth less than the monthly travel eost of
eolleeting it.
. In the case of sehools some principals applied arbitrary criteria in deeiding whieh
households to refer to the DSW, in some cases sending all applieants but more eommonly
blocking eligible households. Some DSW welfare offeers also requested performanee
reports from the sehools, unaware that unlike the previous seheme SDF eligibilty was
determined on ineome alone.
. Delays in issuing payments redueed service institution's ineome and henee their
confidenee in the SWP. Such delays, or fear of them, gave principals and administrators
managing hard-pressed budgets an ineentive to eneourage eligible elients to pay part or
all the fee upfront rather than await an SDF refund maybe months later. Non-government
institutions were partieularly affeeted.
3.1.2.12 The individual targeting built into the SWP schemes eneountered a degree of welfare
resistanee that may have signifieantly redueed take-up, partieularly in sehools, where welfare status
was exposed to peer pressure because applieations and payments were run through the school
administration. Sueh resistance was more probable in urban settings rather than rural areas where
most pupils eame from eligible poor families.
3.1.2.13 Payments backlogs had serious impaets on service delivery:
. During 1992 and 1993, the delay in bringing in the SDF health benefi had the result that
the letters of exemption used to proteet low ineome elients deprived hospitals and clinies
of revenue.
. More reeent backlogs in issuing cheques raised defieits on health faeilties' SDF aeeounts.
For example, the largest referral hospital in the country, Parirenyatwa Hospital in Harare,
c1aimed that at the end of Oetober 1995 it was owed Z$39 millon. The last repayment that
it reeeived from SDF amounted to Z$3.1 million and was made as far back as April 1995.
. The finaneial pineer of inereased take-up and redueing budgetary alloeations whieh hit
Parirenyatwa Hospital had wider effeets in mid-1995 as the suspension of payments when
the SDF ran out of funds at the end of FY 1994/95 was extended by the mueh smaller than
expected alloeation for FY 1995/96. An internal CU assessment eoneluded that no new
c1aims eould be met sinee existing liabilities exceeded the funds available. It reported that
non-government sehools whieh had made outlays in expeetation of SDF payments were
at risk from ereditors to the extent of having assets seized. This arbitrary risk of payments
delay or failure eould only strengthen the earlier inelination of school prineipals to oblige
eligible poor households to pay the fees or to remove their pupils.
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3.1.2.14 Previous studies and evaluations tend to confirm that the origins of many of the problems
with the SWP lie, with minor exeeptions, not in staff performanee but in the design and operation of
the orogramme itself. Amongst the key faetors:
. A major permanent expansion of the soeial welfare system was introdueed in the guise of
a temporary seheme addressing short-term hardships.
. The DSW workload was greatly extended with little extra budgetary provision for either
staff or supplies.
. Little attention was devoted to adapting the struetures, line funetions, proeedures and staff
eompetenees of the central and regional DSW offees to the major new responsibilities they
were expeeted to exeeute.
. A parallei administrative eapaeity was set up alongside the DSW within the SDF which had
little to do with the latters eoordination function and whieh performed a supplementary role
in proeessing payments but whieh was not integrated ¡nto DSW line management.
. The channeIlng of SDA welfare payments through the separate SDF aeeount divided
finaneial aeeountability and separated SWP from other welfare expenditure.
. The heavy administrative overheads inherent in a means-tested benefi system were
extended by adopting different ineome thresholds and by duplicating the applieation and
proeessing proeedures for eaeh of the three benefits.
3.1.3 Proaramme Sustainabíltv and DeveloDment
3.1.3.1 Despite its limitations of targeting and operational problems, the SWP had by 1995, the
final year of ESAP, aehieved a higher outreaeh and, on the whole, improved administrative
performanee. This very suecess raised onee more, however, the issue of sustainability as demand-
led expansion eneountered redueing budgetary provision.
3.1.3.2 The food subsidy is a small budgetary item and therefore probably finaneially sustainable.
Its low monetary value and high co st of eolleetion caused a rapid fall in the number of c1aimants and
the Advisory Board was informed in mid-1995 that it would be merged with Public Assistanee.
3.1.3.3 The school fee and examination benefits are mueh larger budget items. Given adequate
funding, take-up was likely to eontinue inereasing steadily for a time as better information indueed
more of the target households to apply. However, unless they are raised the eros ion of the real
ineome threshold by inflation will be the biggest controlon fuure expansion as the pool of eligible
households shrinks.
3.1.3.4 The health benefit is more reeent and expenditure on it was rising fastest. At the 1995 trend
it would soon overtake edueation as the largest budget item. The same redueing real income
threshold applies as a brake on growth of demand.
3.1.3.5 Whereas over 1992/93-1994/95 aetual SDF expenditure on the SWP was well below the
alloeated SDF budget, that balanee began to reduee fast in 1994 and by mid-1995 had sharply
reversed, as indieated above. The fuure operation of the edueation and health assistanee sub-
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programmes in their present forms will depend on financing closer to the level prooosed for PMP
and maybe somewhat above it. If not sustainable at this level, the terms of the benefits would have
to be altered, for example by paying only a fixed proportion of the fees and eharges rather than the
whole amount. Alternatively, budgetary eaps in this demand-Ied programme wil enforee arbitrary
eut-offs, as in 1995, when funds run out before the finaneial year end.
3.1.3.6 Both the erosion of the real ineome threshold and arbitrary and inadequate budgetary
alloeations are seriously damaging to the confidenee of elientsand intermediaries. If basic SDA
objectives are to be aehieved, the soeial safety nets need to be seeured within a long term policy
framework, whether in their present form or through alternative instruments.
3.2 The Emplovment and Training Programme
Findings
3.2.1 The objeetive of the ETP was defined as relieving eonstraints on the produetive
partieipation of vulnerable groups resulting from retrenehment, laek of skills and inputs. The
resourees of the ETP were to be direeted primarily towards the promotion of produetive employment.
The generation of employment would be aehieved through supporting mieroenterprises and
imparting new ski lis.
3.2.2 The ETP's target benefieiaries for the mieroenterprise finanee were in praetice Iimited to
retrenehees and, later, those taking voluntary retirement and unemployed disabled people.
However, both the SDA and PMP programme proposals eontained a number of other initiatives
in the training and employment fields. It was envisaged that there would be counselling and
retraining in new skils for workers retrenehed as a result of ESAP through out-plaeement, in-plant
training and training for self-employment so as to enable them to re-enter the labour market. The
programme envisaged that new job opportunities would be ereated through new produetive
activities, public works, expansion of informal and small enterprises, and through rural resettlement.
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3.2.3 As of late 1995, however; very few if any Òf the orooosed activities have got beyond the
proieet eoneeot or Drogramme design staae. One exeeption was the Swedish-funded rural road
construetion projeet under the labour-intensive public works programme.
3.2.4 The absenee of alternatives has faeed retrenehees with a one-traek ehoiee: participation
in the microenterprise seheme was the only option on offer. But eoming out of eonventional wage
employment in an eeonomy dominated by its formal sector, many may not have had either the skils
or the motivation to sueeeed in running small businesses. In a context of economie restrueturing,
new skiIIs aequisition and retraining are likely to be important faeilitators of reeyeling retrenehees
back into produetive work. This perspeetive was artieulated in the PMP strategy doeuments and
sub-programmes but not earried through into programme development. The laek of alternatives,
whether under SDF or other auspiees, is Iikely to have inereased the risk of business failure under
the mieroenterorise seheme.
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4. REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE MICROENTERPRISE COMPONENTS OF THE
SDF
4.1 Programme Produets
4.1.1 Financial Resources. Conditions and Disbursements
Findings
4.1.1.1 The main objeetives of the ETP were defined as employment generation in the non-formal
and mieroenterprise seetors, and through labour-intensive public works projeets. In praetice, the
seope of most activities under the ETP has been eonfined to:
· Training retrenehees in basic methods of business management and also imparting basic
entrepreneurial ski lis.
· Provision of eredit to business proposals submitted by the retrenchees.
The SDF's eredit scheme was built from scrateh and constituted a new venture into business
development, unrelated to other similar state and pa rastata I programmes.
4.1.1.2 As outlined in seetion 2.3, the annual budget subventions to the SDF peaked at Z$150
million in FY 1993/94 but fell back thereafter to Z$50 millon in FY 1995/96. This financing was
shared with the safety nets sub-programmes and it is unelear to what extent funds earmarked for
loans were ring-feneed. A breakdown of eumulative SDF expenditure to the end of April 1995
indieated that Z$88 millon, or 45 per cent of total Ministry of Finanee grants to the SDF, had been
designated for lending. This amount was in faet some Z$14 millon less than the amount aetually
disbursed to loans at that date.
4.1.1.3 In addition to domestie funds the eredit seheme also had the ADF loan of FUA5 million
(UA4.6 milion) to eall on. Although the loa n agreement was signed in January 1992 and the start
date set for June 1992, the initial disbursement of FUA 1 million was not made until April 1993. The
first replenishment of FUA 1 millon was made in August 1994. A request for asecond replenishment
of Z$8.5 million was presented in May 1995 and in July 1995 was being proeessed by the ADB.
Onee disbursed, FUA2 millon, or 40 per cent of the loan amount, would remain to be drawn down
in two further replenishments. Expressed in loeal eurreney, by late 1995 about Z$25 million had
been utilised and around Z$32 millon was still available.
4.1.1.4 In the absenee of a single authoritative source of data, three different time-series were
used to ealeulate the sums approved and disbursed under the eredit seheme:
· Summary tables of projects and loans approved, eompiled periodieally by the CU for
internal use. The earliest found was from January 1994.
· Cashbook reeords, giving the amounts actually disbursed and received. The reeords
before June 1994 were too ineomplete to make aeeurate ealeulations.
· Approved projeets and loans, eompiled from the CU projeets database whieh provides a
eomplete reeord from startup in late 1992.
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4.1.1.5 Despite internal discrepaneies between the CU tables and data differenees between the
three series (see Annex 2), the similarity of trend and totals between the three series lends
assuranee to the outcomes as reasonable approximations., The eumulative CU table gives a total
of 1889 projeets and Z$152.9 million in loans approved by the end of January 1996, whieh
eompares with 2092 projeets and Z$172.7 million from the projeets database up to early February
1996.
4.1.1.6 Three distinet phases of lending aetìvity are apparent from the database time-series:
. A slow start lasting from late 1992 to mid-1993, during whieh only 50 loans worth Z$1. 9
millon were approved.
. A rapid esealation during the second half of 1993 leading to a main phase lasting from
December 1993 to Mareh 1995, during whieh 1277 projeets wörth Z$103.5 million were
approved at an average of 80 projects and Z$6.5 million per month.
. A disrupted late phase from April 1995 onwards when approvals virtually dried up in mid-
1995, spurted to over 100 projeets and Z$10 million per month over the last four months
of 1995 before dropping to a standstill by early February 1996. Z$8.5 millon was approved
in the five months between April and August 1995 eompared with Z$42.8 in the final four
months of the year.
4.1.1.7 These figures of eourse refleet approvals and not neeessarily disbursements. However,
the cash book totals matehed the monthly amounts approved reasonably elosely over the 15 months
to September 1995. An internal review in mid-1995 found 66 approved projeets worth Z$5.7 million,
or under 5 per cent of the totalloan amount then approved, that had not yet been drawn.
4.1.1.8 A summary SDF ineome and expenditure statement for Oetober and November 1995 made
no reference to safety nets eategories and eovered only the loa n seheme and PMP. It indieated
that at the end of November, five months into FY 1995/96, the SDF had Z$10.1 milion on hand for
the eredit seheme and Z$1.3 million on hand for PMP.
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4.1.1.9 The system of block alloeations to the SDF introdueed budaeting and seheduling problems
for the ETP:
. Sinee the block sums were not apparentlyassigned to speeifie funetions, the ETP, like its
SWP eounterpart, was subjeet to the uneertainty of laekina a speeifie alloeation of funds
and thus known amount for lending over a given period. Aeeording to the ADB design,
LOGAC was to 'make reports and reeommendations' to the Advisory Board regularly on
the 'percentage distribution of SDF resourees' amongst other topies, but there is no
evidenee that it did so or that the Advisory Board considered budgetary alloeations, whieh
were instead handled administratively by the CU and other seetions of MPSLSW.
. Both programmes were demand driven and either eould unoredictablv hit the budget
eeiling and be obliged to suspend operations. Since SDF subventions ran ahead of
disbursements up to at least late 1994 this eonstraint only began to have serious impaet
in 1995 when both ETP lending and safety net spendìng, espeeially on health 8xemptions,
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aeeelerated at the same time. ETP loan approvals had to be suspended for a time in mid-
1995 and again in February 1996 as the budgeted funds ran out.
4.1.1.10 The delays in disbursement of the ADF loan also deprived the SDF of loa n funds. The
delays were attributable mainly to laek of administrative eapaeity in the CU, leading to failures either
to fulfil the loan conditions or to delays in submitting the necessary doeumentation:
. The SDF eoordinator was not appointed until Mareh 1993 and there were delays in
establishing operational proeedures for utilsing the funds, both of whieh were prior
conditions under the loan agreement for its entry into force.
. The two subsequent requests for replenishments were also delayed by laek of staff to
prepare and proeess the neeessary doeunientation.
4.1.1.11 Prompt requests in late 1994 and 1995 for additional tranches could have released AOF
funds in time to avoid the suspensions of loan aoprovals in mid-1995 and early 1996:
. By June 1995, the Zimbabwean eontribution of Z$20 milion(1S) and the two ADF tranches
of about Z$16.5 milion amounted to utilisation of Z$36.5 millon. But the SDF's own record
indicated that Z$109 million had by then been approved for loans. Adding in the request
submitted in May 1995 for a third tranehe of Z$8.5 millon and some Z$32 millon remaining
to be drawn(19) would have brought total utilisation up to about Z$77 million, well short of
the amount aetually disbursed to loans.
. Thus in mid-1995 the SDF was entitled to draw down the full remaining amount of the AOF
loan, then converting to about Z$40.5 million. Yet at that point the proeessing of projeet
applieations was temporarily suspended for laek of funds.
4.1.1.12 It remains obseure whether the two AOF tranches disbursed to date have aetually been
released to the SDF or retained by treasury to replenish domestie funds previously budgeted to the
SDF. The PMP sub-programme's indicative budget took the latter eourse but the PMP strategy
doeument explieitly treated the loan as additional to theZ$270 millon alloeated to the SDF up to
June 1994. The MPSLSWs ineome and expenditure statement for FY 1993/1994 made no mention
of the ADF loan.
4.1.1.13 An assessment of the SDF's resouree base is eomplieated by the laek of a separate budget
line for the eredit seheme. The SDF aeeount has been run as a single entity and loan disbursements
and overheads have been listed alongside SWP and, more reeently, PMP categories with some
line items merg ing all the programmes.
18. The AOF loan agreement required an 'initial contribution' of Z$20 million and did not include the Governments
commitment, indicated in the ADB Appraisal Report, to contribute a further Z$20 millon a year, adding up to
Z$100 million over the five year ESAP period (Loan Agreement, para 4.01 (3); Appraisal Report, para 4.5.1).
19. The precise amount will depend on the conversion rates prevailing at the time of disbursement.
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4.1.1.14 Lack of published reoorts and gaos and ineonsisteneies in internal data eompilations have
further obseured the assessment:
. There is an absenee of uo-to-date ineome and expense statements, the last available at
the time of miss ion being for FY 1993/94.
. The amounts reeeived from repayments are diffeult to determine because no reoayments
statisties have been published to date, although arecent internal tabular summary has
elarified the trend somewhat. This question is taken up again in seetion 4.2.2.
. Although information on loa n disbursements is more readily available, it must be
emphasised that all sueh data are unoffcial sinee no annual reoorts. balanee sheets or
audited aeeounts have been oublished in respeet of the eredit scheme.
4.1.1.15 The 1992 SDF eonstitution failed to provide at all for the administrative eosts of the SDF.
The 1995 revision added a elause allowing 'ineidental' expenses subjeet to LOGAC approval, but
eaeh instanee would require a separate deeision and general administrative responsibility remains
with the Ministry, whieh is also the employer of SDF staff. The overheads of the eredit seheme are
thus partly hidden in departmental aeeounts and there is no direet means of ealeulating all its
administrative costs.
4.1.2 Eligibíltv Criteria and Taraetina
Findings
4.1.2.1 In the SDA programme document the targeting of SDF eredit was left vague exeept for a
eryptie eommitment to 'direet the resourees of the Soeial Development Fund to faeiltate inereased
employment of retrenehed and vulnerable groups in... infant miero-industries or activities that are
Iikely to grow in sea le and effeieney in the long term'. However, the Minister's preface was more
explicit and set the guideline that 'the ETP shall first and foremost be targeted at faeilitating the
redeployment of those retrenehed into produetive employment activities'.
4.1.2.2 At startup, the eredit scheme was restrieted exelusively to retrenehees. In January 1994
the Advisory Board extended it to include those taking early or voluntary retirement or retrenehed
due to ill health and a little later also to the unemployed disabled. But retrenehees remained the
prineipal target group.
4.1.2.3 The Advisory Board has reeognised that there are problems in implementing policy and
also in policy interpretation and has debated the question of expanding the scope of the seheme on
a number of oeeasions to inelude other poor and vulnerable groups. The original ehoiee of targeting
retrenehees was made because the group was verifiable and easy to identify. Other groups were
seen as diffeult to target and no appropriate guidelines had been provided to LOGAC. At its January
1994 meeting the Board made a CU proposal to extend coverage to women in general and to
'schoolleavers, college graduates and other job seekers' eonditional upon raising additional funding.
Up to mid-1995, however, no further expansion of eligibility had been approved.
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4.1.2.4 The targeting of a sinale and easily identifiable group, retrenehees, gave the SDF credit
seheme a strong programme foeus, one whieh was also direetly eoneerned with transitional impaets
and SDA objeetives. Reasonably firm safeguards against abuse were also assured by the legally
enforeeable proeedures for declaring redundaneies, whieh helped to distinguish retrenehments from
otherdismissals and resignations.
4.1.2.5 There was no way, however, of distinguishing redundancies attributable to ESAP from the
eonsequenees of normal business restrueturing. The ETP thus gave general support to all
retrenehees, whatever the causes of their retrenehment. In its early years most retrenehments were
probably ESAP-related and ironieally the growing gap between the dates of retrenehment and loan
approval (see section 4.2.2) ensured that most oroiect proposals were from victims of ESAP.
However, by 1995 the speeifie linkage between retrenehment and ESAP effeets was beeoming
distinetly tenuous.
4.1.2.6 Some have eritieised the SDF for seleeting the wrong ETP target aroup from the
perspeetive of oovert reduetion. The selection of retrenchees was a speeifie SDF deeision because
the ADB design had defined the intended benefieiaries in very general terms, although it did assign
to LOGAC responsibility for identifying target groups. The general issue of SDA programme
targeting is beyond the seope of this study. However, it can be argued that other groups also
subjeeted to the stresses of struetural adjustment could have benefitted from and effeetively utilised
sueh a mieroeredit faeility. Also, 'retrenehees are often not suited to being entrepreneurs as their
experienee will always have been as employees'.
4.1.2.7 These issues of targeting are taken up again in seetion 4.4.1. Two eomments are in order
here:
. The targeting of retrenchees did not of itself preelude additional microcredit faeilities for
other SDA target grouos. Indeed, the PMP strategy and programme doeuments of 1994
made a specifie if vaguely defined proposal to ereate another mieroeredit faeilty foeusing
mainly on rural women.
. Some retrenehees eould be expeeted to possess the neeessary skiIIs and motivation to
sueeeed as small entrepreneurs. The diffeulty is not that they were offered a credit
programme, but that it was the onlv option they were offered.
4.1.2.8 It was important that the eoneerns of all Tetrenehees be taken into eonsideration but the
differentiation amongst them was not addressed:
. While some of the retrenehees were poor and belonged to vulnerable low-income groups,
others were from middle-ineome groups and even from the managerial stratum. The latter
eommanded a different level of skiHs and resourees (ineluding reasonable lump sums and
terminal benefits at retrenehment). Oooortunities might have existed for some screening,
for example requiring a higher deposit from better provided retrenehees. By contrast, short-
term 'eontraet workers were not eligible and unskiHed retrenehees were more likèly to fail
to get the neeessary emolover's letter of retrenehment: the Advisory Board pointed to the
enforeement powers of the Ministry upon justified eomplaint but the onus remained with
exeluded retrenehees to pursue the eomplaints proeedure.
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. Sereening eould also have served to identify those with entreoreneurial or reauisite
teehnieal skils for priority treatment. The Advisory Board adopted a position that sereening
should preeede training, but the modalities were not worked out. Had the PMP proposal
to offer a retraining alternative through a counselling service for retrenehees been
implemented, sueh sereening eould have served the funetion of improving the viability of
approved projeets.
4.1.2.9 There is some evidenee of abuse leadina to leakage:
. Arecent Seleet Committee report drew attention to exploitation by people of influenee by
highlighting the case of a benefieiary it eneountered who was 'neither a retrenehee nor a
disabled person (bull.. a former high ranking politieian who appears still to be employed
by government and driving a government car'i20I.
. The attention of the Advisory Board was drawn to non-retrenehees slipping through by
virtue of lax sereening at DE ED offees.
. One of the principal training consultants alleged that collusion in allowing ineligible persons
aeeess to the training courses, the first step towards a projeet proposal, was quite
widespread, eiting the example of Mozambieans being allowed onto eourses run in Mutare.
4.1.2.10 It is nevertheless unlikely that sueh abuse was widespread. The loa n amounts were tOo
small to attraet large-sea le racketeering and many ineligible benefieiaries were likely to have been
in similar soeioeeonomie eireumstanees to the retrenehees. A seareh of the CU projeets database
indieated that the great majority of projeet reeords ineluded speeifie details of date of retrenehment
and former employer. It also turned up virtually no duplieate names and a broad diversity of
biographieal and residential information, suggesting that influence-peddling on a large sea le was
improbable. If the data is aeeurate, there were eases where the loan was apparently approved
before the date of redundaney, breaking the seheme's basic rule on eligibilty and suggesting undue
influence to seeure aeeess to loans. But the number of sueh exeeptions was smalL.
4.1.3 Beneficiaries
Findings
4.1.3.1 As at the end of January1996, just before the suspension of meetings, LOGAC had
approved a total of 1889 projects with a loan value of Z$152.9 million (approx. US$16.3 million).
4.1.3.2 The backlog of loan applieations on file was reported as 6,693 in June 1995 with a total
value of Z$803 millon (approx. US$94 million). Allowing for new applieations in the second half of
1995, approximately 8,500 retrenehees had applied for SDF loans by January 1996.
20. Parliament of Zimbabwe, First Report of the Departmental Commitee (Service Ministries) on the Ministry of
Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, 21 March 1996, p.a.
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4.1.3.3 There are no eomprehensive statisties on retrenchments over the ESAP period:
. Aeeording to offeial statisties, stated to be not quite complete, by mid-1995 slightly'more
than 25,000 redundaneies had been reeordèd in the private sector and loeal authorities
sinee January 1991 and 26,332 by year end. This total does not inelude de facto
redundaneies of 'temporary' workers hired on short eontracts.
. In the public sector actual redundaneies have probably been lower than the original ESAP
projeetions in the civil service and higher in parastatals, roughly 6,000 against 10,000 and
4,000 against 2,000 respeetively. Arecent estimate of 20,000 public sector redundaneies
by August 1995 looks too high. Between 1990 and June 1995 the average number of
employees in 'public administration' as a whole dropped by 15,700 aeeording to published
CSO statisties and allowing for an exeess of natural wastage over new appointments a
rough total of 10,000 redundaneies in the public and pa rastata i seetors between January
1995 and December 1995 may be areasonable approximation(211.
. The combined total of formal redundaneies was thus in the region of 36,000 up to
December 1995.
4.1.3.4 The SDF loa n seheme showed the following take-up rates:
. The great majority of retrenehees who eompleted the introduetory training eourse went on
to submit projeet proposals. As of mid-1995 the proportion was 80-85 per cent.
. The applieants eomprised a smaller proportion of all those retrenehed. Assuming a total
of 36,000, close to a quarter had applied for loans by January 1996.
. Analysing the CU database, roughly 4-5 per cent of private sector retrenehees had
obtained SDF loans. In the public sector, the shares were 10 per cent of parastatal
retrenehees and 9 per cent of civil service retrenehees, although these are very tentative
estimates.
4.1.3.5 The great majority of the approved projeets were in the service sectors. There are two
slightly differing breakdowns:
. Aeeording to the latest CU table, as of January 1996 33 per cent of projeets were elassified
by the CU as serviees, 12 per cent as retail and 22 per cent as transport, making 67 per
cent in alL. The only other seetors of signifieanee were manufaeturing at 17 per cent and
agrieulture at 13 per cent.
. An analysis of the CU database reeords shifted the balanee towards manufaeturing, mainly
by reclassifying grinding mils from serviees (12 per cent) into 'agro-industry' (25 per cent
of projeets). The service seetors made up 43 per cent of allprojeets while manufaeturing
and agro-industry were 41 per cent.
21, Zimbabwe Government, A Framework for Economic Reform, p.21; Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Beyond
ESAP, p,15; CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics; eSD, Retrenchment Figures per Industry.
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4.1.3.6 From the CU summary table, the distribution of loans similarly plaeed two-thirds of funds
in the service seetors (services 25 per cent, retail12 per cent, transport 30 per cent) with 17 per
cent in manufacturing and 13 per cent in agriculture.
4.1.3.7 The CU also eolleeted data on the number of jobs eaeh projeet proposed to ereate. The
January 1996 total was 7,424 with 24 per cent in serviees, 12 per cent in retail, 11 per cent in
transport, 29 per cent in manufaeturing and 12 per cent in agrieulture.
4.1.3.8 The average number of jobs per projeet was 3.9 but widé seetoral variations are evident.
The lowest ratios were in serviees and transport (2.9 and 2.0 jobs per projeet). The retail and
agrieulture seetors were close to the general mean (3.8 and 3.7) but manufaeturing was
substantially higher at 6.7 jobs per projeet. Highest of all were two seetors with very few projeets,
mining at 15.7 and construetion at 11.7.
4.1.3.9 A broad speetrum is also evident in investment per job. The average eost in loan funds per
job ereated was Z$20,593 (US$2,200) and the serviees, retail and agricultural seetors were all fairly
close to the mean. But transport was much higher at Z$55,790 per job and manufaeturing
signifieantly lower at Z$12,347 per job.
4.1.3.10 Within most seetors an analysis of the 1491 projeets approved up to September 1995
revealed marked patterns of eoneentration:
. Manufaeturing: the most diversified sector by far, but welding and metal fabrieation elaimed
24 per cent of projeets and elothing 11 per cent.
. Agrieulture: eattle pen fattening, market gardening, poultry and piggery dominate and
represented 92 per cent of projeets.
. Transport: with 257 out of a total of 272 projeets eommuter omnibuses represented 94 per
cent of the projeets. Commereial hau lage numbered another 12 projeets.
. Serviees: there is a eoneentration of eontraet millng/grinding mils, whieh aceounted for
over 62 per cent of total projeets. This eategory properly belongs under manufaeturing.
. Retail: general deaJers, buteheries, hardware and takeaways amounted for 48 per cent of
projeets.
4.1.3.11 Data from the CU database, whieh up to early February 1996 recorded 2,092 loa n
approvals(221, indieate that retrenehees from the private sector obtained 56 per cent of approved
loans. The eivil service and parastatals were 25 and 19 per cent respeetively.
4.1.3.12 The database yields additional information on the eharacteristics of the benefieiaries:
. There was a very strong gender bias in favour of men. Only 9 per cent of benefieiaries
were women.
. Only 34 benefieiaries were disabled.
22. The differences between the data sets are discussed in Annex 2.
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. Two-thirds of borrowers were in the middle age bands: 37 per cent aged 30-39 and 32 per
cent aged 40-49. Only 1 per eentwere 60 years old or over.
. The great majority of borrowers were married. Less than 5 per cent deseribed themselves
as single.
, . Most borrowers had a high school edueation. Nearly half the borrowers had passed 0-
levels and another quarter had JC. A fifth had no qualifieation, whereas 4 per cent had A-
levels and 6 per cent had a higher qualifieation.
4.1.3.13 The geographieal distribution of approved projeets can serve as one measure of national
outreaeh. The following patterns are derived from an analysis of the CU database:
. 53 per cent of projeets were elassified as urban and 47 per cent as ruraL.
. 62 per cent of the jobs to be ereated were loeated in urban areas and 38 per cent in rural
areas. This distribution is the reverse of the 1992 population census (31 per cent urban,
69 per cent rural). The average number of jobs per projeet was 4.6 in urban areas and 3.1
in rural areas.
. Comparing the distributions of projeets and population by provinee, Harare aeeounted for
nearly a third of all projeets, more than twiee ¡ts share of the national population (31 and
14 per cent). Bulawayo, the three Mashonaland provinees and Midlands had roughly equal
shares of projeets and population while Maniealand, Masvingo and partieularly
Matabeleland North and South had far lower shares of projeets than of population.
. The ratio of projeets per 100,000 people puts Hararefar ahead at 43.3, Bulawayo at 21.2,
the Mashonaland provinees and Midlands in the 15-30 range, Maniealand and Masvingo
at 8.3 and 11.3, and Matabeleland North and South the lowest at 4.4 and 4.6 respeetively.
Review of Problem Areas
4.1.3.14 By the end of the ESAP period the SDF eredit seheme had attraeted the interest of a
substantial orooortion of its orineioal target group, retrenehees. The proportion of retrenchees
submitting projeet proposals, at roughly 23-24 per cent, refleets an impressively high outreaeh. The
introduetory trainina eourse provided an effeetive entry ooint to the seheme and the take-up rate
amongst those eompleting was very high.
4.1.3.15 The delivery of loans was less satisfactory. Only about 24 per cent of applieants had
reeeived deeisions on their applieations. As a result the proportion of retrenehees actually benefitting
from the seheme was mueh lower.
4.1.3.16 Aeeess to the seheme in terms of loan approvals appears to have been sianifieantly lower
for retrenehees from the orivate sector than for those from the public sector, although the estimates
are very tentative. This outcome may refleet a more aetive promotion of the seheme by public sector
employers.
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4.1.3.17 The seetoral distribution of projeets exposes a strong bias towards the service seetors.
However, the number and diversity of manufaeturing projeets is mildly eneouraging.
4.1.3.18 More partieularly, there was a high eoneentration of resourees on a narrow ranae of proieet
~: welding, eattle pen fattening, small retail outlets, eommuter omnibuses and grinding mills.
These five eategories alone aeeounted for some 58 per cent of all projects and the last two alone
for 44 per cent (CUdatabase).
4.1.3.19 Whether or not this narrow foeus is desirable is not immediately apparent, but it did have
one major implieation: a dose integration of loa n finaneina with partieular results of eeonomie reform,
namely deregulation of the grain market and the urban transport seetors. Within the spaee of three
years, the SDF eredit seheme pumped Z$49 milion into 422 minibus projeets and Z$27 milion ¡nto
499 grinding mill projeets. By any standards, this investment had signifieant impaet on two sub-
seetors adiusting rapidly under ESAP.
4.1.3.20 The total number of promised jobs - 7,424 aeeording to the CU return, 8,133 from the CU
database - were equivalent, very approximately, to slightly more than a fifth of all redundaneies
sinee 1991. The CU credit seheme has not on its own overcome the adverse employment effeets
of ESAP but it is not, as some have alleged, an insignifieant eontribution. Nevertheless, it is highly
imorobable that all the oromised iobs were aetually ereated. A minority of thriving businesses will
have expanded further, but the majority, if not dormant, will be employing fewer than indieated and
fewer than at startup. This outcome is strongly indieated by the field surveys whieh found that most
borrowers had redueed their workforees, prineipally because of eashflow problems.
4.1.3.21 The seetoral distribution of loans did not maximise effeieney 'in iob ereation:
. The transport sector, whieh had by far the lowest ratio of jobs per projeet and highest eost
per job, nevertheless reeeived 30 per cent of all loan funds approved. By contrast,
manufaeturing, whieh ereated more than three times the jobs per projeet at a quarter of the
co st per job, reeeived only 17 per cent of loan funds.
. Two seetors whieh reeeived hardly any funds at all, mining and construetion, nevertheless
had far higher job ereation ratios (15.7 and 11.7) and far lower eost per job ratios (Z$4,568
and Z$7,202) than any of the better supported seetors.
4.1.3.22 The soeial profile of benefieiaries exposes the very strong gender bias against women,
very few of whom benefied from the seheme. This outcome is attributable in part to the
predominanee of men in formal sector employment - 82 per cent of 'government and senior offciais'
at the 1992 census and 71 per cent of 'administration' - and in those retrenehed. Unfortunately there
is no gender breakdown of retrenehees, but it is disturbing that signifieantly fewer women than men
progressed from eomoleting the training eourse to seeuring an SDF loan aooroval, 8 per cent of
women as at mid-August 1995 eompared to 13 per cent of men. Aeeording to the CU database, only
186 women had seeured loans by January 1996.
4.1.3.23 There has been marginal impaet to date on the disabled. By mid-August only 11 out of 435
eompleting the training eourse had reeeived loans. This was in part due to the late extension of
disabled into the seheme and by January 1996 another 23 had reeeived loans.
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4.1.3.24 The young to middle-aged age profile and the high school qualified edueation profile of
most borrowers indieates a oronouneed bias towards semi-skilled. skilled and white-eollar ex-
employees and lower representation of the unskilled.
4.1.3.25 There is a marked urban bias in the geographieal distribution of projeets but it is not as
strong as might have been expeeted. The bias is, however, more oronouneed in terms of iobs
ereated because the jobs per projeet ratio was markedly higher in the urban areas.
4.1.3.26 The pattern of provineial distribution is also hiahly uneven. In general, the is an inverse
relationship to distanee from Harare: the further away, the lower the ratio of projects to population.
The impaet of overcentralised administration is very evident here. But distanee alone cannot provide '
a eomolete exolanation. In partieular, it is noteworthy that Bulawayo had half Harare's ratio of
projeets to population and that Matabeleland had by far the lowest ratio in the country - only 2.6 per
cent of the projeets eompared with 11.8 per cent of the 1992 population.
4.1.4 Loan Amounts and Terms
Findings
4.1.4.1 The eredit terms offered to borrowers were a required eontribution of 10 per cent of the
projeet eost, a standard interest rate of 10 per cent, a graee period of usually 4-6 months and a
repayment period of 4-5 years.
4.1.4.2 The Advisory Board agreed at the outset that the 10 per cent eontributioneould be waived
depending on the cireumstanees of the case. How often this was done in praetiee is rather
uneertain, sinee there are a number of gaps may be attributable to the diffeulty of valuing
contributions in kind, such as buildings or equipment already on hand. Such a pattern is commonly
found in the results of the field surveys. However, where details are given in the CU database
reeords zero eontributions appear in only 17 per cent of eases. Furthermore, the mean amount for
eontributions above zero is well above the threshold at 23 per cent of total projeet eost.
4.1.4.3 The Advisory Board resolved in May 1994 that additional funding eould .only be made
available where an error of under-funding was made. Top-up funding was to be denied. Further,
c1ients should be diseouraged from obtaining eo-funding to prevent other ereditors enforeing a prior
c1aim on assets finaneed by the SDF.
4.1.4.4 The initial maximum size of loan was set at Z$80,000 and raised in May 1994 to
Z$120,OOO, at whieh level it has remained sinee. The limit was, however, to aet as a guideline and
LOGAC was empowered to lend more at its discretion. The size distribution of SDF loans indieates
that LOGAC exeeeded the guideline in approximately 15 per cent of cases before the raising of the
guideline amount but in less than 5 per cent of eases afterwards. It also approved loans below 75
per cent of the guideline in 50 per cent of ca ses before and 48 per cent of ca ses after; and loans
below 50 per cent of the guideline amount in 12 per cent of eases before and 30 per cent of ca ses
after.
4.1.4.5 Analysing the CU table, the mean size of all loans approved up to January 1996 was
Z$80,932. The averages for most seetors do not vary very mueh and lie in the Z$70-85,OOO range,
but the transport sector average was higher at Z$111 ,307 and the service sector was lower at
Z$60,062.
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4.1.4.6 Analysing the CU database, the average loan size rose steadily from Z$56,529 in 1993 to
Z$78,297 in 1994 and 2$99,178 in 1995. At constant priees(23l, however, it levelled off in the third
quarter of 1993 and remained in the Z$65-75,OOO range throughout 1994 and 1995, during whieh
83 per cent of loan approvals were made. In eurrent US$ a slow rise is evident to alevel through
1995 about 20-30 per cent above the last half of 1993, from US$7,940 in 1993 to US$9,607 in 1994
to US$11 ,455 in 1995 and an overall average of US$9,248.
Re vie w of Problem Areas
4.1.4.7 The mean loa n size of Z$81 ,000 or US$9,250 plaees the SDF loan portolio firmly at the
lower end of the formal small business sector rather than in the informal sector. Only 2.8 per cent
of all approved loans in the CU database were below Z$30,OOO, 1.3 per cent below Z$20,000 and
just 3 below Z$10,000. For eomparison, the majority of loeal mieroenterprise finanee institutions
sueh as Zambuko and Zimbabwe Projeet have initialloan sizes ranging between Z$2,OOO to Z$
5,000. This arises partly because most sueh loans are to existing businesses; however, the majority
of informal sector operators have fewassets and little cash in hand and the loans often funetion as
working capita!.
4.1.4.8 The SDF loa n seheme has therefore been of little relevanee to informal sector
develooment. This, however, may have been a benign outcome since it has reduced to a minimum
direet eompetition with established microcredit sehemes, espeeially those run by NGOs, where the
SDF's subsidised interest rate eould have been disruptive amongst their elient base. The exelusive
targeting on retrenehees has also ruled out most potential elients of other institutions, whieh anyway
tend to consider themselves as meeting only a fraetion of a large unsatisfied demand.
4.1.4.9 The faet that the constant priee average value of SDF loans has been held more or less
steady, whether by default or design, sinee early 1994 has been a source of stability to the loan
seheme in contrast to the safety nets benefits, whieh were allowed to depreciate rapidly with
inflation.
4.1.4.10 That apparentlyahigh prooortion of borrowers have eontributed a deoosit and eommonly
wellabove the minimum is an encouraging sign. Of those eontributing, two-thirds deposited more
than 10 per cent of the total projeet eost, 20 per cent deposited more than a quarter and 5 per cent
deposited more than half. The data gaps do however leave a large margin of uneertainty.
4.1.4.11 The 10 per cent interest rate has been some 20-25 per cent below the prevailng
eommercial rate through most of the SDF's lifetime. Because eharged at a flat rate the gap will
narrow if as expeeted eommereial rates begin to fall, but is unlikely to elose altoaether within the
lifetime of the existing loan Dortfolio. The policy issue of offering heavily subsidised eredit to small
business borrowers is eontroversial both within Zimbabwe and internationally. The following
partieular points may be noted:
. Since few SDF projeet proposals eould probably have seeured eommereial funding, mainly
because of the proposers' laek of eollateral, the seheme has diverted Iittle business away
from the eommercial finaneial institutions. It may, however, have improved the eompetitive
23. Deflated by the buildings materials index.
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position of SDF beneficiaries against eommercial small business borrowers in a few sub-
seetors, espeeially urban eommuter transport and grinding mills. Any negative imoaets are
likely to have been small sinee these sub-seetorswitnessed an explosion of aetivitY.
. Subsidised interest has been a prineioal ooint of disagreement between leading
mierolending NGOs and the CU, whieh has contemplated for some time on lending SDF
funds thróugh reputable NGOs. This has delayed even further the fulfilment of the original
ADB and SDA to provide SDF resourees to frontline established finaneial institutions.
4.1.4.12 While few loans have been made at the informal sector level, the imposition of arbitrary
guidelineceilings has tended to flatten the size of ¡oans at the too end. While 34 per cent of loans
were above Z$100,000, only 3.4 per cent were above Z$120,000 and 0.9 per cent above
Z$150,OOO. The de facto cap beeame a point of contention in partieular with would-be minibus
operators who eommonly needed mueh higher sums to purehase a new vehiele. Sinee the SDF
seheme had been positioned at the SSE entry point, the eap made little business sense and
refleeted the dominant soeial welfare ethos Drevailina in SDF oDerations whieh looked for an
equalisation of benefits aeross as many beneficiaries as possible.
4.1.4.13 The denial of eo-funding imoosed a further finaneial eonstraint. The objeetive expressed
by the Advisory Board, to protect SDF-finaneed assets from other ereditors, eould have been better
served by putting the SDF on a oroper legal footing. This would have enabled it both to eonelude
eo-finaneing deals with other partners, for instanee to finanee more expensive eapital eosts sueh
as minibuses, and to take an enforeeable first charge on any collateral assets. In the event, it is
likely that those able to raise additional eredit did so anyway, invoking the very risk anticipated.
4.1.4.14 A further and serious diffieulty arose from the restrietion of the loa n to eapital eosts.
Although the restriction was a condition of the ADB loan, there was no inherent need to extend the
restrietion to the applieation of domestie eounterpart funds. Because retrenehees were starting up
newenterprises and with little pa st business experienee, their need for working capital in the initial
stages of operation was ofte n aeute. Both the projeet surveys and past studies have exposed this
faetor as the most frequent source of eomplaint and diffieulty amongst SDF borrowers and it has
undoubtedly increased the rate of failure and slowdown.
4.1.5 GrouD Loans
4.1.5.1 There are no group loans in the SDF portolio sinee targeting as a matter of policy and
praetiee is targeted on individual retrenehees. A random eheek on the projeet files indieated no
oartnerships in the formal loa n eontraets, although undoubtedly family and/or assoeiates would be
involved in an appreciable number of the businesses.
4.1.6 ComDarative Re vie w of Other Sources of Credit
4.1.6.1 Aeeording to arecent studyl241, in 1993 there were 941,944 SMEs in Zimbabwe employing
1.36 million people. The definition ineluded all sizes up to 50 employees with proprietor and the
great majority (78 per cent) were one-person mieroenterprises, mostly in the informal sector and
24. Gemini, Changes in the Small-Scale Enterprise Sector from 1991 to 1993, Table 3-1 and Figure3-1.
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mostly home-based. Another 18 per cent, or approximately 170,000, employed 2-5 ineluding the
proprietor. This is close to the mean number of proposed jobs per projeet aeross most seetors in
SDF projects and indicates very approximately the size of the SSE stratum ¡nto whieh the SDF eredit
seheme is propelling its newenterprises. The informal sector is, h oweve r, mueh larger and is the
prineipal target of microeredit institutions.
4.1.6.2 A number of NGO microcredit institutions provide a variety of services to microenterprises
aeross the country. The best-known organisations at the nationallevel are Zambuko Trust,
Zimbabwe Projeet, ZIMFEP, and Christian Care. Other organisations operate at the provineiallevel,
sueh as Zimbabwe Womens' Bureau, Zimbabwe Womens' Finanee Trust, Glen Forest Training
Centre, Colleetive Self Finanee Seheme, ORAP and Dondolo. All these miero-finanee organisation
provide a mixture of loans and training to a wide target group operating mieroenterprises, some also
providing grants.
4.1.6.3 All the major eommereial banks also operate soeeialised small business units providing
speeifie financial serviees to small enterprises. Zimbank, Barelays, Standard Chartered and the
Commereial Bank of Zimbabwe are the major players in this sector.
4.1.6.4 Sharo differenees in business eulture distinguish the NGO and banking sector approaehes
to small enterprise development. The banks are geared to medium and large firms and to
eonventional formal sector modalities, are offee based, tend to laek an orientation to the small-sea le
sector and often find an inadequate business knowledge amongst clients for effeetive partnership.
NGOs sueh as Zimbabwe Projeet, by contrast, operate revolving funds and have an extensive field
staff, who monitor the repayments. They provide ¡oans in small amounts of between Z$500 to
Z$2000 and generally not above Z$5000 for first-time borrowers. A number have started providing
grouo lending sehemes, some also take deposits. and sereening for proieet applieations is rigorous
in the best managed sehemes.
4.1.6.5 Business extension for the small business sector is provided by a number of organisations
including Business Extension and Advisory Serviees (BESA), an affliate of the Indigenous Business
Development Centre (IBDC). The major business representative bodies have also ereated small
business units, for example the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commeree (ZNCC). NGOs
generally undertake training oroarammes in management and Imolementation and organisations
sueh as Glen Forest also provide teehnical and management expertise.
4.1.6.6 Commereial business extension serviees have traditionally been aimed at small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), whieh have a larger absorption eapaeity and are on the threshold of
entering and eompeting effeetively in the formal eeonomy.
4.1.6.7 The average loan sizes of SMEs are in exeess of Z$10,OOO and their eapital funding
requirements eould be as high as Z$100,OOO. SMEs have been able to aeeess finanee from a
diverse fundina base, mainly the eommereial banks and parastatals, ineluding the Small Enterprises
Development Corporation (SEDCO), the Agricultural Finanee Corporation (AFC) and the Zimbabwe
Development Bank (ZDB). Mieroenterprises, to the contrary, have mainly been assisted by NGO
eredit institutions, although both SEDCO and the AFC have in the last couple of years started
sehemes aimed at mieroenterprises.
4.1.6.8 The activities of three organisations with national coverage, the Credit Guarantee Company
(CGC), SEDCO and Zambuko Trust, are reviewed in more detail in Annex 3. The two parastatals,
CGC and SEDCO, have servieed mainly SMEs while Zambuko has eoncentrated exclusively on
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mieroenterprises and the informal sector. Key points emerging from Zambuko's fast growth and
relatively sueeessfullending experienee inelude the following:
. Initialloan amounts are kept small with a usual ceiling of Z$5000.
. Loans are normally made only to existing businesses, allowing a prior eheek on their traek
reeords.
. The loan terms are tight, with effeetive interest eharged at slightly above the eommereial
rate, group liability in many eases, a fairly short normal term of 6-12 months and stringent
repayment conditions.
. Although eollateral in fixed propert is notrequired, loans have to be solid ly assured by
moveable assets of value and a guarantor earning at least four times the value of the loan.
. Borrowers with good reeords have the opportunity of aeeessing follow-up loans.
. A large field staff assures eontinuous supervision and assistanee to elients.
. Deeision-making is deeentralised to braneh offees and field staff.
. A high quality relationship with a principal funder and teehnieal assistanee provider has
been important in the startup phase, baeked up by a diversifieation of funding sourees.
4.1.6.9 The profile of the SDF eredit seheme is doser to that of a eonventional SME institution
sueh as SEDCO than to NGOs supporting the informal sector. In partieular, its typiealloan amounts
are well above the threshold of normal mieroenterprise lending and many of its projeets have a
formal SSE rather than a home- or street-based eharaeter.lt is positioned at the lower end of the
SME speetrum and more in the formal than the informal sector. The mieroenterprise eomponent of
the SDF's original mandate has yet to be fulfilled.
4.1.6.10 The SDF credit seheme has therefore overlaooed the NGO mieroenterorise field only
marginally. It has established a niehe field of operations by:
. Targeting a seleetive elient base - retrenehees - having little aecess to other sourees of
eredit.
. Financing high-risk startups by operators with no previous traek reeord, litte training and
Iittle or no eollateral.
. Restrieting the size of loans to the lower end of the SME finaneial market and for the most
part not offering second or topup loans.
Whether this niehe strateg y is sustainable will be diseussed further in section 4.4.2.
4.1.6.11 The SDF's subsidised eredit terms have not seriously interfered with the NGOs' dient base
but they have been more damaging at the SME level, not by diverting elients sinee the SDF seheme
was restrieted to retrenehees, but by affording a substantial eompetitive advantage over small
businesses relying on eommereial eredit. The impaet was exaeerbated by its eoineidenee through
1994-95 with the even more heavily subsidised SME eredit provided by the CGC.
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4.1.7 Borrowers' Evaluation of Loan Services
4.1.7.1 The projeet ran two small pilot surveys a prineipal aim of whieh was to assess the main
diffieulties, successes and pereeptions of SDF c1ients. It must be borne in mind that the surveys
neeessarily exeluded those who had gone out of business or were otherwise uncontaetable. A
number of key points arisingfrom the responses and from the larger client survey of the SDF
training programme earried out in early 1995(25) are:
. Some elients indieated present temporary downturns or diffeulties. In the training survey
two-thirds stated that their businesses were stable or growing.
. Laek of initial workina eapital was a eommon startup obstaele and was Iinked by some to
eontinuing diffeulties in raising turnover.
. Many elients indieated that their turnover levels were still too small to meet repayments
after the grace period had elapsed. This was stil eommonly the case at the time of
interview, pointing to ongoing diffeulties in their business operations.
. Most were nevertheless optimistic that they would be able to reoay their loans, including
several who were not eurrently doing 50.
. Some would have preferred to take smaller loans initially to match the growth of the
business, but believed that it was not prudent to apply for a lower amount as there was no
guarantee that additional funding would be made available in fuure when required. Large
loans have the impact of unneeessarily inereasing the repayment burden to a business
whieh is at its most vulnerable stage.
. A substantial number had deereased their workforee sinee startup.
. Most were optimistie about their Mure orospeets, a few strongly so. There appeared to be
a fairly strong level of eommitment to making a go of their businesses. These opinions
were also refleeted in the training survey.
. Although a few had speeifie eritieisms to offer, most were oositive about the general value
of the SDF loan seheme. Many saw it asa lifeline and some as an appropriate expression
of a policy of eeonomie empowerment.
4.1.8 Non-financial Services
Findings
4.1.8.1 Most retrenehees would laek the requisite skils to be re-employed or to engage in self-
employment; and also laek finaneial resourees to engage in sèlf-employment or to retrain for other
activities.
25. A.M, Gumbo, "Start and Run Your Own Business" Programme: an EvaJuation Study..., p.25-34.
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4.1.8.2 To address these problems, the CU developed a basic one-week training eourse for
registered retrenchees entitled 'How to Start and Run Your Own Business'. All retrenehees were
offered plaees. Standard training materials were prepared by the CU but the aetual training was
delegated to aeeredited private sector eonsultants.
4.1.8.3 Regardless of skills or prior experienee, intending applicants were required to eomplete the
eourse prior to aeeessing the programme's loans. The registration of the retrenchees was eonducted
by DEED. The aetual training was earried out in groups of about 25 to 30 by the eonsultants.
Training centres exist in all the 10 provinees through the provineial DEED offiees.
4.1.8.4 The content of the training eourse itself is basic and consists of business management
skils, aeeounts, business proposal preparation and loeal market researeh. It is a condensed eourse
so as to fit into a one-week training programme.
4.1.8.5 Up to mid-August 1995, when training was 'temporarily suspended', 12,946 retrenehees
had undergone training, 65 per cent from the private sector and 35 per cent from the public sector.
The numbers trained were equivalent to about 36 per cent of total retrenehments, which are likely
to understate the true aggregate. About 1571 women (15 per cent of the total) went through this
training programme eompared to 8862 men (85 per cent).
4.1.8.6 A geographieal breakdown of the total number trained up to April 1995 revealed that the
large urban centres predominated: Harare/Chitungwiza trained 40 per cent, Bulawayo 14 per cent,
the two Midlands towns Kwekwe and Gweru 19 per cent and Marondera 7 per cent - between them
81 per cent. Six other centres trained the rest. Although the distribution was uneven between the
provinces, on the whole the east/west divide was less evident than in the distriblJtion of projeets.
4.1.8.7 After the widening of the loan scheme to include disabled people, the training scheme was
opened to them. By August 1994435 had reeeived, 29 per cent of them women. A breakdown by
provinee of training eompleted to April 1995 revealed that the majority had been trained in Harare
(61 per cent), the only other signifieant centres being Gweru and Marondera.
Review of Problem Areas
4.1.8.8 The statisties indieate that the training programme had extensive outreach. Probably more
than a third of the target group, though a smaller proportion if non-registered retrenehees are taken
into aeeount, eompleted the basic training eourse. Probably also a slightly higher proportion of public
sector than private sector retrenehees eompleted it.
4.1.8.9 These proportions have been eriticised as evidenee of inadequate impaet. However, some
retrenehees would have reeycled ¡nto the labour market and it is unrealistie to expeet that all would
wish to enter business training. The generailevei of outreach is regarded as ereditable.
4.1.8.10 Only 15 per cent of those trained were women, although the laek of agender breakdown
in the offeial redundaney statisties makes it diffeult to establish how far this proportion differs from
total retrenehment. Astrong gender bias is nevertheless evident.
4.1.8.11 The eourse content itself was elementary and short. It was originally planned to run for two
weeks but cut to reduee eosts. The evaluation of the training sub-programme reeommended that
it be extended to two weeks. It found that the content was generally satisfaetory and 'adequate to
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enable retrenehees to identify via ble business ideas, eonduet basic market researeh and analysis,
and prepare business plans and cash f10w projeetions'.
4.1.8.12 The evaluation found that the eourse was, however, insuffeient to develoo entreoreneurial
skils. The emphasis was primarilyon starting a business and little attention was devoted to how to
run it onee started.
4.1.8.13 It approved the partieipatory methods of training, found the training faeilities adeauate
exeept in Harare and adjudged the trainers well qualified for the iob.
4.1.8.14 It also noted:
. The absenee of elearly defined training needs because there was no training needs
assessment done. Of importanee is the different baekgrounds, edueational levels and
aptitudes of trainees, making a degree of differentiation in grouping and training method
desirable.
. That seetor-soeeifie refresher eourses should be organised regularly as part of the small
business nurturing proeess.
4.1.8.15 The most eonspieuous defieieney is the comolete absenee of an extension service. It is not
possible to eomment mueh further because there is nothing to assess. Once borrowers were
handed their eheques, they were left entirely on their own to sink or swim. The only follow-up was
by the goodwill of their eonsultants, who were not paid for aftereare work and' therefore had little
motivation to offer more than a reseue service in adversity. It need hardly be pointed out that the
laek of support to a eadre of inexperieneed operators starting first-time ventures was likely to prove
amongst the most important faetors in subsequent poor projeet performanee and failure.
4.1.8.16 The urgeney of the need has been well known to the Advisory Board and the CU since
early in the programme's lifetime. Indeed, extensive plans werelaid in the 1994 PMP sub-
programmes to offer, amongst other faeilities, 'one-serviee' small business service centres,
deeentralised administration and service sub-eontraeting from NGOs and finaiieial institutions. Yet
as of Mareh 1996 it seemed that most planningand implementation remained on paper26J.
4.1.9 Borrowers' Evaluation of Non-financial Services
4.1.9.1 There was a general and strong desire for an effeetive extension service and concern at
the present laek of one. This issue eame out more strongly in the survey for the training programme
evaluation, but was nevertheless indieated by many in the pilot surveys.
4.1.9.2 Most were satisfied with the introduetory training though a few highly edueated or
experieneed elients sa id they gained little. A number wanted follow-up training as they gained
experienee.
26. A small sum (Z$717,OOO) appears to have been earmarked in the 1994/95 budget for 'aftereare services' but up
to April 1995 had incurred no expenditure.
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4.1.9.3 Most also appreeiated the assistanee given with oreoaring their market surveys and proieet
orooosals. They eonfirmed that they were given speeifie ad vice by the eonsultants, sueh as whieh
sectors to avoid. Relations with the consultants were generally good and few expressed aetive
dissatisfaetion.
4.2 Operational Meehanisms
4.2.1 Manaaement Information Svstem
Re vie w of Problem Areas
4.2.1.1 The CU is eurrently operating without a full set of aeeounting reeords. The only aeeounting
reeord maintained is the cash book. An analysis of the cash book reveals that basic data, such as
repayments of loans prineipal and interest, is not adequately and consistently reeorded. Adequate
management information systems needed forthe day to day monitoring of the mieroenterprise
financing programme are not in plaee.
4.2.1.2 The aeeounting system operating within SDF is basic and ineomolete. It only eaters for
reeording disbursements of loans direetly to clients and reeords of some repayments by elients. SDF
reeeives some repayments direetly but for elients outside Harare, the repayments are deposited in
a bank aeeount.
4.2.1.3 The bank deposit system has not operated effeiently as SDF does not eonduet a bank
reeoneiliation regularly. There are no bank reeoneiliation statements on a month to month basis, the
last one having been prepared in April 1994. This deficieney also eomplieates the writing up of the
cash book.
4.2.1.4 The cash book does not separate details of grants and loans. DetaiIs of these two separate
operating units are reeorded together. The true reeordof the finaneial oosition of the programme
cannot be aseertained. There are no monthly tallies on all the eolumns and the figures are not
earried forward to the next page.
4.2.1.5 The last offeial financial statement was oreoared as of June 1994. The requirement in the
ADB design that an independent annual audit be earried out by a private firm and submitted to the
ADB within six months does not aooear ever to have been earried out. Nor has the 'separate audit
of disbursements against statements of expenditures'. Apart from a eouple of summary tables, no
auarterly or annual reports have been submitted to the Advisory Board and forwarded to the ADB
as speeified in the ADB design.
4.2.1.6 The funetions of the staff in the aeeounts department are auite rudimentary. The basic
funetions inelude cashbook reeeipting, writing of all SDF eheques, filing of clients reeords, reeording
of c1ients ledger cards, and maintaining elient files.
4.2.1.7 The strueture at SDF is not well suited to man age a diverse portfolio for mieroenterprise
c1ients, who are eommonly beset by operational problems. Eaeh loan is assigned to a CU projeet
officer for supervision. But there is no elient tracking system in plaee, henee arrears can go
undeteeted for a very long time. There is no elear method of reeording arrears and no seheduling
of work to man age elient aeeounts. The 'eomputerised management information and aeeounting
system' preseribed in the ADB design was only in early 1996 reaehing the planning stage.
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4.2.1.8 Individual elient files are kept on all approved loans. The file eontains all relevant
information on the projeet, ineluding the projeet proposal, eorrespondenee, a transaction reeord
sheet with details of the disbursement of the loan and any repayments, and in a minority of eases
a repayment schedule. This system faeilitates easy aceess to all relevant information on a projeet.
The files are shelved in alphabetieal name order under the eight eeonomie seetors used to
categorise all projeets. Most files appeared to be keot in reasonable order. The filing room aets as
the service point for visiting c1ients and the shelving system allows auiek retrieval of relevant c1ient
information.
4.2.1.9 The storage of proiect applieations was less satisfactory. Both elients and consultants have
eomplained on oeeasion that the CU mislaid their submissions, leading to a proeessing delay or the
need to resubmit.
4.2.2 Lendina and Recoverv Svstems
Review of Problem Areas
4.2.2.1 The SDA programme doeument introdueed a erueial ambiguity as to who eould submit
orooosals and how loans were to be disbursed. The original intention seems to have been to admit
only proposals from institutions:
For the effieient utilisation of resourees, funds under the ETP wil not be made
available to individuals as loans or grants. The fund will be given to finaneial and
other development institutions whieh in turn deal with individuals, groups and
assoeiations.
The CU projeet proeessing proeedure, on the other hand, provided explieitly for individuals to submit
their own projeets direetly, whieh was in line with the ADB design but also disbursed direet to
individuals, whieh that design had explicitly excluded. This uneertainty between a wholesaling and
retailing strategy was to beeome a eritical faetor affeeting the performanee of the SDF eredit
seheme.
4.2.2.2 After early experienee during 1993 with the submission of a number of poor quality projeet
proposals, support to applieants was extended to assist them with preparing their proposals.
Following the basic business eourse, the retrenehee was eneouraged to eolleet information for
preparing a business projeet proposal and to submit it to be considered for a loan. The proposals
had to be submitted through a eonsultaney organisation, often the one whieh trained the applieant,
whieh assisted in finalising the brief. Thus the initial appraisal of a projeet was done by a
eonsultaney organisation whieh then submitted it to the CU. The Unit proeessed the applieation,
referred it to an approved agency for teehnieal appraisal in eases of doubt and then submitted it for
eonsideration by the LOGAC. Onee approved, the consultant reeeived a 3 per cent share of the
loan, raised to 5 per cent in mid-1994 after negotiations with the eonsultants.
4.2.2.3 In praetiee the 45-day deadline for a projeet deeision was unrealistie and hardly ever
aehieved. The m'ean gap between projeet su~mission and approval nevertheless remained within
tolerable limits during the first phase, averaging 3-4 months up to September 1994. Thereafter,
however, the gap widened steadily and by late 1995 was averaging more than 14 months. In effeet,
the mean date of submission stalled in the final quarter of 1994 for projeets approved through 1995
and early 1996 as LOGAC, overwhelmed by the flood of new applieations, gave priority to the
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backlog of earlier applieations. Very few applieations submitted after January 1995 have as yet been
presented to LOGAC.
4.2.2.4 This has not been the onlv delay experieneed by aoplieants, who before submission had
to register their redundaney status at DEED offees, eomplete a training course and prepare a
projeet proposal. The ave rage gap between retrenehment and projeet submission rose from around
6-8 months between mid-1993 and early 1994 to 10 months by late 1994 and 12 months by late
1995. In otherwords, the mean waiting period between redundaney and project approval widened
from 6-7 months at the start of the loa n seheme to 12 months by early 1994 to 18 months by early
1995 and 25 months by early 1996. Only 12 suecessful applieants were made redundant after
December 1994 and 1536, or nearly three-quarters, were made redundant in 1993 or earlier.
4.2.2.5 By contrast, the gao between aooroval and disbursement has generally been minimaL. A
random eheek on the projeet files indicated that mostborrowers signed agreements and began to
draw down their loans within weeks of approval. One faeilitating faetor has been a simple standard
form of ¡oan agreement; another was that eheques eould be issued in a one-stoo payment
proeedure at the SDF's service offiee in the Ministry.
4.2.2.6 The ADB design stresse d that loans should not be disbursed in a single payment and a
eheek on the projeet ledger eards indieates that this stipulation was adhered to, the CU issuing
eheques against the borrowers' seleetion from competitive quotations in respeet of eaeh ¡tem of
equipment to be purehased. However, the ADB guidelines linking disbursement to imolementation
were never out into oraetiee: that an implementation schedule and Iinked disbursement timetable
be drawn up for eaeh projeet prior to the signing of the contraet; and that progress be evaluated at
eaeh stage as a condition of further disbursement.
4.2.2.7 The design of a single strueture to undertake two distinet sub-programmes may have been
initially eonvenient, but the practieal requirements of meet the overwhelming demands soon became
too heavy. Soon the flood of projeet applieations was bound to overwhelm the skeleton staff at the
SDF CU. The skeietal strueture by wav of Iimited staffng and resourees eould not eooe with the
esealating aoolication baeklogs.
4.2.2.8 It was initially envisaged that a number of activities would be sub-eontraeted to external
institutions, including the training of retrenehees and appraisal of their projeets. Also envisaged was
an outreaeh extension and reeovery service, although who was to undertake it was not elearly
speeified. In the implementation of this ETP programme, only training and project appraisal were
sub-eontraeted and the outreaeh and extension funetions were never out in olaee.
4.2.2.9 There are no systems in plaee to monitor and manage loan recovery. The reeovery
problems stem from poor aeeounting and reeord-keeoing systems and the absenee of an effeient
repayments colleetion system. As of mid-1995, even basic procedures sueh as invoieing elients for
repayments due were missing. It emerged that one of the main boUleneeks was the need to
ealeulate a eomplieated table of prineipal, arrears and interest due in eaeh case before invoieing.
In September 1995 a simplified straight-line method of ealeulation was substituted whieh allowed
a single repayment amount to be generated for eaeh c1ient and arrears to be quickly assessed.
4.2.2.10 Temporary sta ff were subsequently hired to send out invoiees: eheeks on a sample of
projeet files found invoiee eopies in most, issued in two main rounds in November 1995 and January
1996. However, stopgap measures cannot substitute for a orooerly established aceounting and
repayments system. In April 1996 the lon g plan ned appointment of a qualified aeeount was sa id to
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be imminent, following whieh the entire aeeounting system would be eomputerised. Relianee on an
ineomplete manual aeeounting proeedure and the absenee of automated biling for a portolio of
some 2000 elients in conditions of repeated staff shortage has been a major bottleneek in mobilising
an effeetive repayments system.
4.2.2.11 Some of the borrowers eonfirmed in the field survey that in the absenee of repayment
sehedules, they did not know how much their monthly repayments were.
4.2.2.12 Although the need for projeet monitoring was envisaged at the ineeption of the programme,
staffing and the neeessary eauipment were not orovided at the start of the Drogramme. The
Advisory Board proposed that DEED offees should undertake the monitoring and vehieles have
been bought for this purpose. But the laek of oDerational funds has so far kept the new service
grounded. The DEED person nei, for whom this extra duty is added to their regular workload, may
also have neither the time or the reauisite teehnieal and business analytieal skiIIs to supervise and
monitor the mieroenterprises authoritatively. During the second half of 1995 the CU eondueted
regional seminars for them and it was plan ned that after eomputerisation of the SDF aeeounts, the
CU would prepare itineraries for monitoring rounds and pay for them on a commission basis out of
SDF funds.
4.2.2.13 The Advisory Board has not been unaware of the serious default rate on repayment of
loans. At its May 1994 meeting It resòlved that there should be instituted:
. A repayment system;
. Maehinery for monitoring repayments;
. A legal framework to enforee repayments.
4.2.2.14 An appropriate legal status for the SDF to enable it to enforee repayments has long been
under review without a definite outcome. The Attorney General's Offee advised the SDF to reserve
ownership of the propert bought by SDF. The Advisory Board was advised to consider
ineorporation as a eorporate body so as to have the legal powers to repossess propert. No formal
steps have vet been taken towards ineorooration.
4.2.2.15 The standard loan agreements that all SDF borrowers sign include a spaee for eollateral.
However, the details on a sample of files eheeked were sometimes brief and seanty and would be
diffieult to follow up from an enforeement standooint. In some eases the assets to be purchased
were to serve as seeurity, in partieular vehicles. In others, the applieants house was named. The
forms also required the applieants next of kin to sign as guarantors and in nearly all eases
signatures were in plaee. Intheory, therefore, the SDF had formal legal safeguards aaainst default.
4.2.2.16 In mid 1995 the SDF sought permission to engage attorneys to reeover the repayments.
But only 17 files had been handed over by September 1995 to the lawyers for their action. This
exereise is bound to be eostlv and contrasts with the growing use of debt eolleetion agencies by
parastatals sueh as SEDCO. It will in any case not bear fruit uhless a oroperly eonstituted system
of monitoring repayments is imolemented. A sound arrears eontrol cannot be developed in isolation
to the lending system.
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4.2.3 Risk Manaaement Procedures
Review of Problem Areas
4.2.3.-1 The large loan size and laek of further finaneial indueements inereased the risk of default:
. Sueeessful mieroeredit institutions have tended to find that first time borrowers should
initially be trusted with smallloans andonly after they have built up a repayments reeord
should they be offered bigger loans.
. The possibility of obtaining additional finanee at a later stage also aets as an indueement
to repay on the initialloan.
These factors have an influenee in building good credit management praetiees amongst first-time
borrowers. The SDF operation, on the other hand, was designed to disburse the entire amount as
quicklyas possible and avoid any eontinuing relationship with the clients exeept to enforee
repayment.
4.2.3.2 The level of risk associated with the loan portolio as a whole is in large measure
dependent on the viabilty of the projeets approved for funding and therefore on effeetive prior
appraisal. However, the CU's loa n appraisal funetions were limited to cheeking that the oroieet
aoolieation was consistent with the basic policy guidelines, mainly that the applieant qualified as a
retrenehee. Otherwise, the projeet offeers' funetion was limited to ensuring eonsisteney of
presentation and information and then transcribing information from the projeet doeument to a
simple LOGAC diseussion form.
4.2.3.3 Projeet appraisals were entirely delegated out to the eonsultants. Yet the same consultants
played a major role in generating projeet proposals, eommonly both training and assisting the elients
with their proposals and finally motivating them at meetings of LOGAC. The consultants were then
paid a percentage of the value of the loan on eaeh projeet approved. Two ootential eonfliets of
interest arose:
. The more projeets they got approved, the more the consultants earned in fees, sinee their
formal responsibilities ended with the approval.
. Likewise, the higher the loa n amount, the higher the fee.
Thus to turn down at the appraisal stag e proposals they themselves helped to formulate would result
in losing ineome.
4.2.3.4 In praetiee, as the CU projeet offeers gained experienee they were able toapply a limited
degree of regulation by applying eonsisteney eheeks and validating data. The quality of some of the
proposals was not always of a high order and at least one consultant was eaught bateh proeessing
more or less identieal proposals. A preliminary filter was also put in plaee by allowing consultants
to submit abstraets of projeets they considered doubtful for prior eonsideration by the CU before
proeeeding to appraisal. This proeedure redueed the risk for consultants and helped weed out poorly
prepared projeets at the first stage.
4.2.3.5 Yet projeet offeers had limited caoaeity to perform validations, being restrieted mainly to
telephone eheeks with central, provincial and distriet government offees. All outside ealls, even
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within Harare, had to reeeive prior authorisation. Client interviews and site eheeking were generally
not feasible, espeeially outside Harare, although the assistanee of DEED offees eould on oeeasion
be invoked. Even where projects were deemed unaeeeptable, the result was eommonly not rejeetion
but referred back for resubmission.
4.2.3.6 As a result of this division of responsibilties, eommunication between consultants and CU
proieet offeers has been minimaL. Training and startup proeess positions consultants close to
applieants and they eould provide a regular and usefulflow of information on problems arising and
proeedural diffeulties eneountered
4.2.3.7 Once submitted, LOGAC approved almost all the aoolieations it considered; although a
minority were deferred for further information or elarifieation, they were mostly approved in the end.
Aeeording to the projeet reeords maintained by the Monitoring and Implementation Unit (MI U) of the
Ministry of Finanee up to January 1995 only 66 projects submitted to LOGAC had aetually been
rejeeted while another 122 were at that time deferred, rates of 4.7 per cent and 8.6 per cent
respeetively. In the CU database only two projeets out of 1976 were listed as rejeeted. A CU
memorandum in June 1996 state d that 186 projeets had been rejeeted by LOGAC out of 1,547
considered to date, a rate of 12 per cent.
4.2.3.8 The pace of projeet approvals was regulated more by institutional caoaeity but from mid-
1995 availability of funds beeame the deeisive faetor. The projeet proeessing eapaeity inereased
over time. The original ADB guideline that LOGAC should meet only onee a month was never
realistie. In the last half of 1993 LOGAC was meeting on average onee a fortnight and approving
11 projeets at a sitting. By the third quarter of 1994 it was meeting more or less weekly and
approving about 23 projeets a session; by the third quarter of 1995 it was approving 27 projeets a
session. By 1995, however, proeessing eapaeity was running up against budget eeilings. In effeet,
LOGAC would eontinue proeessing until funds ran out, then suspended sittings.
4.2.3.9 The SDF eredit programme is thus demand driven. The implieit assumption is that there
is money for retrenehees and all those who apply should get it. A very high proportion of loan
applieations reeommended for approval by LOGAC obtain approval unless they do not meet the
policy guideline on being retrenehees. Appraisal is delegated to consultants who take no risk. The
SDF, which bears all the risk, is proteeted only by limited internal eonsisteney cheeking.
4.2.3.10 This outcome has given the eredit programrre a strong welfare charaeter: retrenehees are
entitled to loans and reeeive them so long as they can present a plausible projeet. The plaeement
of the CU in the prineipal welfare ministry and the eombination of the eredit seheme witha large
safety nets programme in the same administrative unit has stronaly reinforeed the welfare ethos.
4.2.4 Incentives for Service Deliverv
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4.2.4.1 Staff motivation and quality of work is of some signifieanee to the sueeess of the SDF
programme. It is apparent from previous evaluation reports and surveys and from the programme
outputs aehieved under both the SWP and the ETP that CU staff at head offee and DSW frontline
offeers have eommonly shouldered heavy additional workloads. often in conditions of staff shortage
and sea reit y of resourees. Their aehievements under diffeult cireumstanees are eommendable.
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4.2.4.2 The issue of motivation and performanee does not end there, however. Civil service
salaries have fallen steeply under ESAP, by 1994 averaging only 58 per cent of their 1990 value.
Performanee eriteria have been introdueed into civil serviceeontraets but apply to periodie general
appraisals rather than speeifie outputs. There is no incentive system directlv related to SDF loan
results, of partieular importanee for case offeers. Indeed, good performanee has generally been
aeeompanied by depreeiating real ineome. Nor is there a eareer path speeifieally conneeted to the
loan seheme. The lack of an ineentive and eareer strueture affeets not only staff produetivity but also
the setting of task priorities.
4.2.4.3 The loeation of the CU inside a large welfare ministry has also largely hindered the building
of a eorporate eulture amongst staff.
4.2.4.4 The CU has also faeed resouree eonstraints arising from the faet that its staff salaries and
operational eosts are merc;ied in the parent ministry's budget and do not have a separate budget
line. The administrative expenses of the CU are part of the ministry aeeounts, subjeeting it to co st 
eonstraints outside its control, arising at short notiee and with unpredietable timing.
4.2.4.5 The effeetiveness of contracting out the preparation and appraisal of projeet proposal was
eomoromised by the method of payment for the eonsultants' serviees:
. The first stage had a built-in ineentive: if the applieant failed to submit a proposal, the
consultant would not be paid. The opportunity to submit an abstraet for prior CU
endorsement redueed the risk for the eonsultants, but if the project was subsequently
rejeeted by LOGAC they reeeived only a flat fee of Z$500 rather than the full percentage.
. The second and eritieal stage had only weak ineentives, sinee so long as the proposal was
plausibly formulated and their elients passed the eligibility test, aoproval by LOGAC.
though not quite automatie. was highly probable. Generally, poorly prepared proposals
were referred back rather than rejeeted outright, so there was usually aseeond ehanee.
The only condition on payment of the percentage fee was projeet approval at a LOGAC
meeting to whieh the consultants would be ealled to motivate their projeets. The SDF
projeets pipeline was thus a virtuallv guaranteed risk-free. source of ineome for the
eonsultants.
4.2.4.6 A eomparative study in 1995 on the effeetiveness of one of the consultant organisations
revealed that while the projeet proposals it submiUed to LOGAC had a 100 per cent approval rate,
projeets it presented to eommereial banks had a zero approval rate. The difference outcomes are
entirely attributable to the faet that the consultants effeetively aooraised their own proieets and that
their c1ients prequalified for aeeeotanee by virtue of their status.
4.2.4.7 A crucial missing link between the quality of projeet preparation and later loan performanee
was the seoaration of the consultants from any responsibility for outcomes. Indeed a disineentive
operated sinee the consultants were not paid for any aftereare support they voluntarily afforded to
projeets they had earlier assisted. At meetings in Oetober 1993 and May1994 the Advisory Board
approved a policy of sharing the risk of default between the SDF and consultants by plaeing a
eontraetual requirement on the consultants to follow up the projeet until it started to repay the loan
at the end of the graee period. If the projeet failed due to projeet design the risk would then be
shared. However, this policy has not yet been implemented.
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4.2.5 Cost-effectiveness of Service Deliverv
Findings
4.2.5.1 The CU appointed a number of private sector consultants to provide five-day training
eourses for the retrenehees for a fixed fee. This service was not direetly related to the eredit seheme
in the sense that it was open to all retrenehees and not only those intending to apply for loans,
although part of its purpose was to eneourage the m to do so.
4.2.5.2 The standard training eontraet between the SDF and the consultants offered Z$1,500 per
day for training a group of 25-30 over five days. The unit fee was thus Z$7,500 in total and Z$250-
300 per trainee. The SDF paid for catering and transport. Cumulative expenditure to April 1995 was
reeorded as Z$2.9 milion for training and Z$2.5 millon for catering.
4.2.5.3 The same consultants were eommissioned to prepare, at the initiation of the applieant, a
projeet proposal to be submitted to LOGAC through the CU. At the outset the consultant was paid
at a fixed rate of 3 per cent of the approved loa n amount. In May 1994 it was raised to 5 per cent
at the same time that the guideline loan threshold was raised, after negotiations with the consultants
who were looking for 7.5 per cent. This fee related solely to assistanee with the preparation of the
projeet proposal and its appraisal. At 3 per cent on the guideline amount of Z$80,OOO the fee would
have been worth Z$2,400, rising to Z$6,000 at 5 per cent on Z$120,OOO.
4.2.5.4 The faet that the SDF programmes are integrated in a eommon aeeount and that a number
of eosts are hidden elsewhere in departmental aeeounts makes it impossible to construet a eomplete
loa n aceount. Nevertheless the fragmentary data available allow several eost elements to be
tentatively estimated, using the ratio to loans approved as the most suitable indieator. As at April
1995, just before the stop-start disruptions, the co st of catering was equivalent to 2.4 per cent of
loans approved, the co st of training was 2.8 per cent and the co st of appraisals was 4.5 per cent,
in all 9.75 per cent.
4.2.5.5 Other incidental eosts attributable to the SDF are smalL. They inelude items sueh as
expenses for members attending Advisory Board meetings.
4.2.5.6 The eosts of aetually administering the eredit seheme are not ineluded in the above
assessment. They arise mainly from the operations of the CU and the ineidental eontributions of the
provineial DEED offees. Data are not available for most administrative eosts but a summary of the
CU's salary eosts was attaehed to the FY 1993/94 SDF ineome and expenditure statement. For a
staff eomplement of nine including the eoordinator, the annual total was Z$302,607, equivalent to
1.1 per cent of loans aetually disbursed during that year.
4.2.5.7 During 1995 expenditure on PMP, prineipally the national povert survey, entered as a
new budget item. Although the results of the survey may have a large bearing on any redesign of
the SDF eredit seheme, its eosts and other associated with PMP are considered here to be more
elosely linked to the safety nets than the eredit programme.
4.2.5.8 No other non-financial serviees hav~ been provided under SDF auspiees to date.
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4.2.5.9 Although retrenehees eould aeeess the training without eommitting themselves to
submitting a projeet, the faet that it was eompulsory for loan applieants and that most did proeeed
to submit applieations makes it appropriate to attribute all the training costs to the eredit seheme.
The failure to synehronise the pace of training with loan proeessing therefore resulted in mueh
higher unit training eosts than neeessary.
4.2.5.10 The training of retrenehees seems to have been treated as demand-Ied, a service to whieh
retrenehees were entitled as soon as possible after registration. As sueh, it had the benign effeet
that for the large numbers on the loan applieation waiting list, the skils gained eould in the meantime
be put to other ineome-generating uses. However, as a charge on the eredit seheme it made little
sense to allow the numbers trained to run ahead to nine times and the number of loan applieations
to six times the number of loans approved by mid-1995. From this standpoint the suspension of
training in August 1995 was a sensible eost-eutting measure sinee at the prevailing rate of loa n
proeessing the backlog of trained applieants would suffee forseveral years to come.
4.2.5.11 The SDF was proteeted from the eosts of appraisal of waiting applieations sinee payment
was eonditional upon approval. However, the lengthening delavs have imoosed an unfair charge
on the eonsultants, who had already eompleted their elient assistance and appraisal work prior to
submission. By 1995 they eould expeet to have to wait for years before payment. On the Z$803
millon value of projeets on the waiting list in mid-1995, the SDF would have owed them Z$40 millon
in appraisal fees.
4.2.5.12 In general, the contracting out system, whieh was part of the original ADB design, seems
to have worked fairly well on co st as well as auality eriteria. A per capita training eost of Z$250-300
was low for the professional serviees it purehased. The mueh higher eost of projeet preparation and
appraisal was nevertheless a neeessary charge for professional facilitation whieh supplied a vital
service to elients having little if any business experience and venturing into the high-risk domain of
new business startups. It sueeeeded in injeeting eommereial skiIIs into a public sector seheme at
aeeeptable and manageable co st.
4.2.5.13 The overhead of roughly 10 per cent attributable to the loan seheme, although not covering
hidden administrative eosts, left around 90 per cent of grant resourees, not eounting interest and
repayments, for disbursement. Thus a high orooortion of SDF grant funds has gone direet to c1ients.
4.2.5.14 There is a elear need for full and transoarent aeeounting of the SDF eredit seheme. The
integration of its aceounts with other programmes and the invisibility of administrative eosts in
departmental aeeounts makes it impossible to exereise proper finaneial management of the eredit
scheme.
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4.3 Organisational Struetures and Funetions
4.3.1 Scope of Financial and Non-financial SefVces
Findings
4.3.1.1 The SDF has funetioned as a simple disbursement vehicle for grant funds donated by the
Government and the ADB. It has not contemplated offering depositor faeilities or any other finaneial
serviees.
4.3.1.2 The SDF has provided two main non-finaneial serviees:
. The introduetory business training eourse, open to all retrenehees and unemployed
disabled on demand;
. Assistanee to applieants in preparing their projeet proposals.
It has offered no aftereare or otherextension services.
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4.3.1.3 The SDF eredit scheme has had the virtue of simplieity: clients, administrators and policy-
makers alike have had no diffeulty in understanding its targeting and lending strategy. Sueh elarity
of purpose was important in getting the scheme off theground and well known amongst its intended
c1ients.
4.3.1.4 The seheme's limitations of seODe have nevertheless been a source of diffieulty for its
elients, in partieular:
. The laek of aecess to working eapital;
. The ban on eo-finaneing;
. The exclusion under most eireumstances of top-up or follow-on lending, or of assistanee
with obtaining additional finanee from other sourees;
. The eomplete absenee of any extension serviees.
4.3.1.5 The implementation of the seheme has also suffered from several key ineonsisteneies and
ambiguities:
. The open aeeess to the introduetory training eourse indueed an expeetation of open
aeeess to loans as well, whieh the high rate of approvals eneouraged. The de facto
rationing of aeeess by the pace of loa n proeessing ahd later by laek of funds eontributed
to the scheme's poor public image and obseured the additional value of the training eourse
as an orientation towards self-employment and small business promotion.
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. Clients had reasonable expeetations that some sort of aftereare service would be
aceessible. The eomplete failure to provide one signifieantly worsened the scheme's
reputation amongst elients and inereased the risk of projeet failure.
. The laek of supervision and monitoring eontributed to an expeetation that loan reeovery
was not seriously intended and thus to a very low rate of repayment.
4.3.2 Structure and CaDacitv
Findings
4.3.2.1 The implementation of the SDF was delegated to existing sections of central government
in line with the general ESAP prescription to avoid ereating new state structures. Initially, oversight
of the SDF loan seheme was loeated in the Ministry of Finanee but was transferred in Mareh 1995
to MPSLSW.
4.3.2.2 The institutional struetures of the SDF are as follows:
. The SDF Advisory Board;
. The Loans and Grants Alloeation Committee (LOGAC);
. The SDF Coordination Unit (CU).
4.3.2.3 The policy formulation and implementation of the ETP is the responsibility of the SDF
Advisory Board. The Board is ehaired by theSeeretary of MPSLSW and its membership consists
largely of eivil servants from different ministries, together with delegates from designated
organisations, mainly representative assoeiations (see Annex 1).
4.3.2.4 The Advisory Board operates as a national SDA steering eommittee or working group. It
meets quarterly to review the general progress of the implementation of SDA activities. It is
responsible for the overall monitoring and implementation of SDA initiatives. In sum, the Advisory
Board advises the Seeretary of MPSLSW on issues of policy affeeting the applieation of the Fund.
4.3.2.5 The Advisory Board's main funetions are as follows:
. Establishing policy guidelines for the operating and managing SDF.
. Setting priorities for the alloeation of SDF resourees.
. Determining eriteria for alloeating loans and grants.
. Reviewing and approving guidelines for the identifieation of target groups and proeedures
for projeet appraisal, proeurement, disbursement, audit and aeeounting.
. Creating specialised or teehnieal eommittees and determining their eomposition and terms
of reference.
. Reviewing progress reports and plans of action.
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. Supporting beneficia ry assessment aetivity.
4.3.2.6 The Loans and Grants Alloeation Committee (LOGAC) is appointed by the Seeretary of
MPSLSW. Its membership is drawn from MPSLSW and the Ministries of Finanee, of Lands,
Agrieulture and Water Development and of Mines. In addition, a member is also drawn from the
National EeonomicPlanning Commission and any other member eo-opted by the Committee's
Chairperson. LOGAC is the SDA Advisory Board's eommittee with responsibility for projeetand
finaneial approvals. LOGAC in its review and approval of projeets/programmes is mandated to give
priority to ineome and employment generating activities, skils development, training and institutional
strengthening as well as soeial welfare measures.
4.3.2.7 It is LOGAC's responsibility to advise the SDA Advisory Board regularly on sueh issues as
the distribution of SDF resourees between the major programmes, the finaneial conditions governing
SDF resourees, eligibility eriteria, and the monitoring of the,utilisation of loans and grants. LOGAC
is responsible for identifying benefieiary target groups for SDF funding, for ensuring that projects
funded by the SDF are consistent with the SDF objeetives of broad outreaeh, and for alloeating
funds to approved projeets.
4.3.2.8 More specifically, the funetions of LOGAC have been spelt out as determining:
. The amount of resourees to be alloeated as loan funding for employment generating
projeets, and to apportion thereafter sueh resourees to speeifie programmes and to
determine the terms and conditions of sueh loans.
. The finaneial resources that will be made available as grants, their alloeation between
different eligible institutions and the conditions and requirements governing the grants.
. The institutions that should be eligible for loans and grants.
4.3.2.9 The SDF Coordination Unit (CU) is the organ responsible for the day-to-day coordination
and implementation of the Social Development Fund, as defined by the Advisory Board. It operates
as an integral unit of MPSLSW and has four key funetions: projeet appraisal, projeet monitoring and
evaluation, outreaeh and extension, and administration, ineluding finaneial aspects. The CU is
therefore the central administrative eomponent of SDF as it interaets with the Advisory Board,
LOGAC and elient benefieiaries of the Fund. Its administrative eapaeity is a major faetor in
determining policy outcomes.
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4.3.2.10 The related issues of institutional autonomy and distinet leaal status are central to the
effeetive functioning of the SDF's eredit operation:
. The CU has operated from the outset under the wing of its parent ministry, funetioning with
offcers seeonded from the ministry and strengthened periodieally with temporary staff for
speeifie purposes. It laeks effeetive autonomy of any kind. Finaneially, its administrative
eosts fall under the ministry budget. It has no independent powers to hire staff direetly, set
their conditions of service, proeure equipment and supplies, or run its field operations.
Main Report: Chapter 4 Page 56
. It also has no legal standina to aet on its own behalf in enforeing eontraets and reeovering
loans. These are basic attributes of any lending institution and the laek of them seriously
limits the effeetiveness of the SDF and its eredibility with elients.
4.3.2.11 Apart from the switehing of line responsibility from the Ministry of Finanee to MPSLSW, the
draft revised eonstitution of the SDF (see Annex 1) does not direetly address the issue of autonomy
or leaal status. ItViould retain the SDF as a speeial fund administered by the Permanent Seeretary
as aeeounting offeer. It is understood that greater autonomy may be envisaged after the pattern of
the Distriet Development Fund. While sueh a framework may be suitable for the disbursement of
grant funds, it would not satisfy the essential requirements of a eredit agency aiming to operate on
a revolving fund basis.
4.3.2.12 Staff shortages have hampered the CU from the oUtset. There was a disjuncture between
the needs of the ETP and the staffng eapacity to run a large programme geared to quick
disbursement. The reeruitment of staff was delayed eonsiderably. This meant that the funetions of
the CU were only slowly implemented, and generally the size of staff was ineommensurate with the
demands plaeed upon the Unit. It was not until Mareh 1993 in the third year of ESAP that a SDF
Coordinator was appointed and not until July 1995 in the fifth year of ESAP that projeet monitoring
staff were appointed.
4.3.2.13 The faet that the administrative bottleneek was a major problem for the ETP was known
to the government at an early stage. In 1993 the government aeknowledged that the eomplement
of professional staff in CU was inadequate. Thus it was remarked that 'the experienees to date with
the implementation of SDA programmes strongly points to a laek of eapaeity in the institutions that
have had the responsibility for delivering these programmes'i27J. However, the restrietions of oublie
service proeedures and the eounter-pressures during a oeriod of public sector redundaneies under
ESAP made a timely response diffcult to aehieve in praetiee. The ETP, like its soeial welfare
eounterpart, required inereased, not redueed, administrative eapaeity to implement and thus ran
eounter to the general thrust of ESAP to seale back the size of the eivil service. The integration of
the CU ¡nto the ministerial struetures thus imposed an inflexibilitv whieh seriously ieopardised the
principal SDA Drogrammes from their ineeotion:
4.3.2.14 The Proieet Analysis Seetion, whieh proeesses the in-eoming projeet proposals, laeked the
neeessary eomplement of staff until mid-1995. The proeessing of the approximately 300 projeets
submitted eaeh mo nth has therefore been painfully slow. Up to mid-1995 only two projeet offeers
were in post, although another two were appointed in July as Senior Projeet Analysts. It is likely,
however, that the inflow of new projeets will slow steadily if eligibility eontinues to be restrieted to
retrenehees.
4.3.2.15 The ETP has eoneentrated on alloeating resourees to applieants. It has not PUt in olaee a
proDer monitoring system of finaneed proiects. neither has it developed an extension programme,
whieh is erueial for the sueeess of eredit programmes of this nature.
4.3.2.16 Monitoring eapaeity was eompletely laeking in the CU until as late as mid-1995. The
Monitoring and Reeoverv Seetion started operating only in August 1995 with a Senior Projeet
Analyst and a Projeet Offeer; a second post for a projeetoffeer was still vaeant in late 1995. The
27. MPSLSW, Povert AllevÎatÎon Action Plan, 1993; Zimbabwe Government, PAAP: the Implementation StrategÎes,
1994; MPSLSW, Implementation of PAAP, 1994. ,
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funetions of this seetion involve monitoring, reporting on the activities, developing a database on all
funded projeets as well as liaising with DEED on the performanee of projeets. It also assists in the
eolleetion of repayments from elients. The day to day activities of the seetion involve preparation of
data input forms, whieh eontain summary details of theapproved projeet; and visiting elients as a
follow-up to assess the performanee of the projeet. But in most eases visits are only undertaken to
assess those elients requiring additional funding.
4.3.2.17 This seetion is expeeted to cover the entire country from ¡ts Harare base. It can eall on the
assistanee of DEED but the staff of the provineial offees of DE ED have neither the time nor the
expertise for effeetive oroiect monitoring and do not have extension or outreaeh services. Nor do
they have the neeessary operational budget for the extensive traveIlng required. The vehicles with
whieh they were provided from donor funds have seen little service on SDF business.
The laek of monitoring eapacity is a eritieal faetor in the failure to establish the eredit seheme as a
revolving fund. The first monitoring field to be undertaken by the CU managed to follow up only 36
projeets spread over three provinees in 10 days, 7 of whieh were not at the stated address. They
formed less than 3 per cent of all projeets then approved. The great majority of elients have never
reeeived a visit from the CU.
4.3.2.18 The pilot surveys and other elient eonsultations have all highlighted the SDF benefieiaries'
identifieation of the laek of a follow-up extension service as a key problem in addressing their
teething problems.
4.3.2.19 The third eomponent of the CU, the Aeeounts and Administration Seetion, remains greatly
understaffed, whieh has seriously impeded aceounting and reeord keeping. In mid-1995 the
aeeounts seetion had no executive offeers at all, having lost the two previously in post, and only one
permanent c1erk. There were three temporary elerks and a temporary aeeountant on secondment
from the Ministry of Finanee to help prepare aeeounts for FY 1993/94. Three additional c1erks were
hired to start in July and the number of temporary elerks was raised to five, but the laek of offeers
at executive level remained a eritieal weakness. The section also laeked a qualified aeeountant. One
example of the eonsequenees arising was that some projeet files were missing key doeuments such
as repayment sehedules(28).
4.3.2.20 Although there is general awareness that the ETP requires additional staff to be
implemented effeetively, current budgetary pressures impinging on the Government make it
uneertain whether the neeessary staff will be hired, or replaeed when vaeaneies arise.
4.3.3 External Linkaaes in Proaramme Imolementation
Fin dings
4.3.3.1 The SDF has funetionallinkages with other ministries, in partieular Finanee, Agrieulture,
Energy and Water Resourees, and Industry and Commeree. Projeet applications submitted on
agrieulture are usually vetted by the Ministry of Agrieulture to assess their viability. Similar referrals
for technieal assessment are made in doubtful eases, for instanee to SEDCO.
28, ADB, Supervision Report, July 1995, p.5.
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4.3.3.2 Under its original eonstitution responsibility for the SDF was divided between the Ministry
of Finanee, whose MIU ehaired LOGAC, and MPSLSW, whose Permanent Seeretary ehaired the
Advisory Board but which had no other representation on the Board. The formal aecounting
responsibility resided with the Ministry of Finance. This responsibilty was transferred in early 1995
to MPSLSW and with it the ehairing of LOGAC. The SDF Coordinator chaired the Advisory Board
from January 1995.
4.3.3.3 There are no direet linkages and no proeedural relationships with NGOs or private sector
organisations.
4.3.3.4 Representation on the two deeision-making organs of the SDF is heavily dominated by
ministries. Five non-governmental umbrella bodies are represented ex offcio on the SDF's Advisory
Board, of whieh only one seat is for NGOs. Under the old eonstitution the Board had at least nine
ministry offeials; under the new eonstitution that number has been fixed at 14. LOGAC has no ex
officio non-ministry members. 80th eommittees may, however, eoopt additional members at their
discretion.
4.3.3.5 Relationships with donor ageneies, espeeially sueh international institutions as the UNDP,
ILO and UNICEF, have been reasonably strong. Both teehnieal and material support have been
extended to the unit in the form of offee equipment, vehieles and the reeruitment of additional staff
to eope with the pressure on demand for serviees from the Department of Soeial Welfare. Dialogue
with these institutions amongst others was useful in the drawing up of the Povert Alleviation Action
Plan (PMP).
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4.3.3.6 The division of responsibility between the Ministry of Finanee and MPSLSW set up a dual
mandate whieh was satisfaetorv to neither ministry. The transfer of aeeounting responsibility to the
MPSLSW returned to the original plan as refleeted in the Appraisal Report. The laek of effective
eooperation between the MIU and the CU was shown, for example, in the faet that the projeets
database was handeçl over only on paper, requiring the CU to key in all the data from serateh.
4.3.3.7 There was from the outset a large majority of ministry offeials in the two SDF eommittees,
a very limited NGO DartieiDation and in partieular an almost eomplete absenee of the private sector:
· On the Advisory Board, NGOs were restrieted to two umbrella bodies, the National
Association of NGOs (NANGO) and the National Council of Disabled People (NCDP). The
eontribution of the latter is evident at a number of points in the Boards deliberations and
is a measure of the quality of input that other NGOs might have made. Yet frontline NGOs
were entirely absent. In particular, not one of the leading NGOs running mieroeredit
sehemes was invited to join. The Board was thus deprived of input from organisations with
direet mierofinanee experienee. This weakness is also evident in the original ADB design.
. A similar absenee of finaneial institutions is also very apparent. Private sector
representation was left to the IBDC. Other mainstream business assoeiations were not
ineluded and nor were the eommereial banks, despite the inclusion int he ADB design of
representatives of both employers and finanCial institutions.
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. While several ministries with tenuous eonneetions to small business development had
seats, parastatals aetually running small business serviees, sueh as SEDCO and the AFC,
were not direetly represented, although in the ADB design the Ministry, of Industry and
Commeree's nominee was assigned to SEDCO.
. Membership was overwhelmingly from central offees and Harare-based. Participation from
other regioIls was more or less eoincidental.
4.3.3.8 Membership of LOGAC was eonfined to ministry offeials. There was no external inDut of
professional finaneial or business eXDertise into its Droeeedings exeept in an ad hoc manner through
the partieipation of consultants motivating their projeets. This heavy Dredominance of central
government administrators was against the spirit of both the original SDA programme and PMP,
whieh plaeed strong emphasis on NGO partieipation and deeentralisation of initiative. Sueh
partieipation was also emphasised in the ADB design, whieh misguidedly proposed to constitute
LOGAC exelusively with senior offeials but also properly antieipated that professional institutions
would aetually administer the loans¡29J.
4.3.3.9 It must be emphasised that the above struetural imbalances should not be eonstrued as
a eritieism of the eommitment or professionalism of the members of the two eommittees. It was
previously noted, for instanee, that the performanee of LOGAC improved steadily over time in regard
to the speed of projeet proeessing. Nevertheless, this was a small business development seheme
whose benefieiaries would have to sink or swim entirely in the private sector and with Iittle if any
further state assistanee to fall back on. The laek of business experienee and finaneial expertise
amongst their memberships was bound to have a serious imDaet on the setting of Driorities. the
deeision-makinc; and the operations of the Advisorv Board and LOGAC.
4.3.3.10 Of major importanee has been the relationship between the main externallender to the
ETP programme, the Afriean Development Bank. It would appear that the ADB inDut has been less
aetive than oriainally indieated in the Appraisal Report. There is little evidence in the CU reeords of
aetive eontributions by the ADB's Resident Mission, whieh was eharged with responsibility for
ongoing supervision. The Mission was in any case closed down in early 1995. The joint mid-term
review with the World Bank does not seem to have taken plaee and the three supervision missions
were widely spaeed at roughly 18 month intervals. Thus expert adviee and teehnieal input were
laeking, partieularly in the early stages when it would have been of most value. The beneficial
outcome of sueh assistanee was shown by the results of the most reeent miss ion in mid-1995,
whose adviee assisted several administrative andproeedural reforms in the months following.
4.4 Programme Performanee and Sustainability
4.4.1 Target GrouDS
Performance
4.4.1.1 The ETP's outreaeh has been mixed. A substantial proportion of retrenehees have
eompleted the introductory training eourse and a large proportion of these have prepared and
submitted projeets for loa n finanee. However, the proeessing of loans has not kept pace with
29. ADB, Appraisal Report, paras 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.4.3.
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demand, resulting in a large backlog of applieations. Nevertheless, in itself the SDF eredit seheme
has aehieved fairly rapid progress after its slow startup: the approval of around 2,000 loans within
30 months is a substantial aehievement for an entirely new lending programme.
4.4.1.2 The impaet of the seheme on the disabled is diffeult to assess because its extension was
fairly reeent. To date few projeets involving the disabled have been approved and progress appears
to be slow.
Sustainabílty
4.4.1.3 With the first ESAP now eompleted, mueh depends on the Governments future intentions
in the field of eeonomie reform. The SDF was designed to address one partieular negative outcome
of struetural adjustment, transitional unemployment. The first round of reforms have now largely
worked through the private sector and the redundancies now pieked up from the private sector by
the SDF will be attributable largely to the normal ups and downs of the eommereial eeonomy and
to other maior imoaets, sueh as drought, changes in seetoraleeonomie prospeets or the revision
of trading arrangements, partieularly with South Africa. On the other hand, in the parastatal sector
and espeeially in the civil service the pace of retrenehment was rather slower than antieipated. If
further downsizing of public sector organisations is to be pursued, a new wave of redundaneies may
follow, albeit on a smaller seale than during 1991-94.
4.4.1.4 The large backlog of loa n applieations on file with the CU will now eonsiderably overstate
the state of aetual demand sinee many applieants will now have found other jobs or means of
survival. Nonetheless a sizeable pool remains with a preferential eaU on any new ICan finanee made
available.
4.4.1.5 Apart from the minor extensions already made, there appears to be no eurrent intention
to expand eligibility for the eredit seheme to other grouDs of direet benefieiaries. The proposals in
the 1994 PMP strateg y and programme doeuments inelude a separate microfinanee initiative
aimed primarily at rural women and of a very different charaeter.
4.4.1.6 On the other hand, there has been wide-ranging informal diseussion on the possibility of
establishing a wholesaling faeilty under the SDF, aUowing it to onlend funds to frontline mierofinanee
institutions. This approaeh would be distinet from the present operation serving retrenehees and
would greatly extend the range of target groups. The original design of the credit seheme was infaet
a hybrid mixture of retailing and wholesaling whieh envisaged the CU reeeiving and proeessing
projeet proposals but contracting out the disbursement and administration of the loans themselves.
The CU's present plans do not appear to envisage transferring any of its existing loan portfolio to
other institutions. It can be expected therefore that the existing eredit seheme and its target grouo
will remain a distinet oDeration whatever other loa n faeilities are initiated under SDF auspiees.
4.4.2 Loans
Performance
4.4.2.1 The reeovery rate on the SDF loans is low. One estimate is that only 3 per cent of
borrowers are repaying regularly while a rate of about 10 per cent was reported to the Advisory
Board. In the field survey in September 1995 of mainly urban-based mieroenterprises, 20 per cent
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of those sampled c1aimed to be making repayments. Stil another estimate is that at least half of the
microenterprises are operational and have the potential eapaeity to service their loans if an effeient
reeovery system was instituted. The field survey eonfirmed that more than halfof respondents were
willing to make repayments although many elaimed temporary eashflow problems at the time.
4.4.2.2 It is impossible to determine the aetual repayment rate with any degree of aeeuraey on the
data available. A sample eheek on the ledger eards in the projeet files revealed that:
. About 32 per cent of the c1ients have made one or more repayment(s).
. Not one was up to date with repayments.
. There are no details of ageing of arrears and few repayment sehedules.
But as reported earlier it is probable that some repayments paid direetly into the bank will not have
been captured onto the transaction sheets.
4.4.2.3 One of the field surveys indieated that 62 per cent of the clients elaimed to have made one
or more repayments to SDF on their loans. Most elients were not eurrently repaying and they gave
several reasons for not doing so, for example that they did not know how mueh to pay and where
to send the money. Some indieated that their businesses were not doing well and therefore they did
not generate enough resourees to make the repayments.
4.4.2.4 A review of the cash book revealed that a total of Z$88.5 millon was paid out in loans
between July 1994 and September 1995. Approximately Z$30 millon had been disbursed between
1992 and June 1994. An arrears matrix was developed for the period between July 1994 and
September 1995 in an effort to determine the repayment rate (see table 29). Interest due for
eolleetion for this period was approximately Z$6.1 milion and eapital repayments due approximately
Z$13.7 million. The total potential ea"sh inflow for this period should have come to about Z$19.7
million. For the period in question the CU aetually reeovered Z$1.6 million, whieh represents a
repayment rate of 8 per eent(30J.
4.4.2.5 A separate analysis was performed on the entire CU database of approvedSDF loans,
taking aeeount of eaeh projeets graee and repayment periods and ealeulating the interest due; The
results indieate that over the same 15 month periodtotal repayments due, now ineluding pre-July
1994 projeets, were rather higher at Z$31.8 million and the aetual repayment rate eorrespondingly
lower at 5.0 per cent. Total repayments during this period should have been equivalent to about 36
per cent of the amount of loan approvais; instead they covered less than 2 per cent.
4.4.2.6 Over the whole period to early February 1996 repayments due were Z$52.2 million on
approved loans totallng Z$172.7 millionl31J. By that time some 30 per cent of the amount lent out
should have been reeovered. Aetual reeoveries probably did not exeeed Z$2.5 million..
4.4.2.7 In a report on a visitation to c1ients in Bulawayo, Kwekwe and Gweru between 28 August
and 7 September 1995, the CU monitoring unitassessed Z$446,OOO in arrears from 29 visited
elients. The monitoring unit found that some elients (7 out of 36) had ehanged addresses without
30. The calculation did not take account of the grace period and is therefore approximate.
31. The CU database yields an aggregate some Z$20 millon higher than the CU running total by the end of the
period.
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informing the CU. The SDF team managed to eollect only 6.7 per cent of the identified arrears. The
team determined that 68 per cent of the projeets visited had the eapaeity to pay but were not doing
so mainly due to laek of proper SDF systems.
4.4.2.8 The Monitoring Unit suggested that DEED offees be made aware of the loeation of the
projeets and that follow-up with elients be effeeted regularly through the DEED offees. It was also
observed that a number of elients do not keep a proper aceount of their operations and the relevant
reeords, which makes it diffeult to assess the performanee of the projeets.
4.4.2.9 The results of the survey and general review of the SDF elients payment reeords show an
inability to pay due to poor business performanee on a number of projeets. However, the majority
of the projects surveyed have not bothered to make repayments mainly due to the administrative
problems besetting SDF.
Sustainabílty
4.4.2.10 While the objectives were worthy, ad hoc visitations of the type mounted by the CU in mid-
1995 hardly begin to serateh the surfaee of the oroblem of plaeing under effeetive monitoring and
suoervision a diverse national portolio of some 2.000 proieets. In early 1996 the CU was planning
to aetivate field monitoring by sub-eontracting the provineial offees of DEED to undertake field tours
of inspeetion, paying out of SDF funds. Regional seminars had been held for DEED offeers. This
strategy is taken up again in seetion 6.3.1.
4.42.11 The hypothetieal projeetions of fuure repayments of prineipal and interest suggest that g
strong repayment rate could generate a sizeable inflow of funds for reiending despite the subsidised
interest rate. The amount due for repayment was Z$34.4 million in 1995. Assuming no further
lending, projeetions indicate repaymentspeaking at Z$53.9 millon in 1996 before declining gradually
to Z$35.6 millon in 1999 and tailing off rapidly thereafter. These are substantial inflows and would
be eapable on their own of sustaining a lending rate between a third and half the 1995 approved
loan total of Z$72.9 milion. The projeetions are, however, at eurrent priees and take no aeeount of
the substantial gap between the fixed interest rate of 10 per cent and inflation and eommercial
interest rates that are likely to remain substantially higher throughout the main period of loan
repayments.
4.4.2.12 All the repayments will be at the highly subsidised interest rate of 1 d per cent. If
eommercial interest rates and inflation eontinue at signifieantly higher leveis, the loan fund wil
inevitably deoreeiate steadily irrespeetive of whether new lending is at nearer to eommereial interest
rates. The high overhead eosts of supervising the existing loan portfolio would further reduee the
value of the portolio by an appreeiable faetor. Finally, there can be little doubt that el growing
minority of oroieets have failed or eeased to oDerate for various reasons and with liUle chanee of
reeovering the loans.
4.4.2.13 On redueed expeetationsl32J, the projeeted return from repayments of prineipal and inlerest
eould reaeh Z$25-28 millon annually through 1997-1999 and total Z$125 milion by the end of2001,
or around Z$35 millon at constant (late 1992) priees. On this projeetion the eventual returns would
32. 50 per cent default, no assets recovered, average arrears of one year, 15 per cent inflation, average 3 per cent
positive interest rate on deposits (see table 31).
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be worth a fraetion of the nominal value of the loa n portolio. They eould nevertheless sustain a
modest reiending Drogramme of around Z$20 milion a vear if well managed on a revolving fund
basis at near to eommereial terms. If the repayments on thE; existing portolio earned interest at 3
per cent above inflation, whether from deposits or new lending, their constant price value would
reaeh around Z$64 million at late 1992 priees by the end of 2001.
4.4.2.14 The SDF's verv low recovery rate is thus threatenina the sUrvival of the Drogramme, whieh
eould be self-finaneing at a redueed rate of iending if appropriate steps were taken to reeover a
mueh higher proportion of due repayments. To aehieve this end an effeetive monitoring and
reeovery service is urgently needed as well as proDer leaal powers of enforeement.
4.4.3, Non-financial Services
4.4.3.1 The business trainina course performed fairly well as a basic introduetion and orientation
for inexperieneed retrenchees entering self-employment for the first time. It also managed to reaeh
large numbers within a short timespan.
4.4.3.2 Because the training was demand-Ied and far outpaeed the proeessing of loan applieations,
it beeame an early easualty when funds ran out in mid-1995. Viewed strietly as a feeder service for
preparing and eneouraging retrenehees to take the next step towards a loa n applieation, training
eourses will not be needed for some time if the priority remains to elear the large backlog of projeets
already submitted. Training of this type would nevertheless be essential if newly registered
applicants were to begin to enter the seheme.
4.43.3 Viewed as a service to retrenehees in general, the training courses had some value in
terms of equipping retrenehees with some basic eeonomie survival ski lis. No follow-up information
is available on how relevant the skils learnt have been for the great majority of trainees who did not
get early aeeess to an SDF loan.
4.4.3.4 The assistance to applieants in preparing their project proposals was similarly an essential
element in the oroieet cycle and on the whole Derformed well. It too has an uneertain future sinee
consultants have not been paid for most of the work they have already done and awaiting
proeessing by the CU.
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5. THE INTEGRATION OF SDF PROGRAMMES WITH PMP
5.1 PMP's Obieetives and Strategies
5.1.1 During 1993, mid-way through ESAP, the Zimbabwe Government drew up a Povert
Alleviation Action Plan (PMP). The main proposals were published in Oetober 1993 and presented
to a Consultative Group meeting in Paris in December 1993. A year later, two further doeuments
set out the plan's implementation strategy and detailed its three-year operational framework. Under
this timeframe the first budgetary alloeations were made in finaneial year 1994/95 and the activities
were to run from the second half of 1994 to 1997, well beyond the period of ESAP.
5.1.2 The plan sought to build on the SDF programme launehed earlier in 1991-92 as well as to
ineorporate it into a broader set of objeetives and scope of activities. PMP was designed as a
'eonsolidated implementation plan (whieh) represents a eomprehensive view of the Governments
efforts aimed at redueing povert and unemployment. It thus ineorporated, partly because of delays
in their financing and implementation, the SDA strategies and programmes already under way.
5.1.3 This eombination of short and long term faetors set a markedly different perspeetive on the
soeial dimensions of ESAP. Aecording to the PMP strategy doeument, 'the intentions are to
broaden and enhanee the overall seope, coverage and intended impact of targeted soeial
programmes, with special emphasis plaeed on employment ereation and self relianee programmes' .
It stated explieitly that for the purposes of the plan 'povert... is both the ongoing genre experieneed
in Zimbabwe and struetural adjustment related povert'.
5.1.4 This radieal realignment of SDA orientation was based on a eritique of the social
eonsequenees of the first three years of struetural adjustment. Although the original objeetive had
aimed at 'sustaining higher medium and long term growth and redueing povert' and although
eeonomie reforms had proeeeded well,
the greater reform objeetivesof poverty alleviation remain without eomparable
adjustment efforts and support to aeeomplish them. As a result, the poor and
disadvantag~d seetions of the population have been further marginalised by
market-based eeonomie reforms, and the adverse effeets of spirailing living costs,
falling social service expenditures, unemployment and redueed ineome leveis.
It was coneeded that 'the povert aspeets of development had not been 'effeetively addressed
under the original reform policies'.
5.1.5 In sum, the Zimbabwe Government viewed PMP as 'based on direct approaehes for
aehieving the fundamental investment in people for long term development, and alleviating and
eliminating povert'. The major eomponents of the P MP strategy were to:
. Empower benefieiaries using partieipatory methods of work whieh give reeognition to
benefieiaries' expertise and knowledge;
. Engage NGOs, the private sector and a broad range of eivil society in partnership in the
various tasks of poverty alleviation;
. Target public expenditure on those areas with potential for highest benefits for the poor;
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. Decentralise deeision-making in sueh a manner that the poor will be able to partieipate
effeetively;
. Mobilise popular support for the implementation of povert substantive polieies that move
the poor from welfare into ineome-earningproduetivity;
. Place greater emphasis on social policy and monitoring of povert alleviation programmes
for sustainable human development;
. Alloeate resourees to facilitate the eonsultative proeess amongst partners for community
involvement.
5.1.6 The 'new features' in the strategy were summarised as being:
. Targeting of soeial expenditures;
. Deeentralisation of programme implementation;
. A partieipatory approaeh to povert alleviation, and
. Partnership approaeh to address distortion in soeial provisions and povert alleviation.
5.1.7 Of the four features, targeting under PAAP was simplified to foeus on 'the poor and
vulnerable groups only', irrespeetive of the short or lon g term origins of the povert status. The
narrower SDF targeting under the ETP had exeluded most eategories df the poor from eligibility for
its benefits.
5.1.8 Many of the other elements in the PMP strategy expressed as mueh a major ehange of
approaeh as of programme content. The SDF had been eoneeived primarily as a top-down, centrally
administered programme of temporary remedial measures. PMP, on the other hand, stressed
bottom-up approaehes in projeet design and implementation, a partieipatory planning method and
the empowerment of benefieiaries. Mueh of the revised strategy addressed the modalities of
programme delivery and the means of equipping both the final benefieiaries and the intermediating ,
institutions, ineluding state struetures as well as NGOs, to partieipate effectively. Benefieiaries and
eommunities would be the source of projeet initiative; planning and implementation would be
deeentralised; executing ageneies would be largely non-governmental and selected by the
benefieiaries.
5.2 PMP and Existing SDF Programmes
5.2.1 Beyond the preparatory phase and the strengthening of delivery meehanisms, PMP was
to be eoneentrated on four areas of aetivity, two of whieh had established SDF equivalents: an
enabling environment for small and informal sector businesses; improved safety nets; sustainable
livelihood initiatives; and labour-intensive public works. All had featured in the SDA programme
outline but appeared in the PMP strategy as more consistent and integrated initiatives.
5.2.2 The informal sector and miero-enterprises develooment oroaramme was more broadly
targeted than the ETP loa n seheme. It 'aimed at supporting the self-help employment initiatives of
the disadvantaged groups of the population', later defined as 'all those poor and unemployed who
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intend to start a via ble informal or miero-business' and later still as 'retrenched workers and
unemployed. In praetiee, however, the main sub-programme was to remain the existing ETP loan
seheme targeting 'all retrenehed workers, early and voluntary retirees and disabled persons'.
5.2.3 The ETP seheme would, however, be strengthened in four major respeets:
. A eounselling service would be instituted for both public and private sector
retrenehees;
. Starting a business would no longe r be the sole option offered to retrenchees, who
eould now also aeeess employment plaeement serviees for jobs in the private sector
or retraining at an appropriate institution;
. An extension service, sub-eontracted to private sector eonsultants, would be started
to support borrowers' new businesses;
. The eentralised eoordinating and administrative struetures would be replieated at the
provineiallevel to enhanee nationwide programme delivery.
5.2.4 The programme also ineluded a number of related and new elements:
. A network of 'Business Extension Service Centres' similaÍ" to those plan ned for
seleeted rural communities and loeated at eve ry growth point and seeondary town.
The centres would provide support serviees for retrenchees and others through sub-
eontraeted NGOs and eommereial enterprises.
. Industrial estates and business infrastrueture at growth points and secondary towns.
. A revised Youth Training Programme 'that will develop an entrepreneurship eulture
amongst youth through ski lis and business management training', covering about
3,000 a year.
. Study and action plan to promote niehe tourism, targeted on retrenehees and the
unemployed.
. Study to prepare a resettlement seheme for the alloeation of land 'on a priority basis'
to retrenchees intending to settle in rural eommunities.
5.2.5 In the revised ETP under PMP, laek of elarity and ineonsistencies remained:
. Client groups for the eounselling, training and eredit seheme were retrenehees and
'early and voluntary retirees from Civil Service'. The disabled were ineluded in most
but not all definitions and proposals to address their speeifie needs were absent.
. The business extension centres were to target anyone applying to or partieipating in
a PMP ineome generating projeet or seheme. It remained unelear whether this
definition was to include retrenehees and whieh other ineome generating projeets
might qualify, sinee a separate programme was provided for rural eommunities and the
only urban eredit seheme was restrieted to retrenehees. A 'miero lending seheme' was
mentioned but not further elaborated.
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. The relationship, if any, between the deeentralisation of the SDF eredit seheme and
the new extension eentre service was not addressed despite evident potential overlap.
. Similar overlap was apparent between the respeetive provineial eoordinating
structures.
5.2.6 The soeial safety nets sub-programmes amounted to a eontinuation of the SWP subjeet
to review and with several modifieations:
. Common eligibility eriteria based on a per capita ineome threshold derived from the
povert assessment study;
. Deeentralisation of programme delivery to the provineial level and adoption of a
simplified eommon applieation form;
. Continuation of the food subsidy for urban households but a possible switeh from cash
handouts to subsidising hammer mils;
. Extension of the education subsidy to cover the non-fee eosts of rural households;
. Revision of eost reeovery in the health sector to ensure universal aceess witha
reinforeed referral system.
5.2.7 The other two major PMP activities were to be new additions to te SDF portolio. Under
the sustainable livelihoods initiatives, a new programme, five sub-programmes were targeted on
women and two on youth, in both eases qualifying by membership of 'seleeted disadvantaged rural
eommunities'. How broad or narrow the seleetion was to be, by what eriteria and by whom was not
indieated.
5.2.8 The two operational arms were to be 'one stop business extension servicecentres' and
a rural mieroeredit seheme,whieh would 'make smallloans available to womèn and youth in rural
areas - something similar to the "Grameen Bank" mode!'. The funding would be wholesaled through
existing public, eommereial and NGO ehannels where viable but 'if none are found to be suitable',
a new microcredit faeility would beinstituted.
5.2.9 The labour intensive public works proaramme, a new initiative, was to provide grant-based
funding unrelated to fuure ineome generation and aimed at short term employment ereation and the
bu ilding of community assets. Criteria were first to be established for seleeting eligible eommunities,
whieh would be entitled to a per capita grant amount with a minimum threshold to safeguard very
small eommunities. The eommunities would then prepare projeets and ehoose exeeuting ageneies.
The targeting was now explieitly on 'disadvantaged rural eommunities' and appeared designed to
pump grant funds into ineome-boosting soeial infrastrueture projeets. Community empowerment was
to be a key facto r and funds were to be disbursed direetly to the implementing organisation, whieh
would pay the suppliers of goods and serviees.
5.2.10 The alloeation of programme resourees indieated that the ETP and SWP were to eontinue
as the principal eomponents of P MP but with a timespan well beyond the end of ESAP in 1995. The
programme descriptions speeified some riodifications but on the whole envisaged a perpetuation
of the two established SDF programmes in mueh their present operational form. The two main new
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programme eomponents, microcredit faeilities for women and youth and labour-intensive public
works, were designed to redress the strong SDA urban bias by targeting poor rural eommunities.
5.2.11 All SWP and ETP activities were to be ineorporated within the PMP framework but the
integration of existing and new programme eomponents was as yet ineomplete and left a number
of ineonsistencies to be resolved in sueh areas as targeting, deeentralisation, service delivery and
eredit provision.
5.2.12 The modifieation of existing programmes and the launching of new activities and sub-
programmes were hedged with a number of eonditionalities:
. They were mueh more dependent on raising donor finanee than the existing ETP and
SWP.
. The modifieations and new sub-programmes also depended in many instanees on the
eompletion of donor-funded studies and surveys yet to be started.
. Implementation would require a eonsultation and reprogramming exereise that was
bound to take time in view of the number of ageneies involved and the demands of the
new eommitment to partnership.
5.3 Exoanded SDF Funetions and Resoonsibilities
5.3.1 The implementation of PMP in eonformity with the new partieipatory approaeh together
with the additional programme activities implied major ehanges to the SDF's mandate and
eapacities. The SDF itself was to remain the prineipal vehiele for delivering PMP programmes:
The thrust of the medium-term action plan is on establishing SDF as an effeetive
instrument for the implementation of projeets and programmes that can have a
direet and tangible impaet on the Governments objeetive to reduee povert and
unemployment.
5.3.2 However, the emphasis on governments faeilitatory role meant that:
Sueeess in implementing PMP initiatives to a large extent wil depend upori the
level of partieipation of private sector institutions and the NGOs... It is absolutely
critical that those involved in the management place speeial emphasis on
ensuring that effeetive linkages are established between public and private sector
institutions and NGOs, and that maximum use is made of the serviees availablé
through them rather than spending searee resourees to build eapaeities to deliver
these serviees through public sector institutions.
5.3.3 PMP's management strategy was to follow a decentralised model with the weight of
responsibility devolved to broad-based PMP distriet eommittees. Projeet implementation would
proeeed under tripartite eontraets between the state, the community or benefieiary and the executing
agency; and service delivery would also usually be sub-eontraeted from NGOs or eommereial
ageneies. On the basis of experienee to date with the implementation of SDA programmes the
government nevertheless identified laek of institutional eapaeity as a major eonstraint and integrated
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into PMP a number of measures to strengthen the eapacity of teehnieal units, line ministries and
NGOs and CBOs.
5.3.4 The SDF itself was to aet as the disbursement véhiele for all government and donor funds
committed to PMP. The CU was to:
. Deliver 'a eomprehensive teehnieal assistanee programme that will meet the needs of all
PMP initiatives', funded by donors.
. 'Coordinate the teehnieal side of the implementation and provide information and teehnieal
assistanee' .
. Manage the funds and report to the national PMP Management Committee.
. 'Sub-eontraet all infastruetural and ineome-generating projeets to agen eies and
organisations (Government, NGO or private sector institutions) and ehannel the funds
alloeated for the projeets to the project aeeounts.
. Monitor the projeet exeeution and expenditures and produee regular progress reports to
the PMP Management Committee and the eontributing parties'.
. 'Compile a data base on teehnieal expertise available in the country as required per
programme area', to be made aeeessible at locallevel to PMP partners.
5.3.5 These responsibilities implied a major expansion of the CU's operational eapacity.
Compared to the simple, direetly administered loan seheme for individuals under the ETP, it would
now need to cover rural microcredit and community public works projects as well as lending to
retrenehees; tripartite eontraets; a large range of NGO and eommereial partners; individual,
community and CBO elients; multiple donors and teehnieal ageneies; the operations of distriet
eommittees; training programmes; and diverse information service needs.
5.3.6 Although by no means fully mapped out, thereare indieations that the deeentralised PMP
approaeh was to be extended to the established SDF programmes, in partieular the ETP. LOGAC
was to be replieated at the provineial and distriet levels to eoordinate the delivery of the smallloans
seheme.
5.3.7 Despite their eomplexity and the extensive institutional upgrading preseribed, the timeframe
for operation as a set of speeial programmes was firmly limited to three years, an expeetation that
has to be regarded as unrealistic.
5.3.8 PMP was eoneeived as a non-repeating programme. 'After this period, the Ministries,
other governmental ageneies, private sector institutions and NGOs whieh have partieipated in the
implementation of PMP initiatives would be expeeted to eontinue to deliver these initiatives as an
integral eomponent oftheir normal funetions'. This implied that PMP would funetion as a transitional
programme to establish the improved and retargeted delivery of povert reduetion initiatives as a
permanent eomponent of national develop~ent efforts.The long term funding and institutional
implieations of integrating a heavily donor-finaneed programme were not diseussed.
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5.4 Proaramme Resourees
5.4.1 There are diserepaneies in the PMP budget estimates: the stated SDF total adds upto
Z$520 milion over the three years but the aggregate of the SWP and ETP eomponents of P MP is
Z$715 million, whieh ineludes donor finanee already eommitted or to be sought (see table ).
However the ineonsistencies are resolved, the PMP projeetions pointed to both inereased spending
on povert alleviation programmes through the SDF and a continuation of the SDF itself well beyond
the Iifetime of ESAP.
5.4.2 The programme as a whole was budgeted at an estimated US$ 150 million with 44 per cent
(US$66 million) of the funding to come from domestie resourees. The three SWP sub-programmes
were to reeeive 45-50 per cent of their financing from the government budget while for the ETP the
domestie eontribution was to be nearly two-thirds of the total requirements (see table ).
5.4.3 The combined total of Z$397 million for the ETP and SWP eomponents aeeounted for 75
per cent of domestie funds earmarked for PMP. Z$67 millon in domestie funds was estimated for
1994/95, rising steeply to Z$161 million in 1995/96 and to Z$168 million in 1996/97.
5.4.4 Of the two other employment-ereating PMP sub-programmes, the ruralmieroeredit faeility
was to reeeive a one-time eapitalisation of only Z$10m with a further Z$4m, Z$8m and Z$8m
respeetively to subsidise interest rates on non-agrieultural, agricultural and handicraft
mieroenterprises for women from 'distressed disadvantaged rural eommunities'. Subsidies totalling
Z$4m and Z$3m were also budgeted for transport and niehe rural enterprise projeets targeted on
youth. All the Z$37m thereby alloeated to eapital, interest and ineentives for rural mieroenterprises,
equivalent to 11 per cent of the retrenehee budget, was to be finaneed by donors. The financing was
thus small and without domestie commitment.
5.4.5 Rural public works was budgeted at Z$120m over three years with donor finanee sought
for two-thirds of the amount. The domestie funding eomponent was thus about a fifth of the projeeted
eommitment to the ETP.
5.46 The sehedule of PMP programme financing projeetions thus gave priority to the existing
SDF programmes over its three-year timeframe:
SWP : Z$390 million, 49 per cent domestie
ETP : Z$325million, 64 per cent domestie
Rural public works : Z$120 million, 40 per cent domestie
Rural mieroprojeets : Z$37 milion, O per cent domestie
5.47 The Zimbabwe Government had indieated in ¡ts 1994 PMP implementation doeuments
that the extensive relianee on donor funds to finanee the programme might influenee its timetable,
whieh would be adjusted f1exibly in line with the resourees raised. It appears that few donor
eommitments were in plaee by the end of 1995. The list of eurrent donor eommitments as of late
1994 comprised in the main a number of studies and teehnieal assistanee support pl 
us several
already agreed projeets, including British support of Z$27 milion to the Youth Training Programme.
The only new eommitments aetually listed in the first progress report issued a year later were a
SIDA grant of SK10 million (approx. Z$13 millon) to a labour-intensive rural road construetion
programme and additional UNDP teehnieal assistanee.
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5.5 Current Status and Future Planning
,5.5.1 Prior to the launeh of the main three-year action plan, a preparatory first phase, expeeted
to last 8 months, was to establish the institutional eapacity required for the SDF to fulfil the broader
objeetives of PMP. The eomponents of this first phase would be speeifie programmes to:
. Improve the SDF administrative and delivery meehanism;
. Widen the outreaeh and impaet of the soeial safety net;
. Complete a comprehensivenational povert assessment.
5.5.2 The povert study got under way during 1995 and the first results from the proeessing of
the field data were expeeted to be produeed in April 1996. However, the completed report was not
expected to be ready until about September 1996, two years after the launehing of the PMP
programme. Sinee the study was provide a foundation for the revision and tailoring of many of the
sub-programmes, delay to the final ising and startup of a number of PMP activities has been
inevitable.
5.5.3 The PMP strategy and programme doeuments were published in late 1994 and the
financing of PMP was taken up at the Consultative Group meeting in Paris in Mareh 1995. The
PMP progress report issued in November 1995 indieated that donor support at the CG meeting in
Mareh 1995 had been positive but eonditional. It reve81ed that eonfirmed donor eommitments to date
were largely restrieted to the funding of the povert study and teehnical assistanee to studies and
SDF eapaeity building. The PMP strategy doeument had made clear the strong linkage of
programme implementation to mobilising adequate donor eommitments, stating that the initial
nationwide mobilisation exercise 'will only start once the PMP resouree position is aseertained'.
Few of the planned PMP initiatives had therefore got off the ground before the conclusion of ESAP
at the end of 1995.
5.5.4 Throughout PMP's three-year gestation period the ESAP programme itself and the original
SDA programme delivered through the SDF had eontinued in mueh their original form. The SDF
programme was planned to exeeute to the same timetable as ESAP and the ETP was effeetively
suspended in February 1996 when its funds expired. PMP might better be regarded therefore as
the potential sueeessor to the first SDA programme rather than its replaeement during the latter
stages of ESAP.
5.6 Modalities for the Integration of the SDF with PMP
5.6.1 The broad objeetives of PMP aimed at povert alleviation are laudable. The problematie
aspeet of the envisaged PMP programme relates to the bridging of the gap between the objeetives
and the means of aehieving them. To that extent, PMP is an exeeedingly ambitious programme.
It is more wide-ranging, ambitious and loosely struetured than the SDF programme whieh itself has
experienced serious bottleneeks.
5.6.2 First, the institutional meehanism for the delivery andadministration of PMP remains
ambiguous. It is unelear whether the executive authority of the programme lies with the National
PMP Management Committee or with CU or with MPSLSW generally. There appear to be areas
of potential confusion of roles between PMP eommittees and government struetures, even though
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representatives of government also sit on the eommittees. Here are possible sourees of confusion
or potential areas of duplieation of authority and responsibility:
. The National PMP Management Committee wil establish policy and oversee the overall
exeeution of PMP initiatives, and ensure the integration of PMP activities in
government's development programmes and the annual budgetary alloeation proeess.
. The Distriet PMP Management Committees wil oversee and faeilitate the exeeution of the
sub-eommittees but report to the CU (not to the National PMP Management Committee).
The question is whether sueh a strueture and reporting proeedure would be workable.
. The finaneial administration of PMP will be by the CU but the aeeount for SDF-PMP wil
be loeated in the Ministry of Finanee.
. The National PMP Management Committee - whieh would inelude senior offeers of key
ministries, and NGO and donor representatives - would draw upon 'dynamie personalities
in eivil society' and report to the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Soeial Welfare.
5.6.3 The dispersion of authority, responsibility and resources between these committees and
government ministries eould be a reeipe for bureaucratie rivalry, inertia and confusion. The SDF has
experieneed similar problems relating to the 'sharing' of responsibilities with the Ministry of Finanee.
A streamlining of the institutional framework and meehanism for PMP is therefore required. If the
CU eould experienee problems with other departments over the overlapping of responsibilities in its
own parent ministry, these are likely to multiply where other important players wil be other ministries
and departments and NGOs. The present PMP does not posses a meehanism to avoid
interdepartmental duplieation of effort and eonfliet.
5.6.4 As we have already observed, the CU is eurrently overburdened in respeet of its existing
funetions. Previous evaluation studies have also eonfirmed this observation and eoneern. It would
only inerease the burden to give it the additional responsibility of:
. Delivering international and national teehnieal assistanee to all ministries, 'other
government departments, public and private sector institutions, and NGOs.involved in the
delivery of PMP sub-programmes aeross the country.
. Providing a eomprehensive national institutional eapaeity-building programme, ineluding
both training and essential equipment needed, to support the implementation of PMP sub-
programmes and to ensure the sustainability of these initiatives in the post-PMP period.
5.6.5 The realism of these expeetations must be doubted, espeeially in view of the eonstraints
under whieh the CU is likely to eontinue operating in the foreseeable future. This is the more so
given their substantial eost implieations and the administrative overhead required for their
assessment and the associated eonsultative proeess.
5.6.6 In sum, general questions about PMP relate to whether it addresses the priority problem
of the poor and provides arealistie framework for dealing with the identified problems. A more
modest and eoherent programme with elearer foeus would be more feasible than the eurrent PMP.
It needs further development beyond its present format as a loose framework and 'shopping list'.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Seope and Mandate of the SDF
6.1.1 It is beyond the seope of this study to consider the general issues, design and outcomes
of SDA programming in Zimbabwe, whieh has subsequently evolved into PMP. It has eovered two
broad fields of action: soeial safety nets (means-tested user fee exemptions in health and edueation,
and a cash food benefit); and employment creationand training, whieh in turn has extended to
business training, SSE financing, temporary public works employment and, on paper, community-
based projeets and retraining. The SDF's mandate presentlycovers all of these programme areas.
6.1.2 The position of the SDF has been eomplieated by ehanging expeetations of its niandate
and role:
. On the one hand, it has funetioned as a tailor-made meehanism for channeIling budgeted
funds to two speeifie SDA programmes with identified target groups and a limited
timeframe. On the other, it was expeeted under PMP to aet as a general funding vehiele
for a wide and somewhat open-ended range of povert reduetion activities of varying
duration, many foeussing on long term struetural issues.
. On the one hand it has been eonstituted and broadly perceived as an exeeuting agency
whieh is direetly involved in distributing the resourees it disposes. On the other, it is viewed
as a ehannel for assigning funds to a variety of state and NGO exeeuting agen eies and to
eommunities themselves.
. The extent of its role in supporting funetions has also been ambiguous, ranging from policy
and institutional eoordination through povert monitoring and researeh to teehnieal
assistanee to implementing ageneies as envisaged by PMP.
6.1.3 Four general issues seem to require further elarifieation. The first is how ooen-ended the
SDF's mandate is to be. At present, its constitution, ineluding the 1995 revision, Testriets the
objeetives of the SDF to the short-term adverse effeets of ESAP. Aseeond ròund of ESAP might
streteh the mandate for a further period but the speeifie linkage to struetural adjustment and the
short-term limits set definite boundaries for the seope of its activities, whieh are not restrietedeither
to povert alleviation. If however the primary intention is, as would appear to be indicated in the
PMP strategy, to turn the SDF into a funding and eoordination agency for long term povert
reduetion,its SDA foeus must be disearded and a major redefinition of its mandate and modalities
is required. This question is taken up again in seetion 6.3. There is a risk that the SDF may tend to
be used as a eonveniently available vehicle for any speeial programme in the field of soeial policy
that fails to find a loeation within the regular planning framework, disturbing its eoherenee of
purpose.
6.1.4 Second, the degree of vertieal integration in the SDF's modalities of operation needs to be
more c1early thought out. At present the SDF has a hybrideharaeter with the CU sharing with DSW
and other ministries the administration of the safety nets funds and undertaking most of the training
and eredit seheme administration assisted by DEED. It funetions as a fund, a coordinating agency,
and a departmental administration, and is widely pereeived by elients and the public as an integrated
agency. An alternative model would be for the SDF to aet as a distributive vehiele distinet from the
ageneies whieh it finances.
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6.1.5 Third, the autonomv to be exereised by the SDF needs greater elarity of definition. Sinee
the SDF aeeount itself falls under the implementing ministry, it funetions more as an additional
budget line for that ministry than as an autonomous fund in its own right. The Advisory Board has
no powers to do more than deliberate on a preseribed agenda; it does not even have the right to
review a workplan, an annual report or audited aeeounts. Whieh approach works better - close
integration into or alongside existing line operations or greater autonomy of deeision-making and
management -depends in large measure on the type of programme and the extent to whieh
programme delivery depends on departmental struetures.
6.1.6 Fourth, the institutional positioning of soeial Drogrammes of sharoly differinQ eharacter
demands careful planning. A principal conclusion of this study is that the integration of the safety
nets and eredit programmes under the same budget line and within a single administration had
markedly negative consequenees for the latter. Whether or not both programmes were to be
finaneed through the SDF, a separate budget line and administration would have established the
eredit scheme with greater elarity of foeus and stability of planning and implementation.
6.1.7 The SDF statement of objeetives outlines three main fields of action: soeial safety nets;
credit for mieroenterprises; and grant finanee to public works and ineome-generating community
projeets, the latter also to reeeive teehnieal assistanee. The first two, implemented through the
existing SWP and ETP, are diseussed in the following seetions and the third, within whieh most
activities are still at the planning stage, is set in the context of PMP.
6.2 Soeial Welfare
6.2.1 The issue of user eharges for soeial serviees and of targeted eompensatory benefits to
proteet the poor has been eontentious in policy debates internationally as well as in Zimbabwe. The
arguments have been well rehearsedi33) and do not need further exposition here. The diseussion will
take up several aspeets direetly relevant to the fuure of safety nets subsidies under SDF auspiees.
6.2.2 It is eommonly argued that self-tarçieting aoproaehes have advantages over the individual
tarQeting or sereeninq of benefieiaries in respeet of broadening outreaeh and redueing administrative
overheads. These should ensure that all eligible households can have aeeess to them while
minimizing 'Ieakage' to those households not eligible. In view of the urgeney of the needs, especially
that of nutrition, it may be more important that in the first round all households have aeeess,
aeeepting the leakage this implies, than restrieting aeeess by bureaucratie means and thereby
blocking the aeeess to vulnerable eligible groups. Ex post audits should be earried out to identify the
degree of leakage and how it can be minimised. This approaeh of extending the soeial safety net
as widely as possible amongst the vulnerable groups is potentially a more useful and effeetive one
than a meehanieal implementation of eost-reeovery measures.
6.2.3 Nonetheless, if individual user eharges are applied, some form ot sereening is unavoidable
if the poor and vulnerable grouDs are to be eomoensated. To that extent the issue wil remain on the
povert alleviation agenda whatever the immediate fate of the SWP itself.
33. Eg Gibbon, Structural Adjustment; Gibbon, Structural Adjustment and the Warking Paar in Zimbabwe, 1995;
World Bank, Public Sectar.
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6.2.4 For praetieal purposes the fuure of the SWP may al ready have been foreelosed. The SDF
funding erisis of mid-1995 indueed the CU to consider recommending the eomplete shutdown of the
programme. The ending of the food benefit as a separate sub-programme had already been deeided
earlier in the year with the intended outcome being its merger into regular Public Assistanee.
6.2.5 The size of the budget subventions provided to the SDF was entirely consistent with the
original SDA perspective: a eoneentration of adjustment-assoeiated soeial distress in the first phase
of ESAP, easing down as the reforms took effect and employment and ineomes rose. Thus the
highest subvention was for the second year of the SDF, 1993/94, while the vote for 1995/96, during
whieh the first ESAP offeially ended, was less than suffeient to meet existing SWP eommitments.
6.2.6 The severe budget cut in mid-1995 does, however, raise fundamental questions
eoneerning the design and objeetives of the SWP, sinee it ran direetly eounter to the budget
projeetions presented only 9 months previously in the PMP strategy documents. The PMP sub-
programmes took over the three safety nets virtually unehanged as part of ¡ts long term povert
reduetion strategy and projeeted their annual budgets at steady or rising levels for three years
ahead, including the domestie eontributions. The MPSLSW bid for Z$200 millon for 1995/96 was
consistent with the PMP perspeetive. The sharoly different outcome Doints to a basic policy
dilemma over the status of the safety nets programme.
6.2.7 The SWP's three safety nets were defined in traditional SDA terms as temporary
assistanee. The food benefit was specifieally targeted on a transitional impaet on the poor and
whether it suceeeded or failed, its phasing out in 1995 was consistent with its stated objeetive. But
the edueation and health subsidies were to eompensate for new or inereased user eharges that
were intended to be permanent. It eould be argued that the subsidies assisted the poor during a
transitional phase of higher unemployment and fallng real ineomes and therefore retained a short-
term SDA charaeter, the outcome being that at the end of adjustment the poor would have to pay
the fees but with rising ineomes and employment as the positive soeial benefits of adjustment took
hold. However, this rationale has not been publiely advaneed at any time sinee the original SDA
presentation in 1991. To the contrary, the SWP has been sustained as providing proteetion to the
poor from the impaet of the user eharges themselves. Its obieetives have thus borne little direet
relation to the usual SDA goals. but rather. fit sauarely into the framework of long term struetural
Dovert alleviation. in the form of conventional means-tested soeial seeurity benefits.
6.2,8 The mixed outcomes of the health and edueation safety nets are partly attributable to this
underlying strategie confusion. The planning and implementation of what eonstituted major
extensions to the Zimbabwean welfare system were bound to take time. Yet the SDA priority was
with quick action to alleviate early transitional stress. In the case of health, the enforeement of user
eharges started a full two years before the exemption system was introdueed, preeisely at a time
of inereasing social hardship. On the other hand, by late 1994 and early 1995 both the health and
the edueation benefis were beginning to aehieve moderate rates of uptake. Their sudden
suspension in mid-1995 as a result of the budget cut raised doubts about their plaee in the soeial
seeurity system and long term Dovert alleviation strategy.
6.2.9 The seleetion of the SDF as the funding vehiele for the edueation and health safety nets
was therefore miseoneeived. Thev should rath.er have been integrated from the outset ¡nto the line
budget of the DSW, whieh in any case had the major responsibility for delivering the new serviees.
This would have faeilitated proper planning, systems integration and line management. The
assignment of partieular administrative funetions to the CU also led to divided responsibilities and
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ad hoc responses and ineffeient methods sueh as the manual signing of eheques. To the extent that
the SWP is eontinued or similar targeted safety nets introdueed in the future, it is reeommended:
. That for sodal benefis of a long term charaeter, sueh as education and health assistanee,
budaetary alloeations be made direet to the DSW or other imolementing ageneies and not
through the SDF.
. That for SDA or short term soeial benefits, sueh as the food money, budgetary allocations
be made preferentiallv through line budgets wherever feasible and otherwise through a
speeial aecount opened under SDF auspiees for that purpose.
. That both lon g and short term targeted benefits should be delivered through existing line
struetures, reorganised and temporarily strengthened as neeessary, and not through
parallei struetures sueh as the CU.
. That if a separate fund is deemed appropriate to ehannel targeted safety nets resourees,
the fund be established in its own right exelusivelv for that puroose and not eonjoined to
funding for other purposes.
6.2.10 This study and several previous evaluations and studies have identified a number of
shorteomings whieh have impeded effeetive delivery of the serviees. In summary form, some of the
reeommendations are as follows:
. That household size be taken ¡nto aeeount in determinina eligibility, for example by ,
assessing per capita ineome. The effeet would be to reduce the threshold below the
guideline àmount for single persons and small households and inerease it for large
households.
. That a single ineome threshold be applied for all means-tested benefits.
. That the threshold be reviewed annualIv before a set date to take aeeount of inflation.
Whether the ;:mount is revised at, above or below inflation is a matter of policy ehoiee.
. That where feasible repeating transactions be combined to cover longer periods, for
instanee school fee exemptions for the school year rather than a term at a time.
. That a eommon applieation form be used, that the set of required supporting documents
be standardised as far as possible and that an applieant be proeessed for all relevant
benefits and exemptions at the same sitting.
. That mobile offiees be used to deliver serviees and payments in the remoter rural areas.
. That self-targetina meehanisms be evaluated alongside sereening wherever feasible on
a partial basis, as for example with the urban elinies, or for general applieation, for example
a straight-run grain subsidy as an alternative to food money. More preeise geographieal
targeting may beeome more praetieable on the basis of the povert survey results.
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6.3 Mieroenterorise Development
6.3.1 ReDositonina the SDF's Microenterprise Proaramme
6.3.1.1 The SDF's eredit operations are presently at a erossroads from whieh their fuure evolution
eould take a number of direetions. The most immediate issue is the fuure positioning, of the existing
eredit seheme. Also on the agenda are new initiatives which have previously been proposed but not
yet aetivated. In both cases the ehoiee of options will materially affeet the future shape of the SDF
itself.
6.3.1.2 The main phase of the SDF's eredit seheme effeetively ended in mid-1995 when domestie
grant funding ran out. The CU's proposed response to the mueh reduced budget alloeation for
1995/96 was to assign it to meet safety nets obligations al ready ineurred and to turn to repayments
and the outstanding balanee of the ADF loa n for financing further lending under the eredit seheme.
The final round of lending came to a halt in February 1996 primarily because the inflow of
repayments, running at roughly Z$0.2 million per mo nth in the third quarter of 1995 - equivalent to
less than two loans a month at the mean loan amount - was nowhere near to match 
ing the
requirements for clearing the backlog of applieations.
6.3.1.3 There appear to be three basieoptions for the eontinuation of the SDF eredit seheme:
. Option A: CIosing its lending operations and concentrating on recoveries, partly in order
to repay the ADF loa n in due eourse.
. Ootion B: Continuing the programme with the same objeetives but geared to a lon g term
povert reduetion perspeetive as outlined in PMP.
. Ootion C: Redesigning the programme to deliver different forms of credit or to serve other
target groups. l'
6.3.1.4 Option A would be consistent with the SDA foeus on temporary effeets sinee the first ESAP
is now well past its end date. It would, however, turn aside the large numbers of ESAP retrenchees
with projeets queued in the backlog. It would also reduee the resourees available for future
mieroeredit, deelared as a eontinuing priority under PMP.
6.3.1.5 There is a danger that an unehanged eontinuation of the oresent seheme will generate a
result similar to Option A more or less by default. If the rate of repayment remains very low and
there is no further reeapitalisation from government or donor sourees, the funds available for lending
will not suffee to sustain a eredible lendingoperation. Yet without a major upgrading of the CU's
monitoring and reeovery eapaeity there is little chanee of inereasing the inflow of repayments. Sueh
upgrading would demand substantial funding and would take time to yield signifieant results. As of,
Mareh 1996, the CU was considering submitting a proposal along these lines for funding in the
1996/97 budget. If not alloeated, there is little chanee of the eredit seheme beeoming self-suffeient
within its present modus operandi even on a small scale. Nor would reeoveries aceumulate to more
than a fraetion of the AOF loan to be repaid.
6.3.1.6 The justifieation for eontinuing to target retrenehees exelusively, as under Option B, would
derive either from a new round of redundaneies arising from a further programme of struetural
adjustment or from a deeision to inelude eredit as part of a general paekage of support to those
made redundant as a result of the normal operations of a market-driven eeonomy. It eould serve as
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a niehe eomoonent of sueh a suooort oaekage, eomplementing miero and SSE eredit programmes
aimed at other target groups, in order to open an enterprise alternative to other employment ereating
options for retrenehees.
6.3.1.7 Putting the existing eredit seheme on a lon g term footing would make little sense in the
absenee of sueh alternatives. It has been argued that a chief weakness of the SDF eredit seheme
during ESAP was that it eonstituted the on ly assistance on offer: faeing unemployment, retrenehees
had automatie entry to the business training eourse and easy aeeess to loans. The outcome was
exeessive take-up and an inability to sereen, sinee all applieants had entitlement. The 1994 PMP
sub-programmes proposed to diversify the support to retrenchees by offering eounselling, a
placement service and retraining for re-entry into the employed labour-force as well as aeeess to,
microcredit. A balaneed aooroaeh to employment ereation for retrenehees is aporooriate sinee many
may laek either motivation or aptitude to perform well as entrepreneurs but at the same time have
suffeient experienee or expertise to re-enter the labour market, even in times of adjustment.
6.3.1.8 The essential preeondition for improving the quality of projeet proposals and of subsequent
enterprise performanee is that aoolieants and oroieets be assessed by normal business standards
and no longer on grounds of entitlement. Sueh screening beeomes more aceeptable to elients if
alternatives are available, but it remains a precondition of the seheme's overall viability even if they
are not.
6.3.1.9 A similar risk to Option A attaehes to a eontinuation of the eredit scheme, that it wil remain
unsustainable in the absenee of greatly improvedloan reeoveries. Any further reeapitalisation
without the maior uograding would be very likely to do no more than oostoone a similar outcome.
Under present arrangements the CU is eapable of disbursing new funds quickly: LOGAC eould be
reeonvened, a large backlog of proeessed projeets is available for deeision and new applieations
eould be solieited. But the lending operation would be foreed to reduee to a low level as soon as the
new funds were exhausted.
6.3.1.10 Ootion C opens the question of revising the scheme's targeting or finaneial serviees or
both. There are a number of possible alternatives but in praetiee many are eonstrained both by risk
of duplieation and by the partieular eharacter of the present seheme:
. Extending the outreaeh: The SDF eredit seheme's profileis. as seen earlier, at thelower
end of the MSE speetrum. In thisfield the parastatal SEDCO has lon g been established
with a broad enterprise development mandate. During the field mission doubts were
expressed in eertain quarters about SEDCO's effeetiveness in SSE promotion. Whether
this view is valid or not, it provides poor justifieation for duplieation within the public sector
by extending the targeting of the SDF seheme. In the finaneial, commereial and NGO
seetors there are aIreadv a number of established institutions and programmes with which
the SDF would come ¡nto direet eompetition if it broadened its SSE outreaeh.
. Revising the serviees and target grouos: An alternative path would be to redesign the SDF
eredit seheme to target different groups. One possibility would be to offer support to the
informal sector through mueh smaller loans in a reformulated service paekage. A
mierofinanee facility targeted on rural women was proposed in the 1994 PMP programme
doeument. However, the eredit operation as presently run is far removed from the
eharaeter of effeetive mierofinanee organisations; informal sector credit would sit uneasily
alongside the present SSE portfolio and in any case a number of NGOs are already well
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established in this field. It would be oreferable to design a new mierofinanee faeility from
serateh than try to adapt an existing institution il suited to the task.
6.3.1.11 All three options would require major ehanges in the way the seheme is presently run. A
erueial eommon element wil be a rapid imorovement in the rate of loan reeoveries, whieh will
neeessitate a eomplete overhaul of the present CU operation. Closely related is the need for an
effeetive extension service to maximise the proportion of performing projects, a preeondition for
aehieving a satisfaetory rate of paybaek. Three prineipal institutional arrangements can be
considered:
a) Reorganisation and strengthening of the CU;
b) Contracting out partieular funetions, sueh as reeoveries or extension serviees;
c) Transferring the entire seheme to one or more eommereial or parastatal organisations.
6.3.1.12 It is a preeondition of Option Ameeting its target of Options B and C even getting off the
ground that loan suoervision and extension serviees be exoanded and thoroughly overhauled. The
need to do so has been artieulated in Advisory Board meetings for several years pa 
st and is well
known to both policy-makers and CU staff at all leveis. The CU's eurrent proposals as of March
1996, eonsolidating earlier ad hoc initiatives, centred on sub-eontraeting offeials in the provincial
DEED offees, using SDF funds, to undertake monitoring rounds in their eatehment areas. Following
the imminent appointment of an aecountant, the information flow was to be integrated by linking the
CU's projeets database to a new eomputerised aeeounting system whieh would generate monthly
bil ing of borrowers and regular reporting on loan status, quiekly identifying those in arrears. The CU
would prepare itineraries for the DEED offeers' monitoring rounds centrally and distribute them to
the regional offees.
6.3.1.13 While this proposal is to be weleomed as the first systematic attempt to taekle the
monitoring of SDF elients, it is unlikelv to oroduee quick results and has a limited chanee of eventual
sueeess:
. In the short run, it will take some time to design an integrated projeet management and
aeeounting system, computerise the large set of paper files, set up an operational system
for sub-eontraeting and managing the DEED field offeers, piloting the new routines and
finally launehing the full monitoring service nationwide. The contents of the database and
probably also of the projeet files will need extensive validation to ensure their aceuraey.
. The monitoring system itself wil need to be linked to an extension service if it is to win the
confidenee and eooperation of c1ients. A monitoring system geared solely to enforeement
of repayments is likely to be viewed as a policing operation and to meet widespread
evasion. Client eonsultations have plaeed teehnieal and finaneial support for making a go
of their enterprises at the top of their priority list. But planning an SDF extension service
does not yet appear to have started.
. Running a large national mierofinanee seheme requires orofessional finaneial management.
and administration and generallv a soeeialised. autonomous institution for effeetive service
delivery and sustainable finaneial growth. Despite the best efforts of ¡ts staff, the CU is
eurrently a long way short of that ideal and is restrieted in its further institutional
development by being loeated as a seetion of a large ministry .
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6.3.1.14 The second type of institutional arrangement, contracting out partieular funetions or
serviees, is already a tried and tested solution under the SDF credit programme: both the
introduetory business course and the projeet appraisals were sub-eontraeted to private sector
consultants with on the whole satisfaetory results. The same strategy eould be followed in setting
up projeet monitoring and extension serviees. These tasks are, however, altogether more
demanding than running a paekaged short eourse or condueting largely offce-based projeet
preparation and appraisal. They require a national infrastrueture. a dedieated and experieneed field
staff and strong information and financial manaaement systems:
. It is probable that at present no bank, finaneial institution or eonsultaney organisation has
adequate national infrastrueture for sueh an assignment although the small business units
of several of the major banks eould cover the pririeipal towns.
. Severalleading NGOs involved in mieroeredit have by far the strongest field staff but do
not have national coverage and in any case are foeussed mainly on the informal sector
rather than SSEs.
. The two prineipal parastatals offering eredit services, SEDCO and AFC, do have a national
mandate and infrastrueture and would appear to be the most suitable ageneies for taking
on monitoring and extension as a combined operation.
6.3.1.15 The argument for contracting out eould be extended to the core funetion of oroeessing loan
applieations. It is in many respeets one of the more extraordinary features of the original SDF design
that an ad hoc eommittee of ministry offeials, LOGAC, should be expeeted to perform functions
normally assigned to trained specialists in professional finaneial institutions. The case for doing is
argued nowhere in the ADB Appraisal Report, the Zimbabwe Governments SDA programme or the
PMP strategy and programme doeuments. Indeed, the CGC offers a Zimbabwean case of
government funds disbursed through a professionally eonstituted independent organisation. Both
the SDA and ADB doeuments provided for independent institutions to play a major rele in submitting
projeet proposals and administering approved loans, but did not extend this logie to the proeessing
of loa n applieations as sueh, probably because LOGAC's formal mandate extended more widely to
cover non-eredit funds as well.
6.3.1.16 If the monitoring and extension serviees are to be eontraeted out the case for delegating
¡oan oroeessing also strengthens sinee it would be the only major funetion retained in the CU apart
from finaneial management. Some of the disadvantages for the CU of the relationship with the
consultants on projeet appraisals were outlined earlier in this study. The problems of integrating a
second major eontraeted out operation at the other end of the project cyele would impose
considerable extra demands on the CU's management.
6.3.1.17 The third type of institutional arrangement is likely therefore to prove the most sustainable
in the long run: transferring the existing eredit seheme in ¡ts entirety to one or more established
finaneial institutions having a SSE eredit traek reeord and the neeessary eapaeity to administer it
effeetively. As indieated above, not many institutions are likely to meet that requirement. The leading
eandidates are the parastatals AFC (for agricultural projeets) and SEDCO (for all other projeets) and
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the small business units of the eommereial banks(34). It must be stressed onee again that the majority
of SDF-financed projeets are in the SSE braeket and do not fit the informal sector foeus of most
eredit-giving NGOs.
6.3.1.18 A deeision in prineipal to sanetion sueh a transfer is, however, no guarantee that it can be
effeeted. In parteular, the SDF eredit seheme's very poor repayment reeord and its origins in a
welfare entitlement programme are likely to deter professional finarìeial institutions from taking it on.
The orineipal indueement is the potential ineome f10w from even Iimited reeoveries on what is
nominally a sizeable loan oortolio. On the basis of the Z$172.7 million reeorded in the CU database
as aggregate loans approved to February 1996, a 100% repayment reeord would generate Z$238
million by the end of 1999 and a total of Z$249 milion onee allioans are repaid. At a 50 per cent
repayment rate and an average 12 months in arrears, the portolio eould stil yield a mean inflow of
Z$20-25 millon over the next 4-5 years.
6.3.1.19 These rough projeetions of course take no aeeount of defaults and bad debts, whieh are
bound to be high. Some businesses will have failed, others wil have applied the money to other
purposes with little prospeet of reeovery. At present there are only fragments of information on the
true standing of the individual projeets. An urgent task, one whieh has to be eompleted in partieular
before any serious negotiations can be eondueted on a possible transfer of the loan portolio, is g
systematie census of all SDF proieets to establish their existenee, their status, their needs and their
eurrent prospeets. This will be a major exereise but it is essential. Once eompleted, arealistie
assessment can be made of the development potential of the projeets and the finaneial status of the
loan assets.
6.3.1.20 Onee the transfer is eompleted the SDF projeets would be integrated into the normal
oDerations of the administering institutions, as originally proposed by bot h the SDA and ADB
doeuments. This integration would set up their ineorporation into long term small enterprise
development and lead to the via ble amongst them entering the normal paths of business expansion
as they retire their SDF loans.
6.3.1.21 In the light of this study's prineipal reeommendation that the eredit scheme be transferred
in its entirety from the CU to a finaneial institution, there is little point in making detailed
reeommendations for improving the management and administration of the scheme in its present
form under the CU.
6.3.1.22 Handing over the existing loan portolio does not entail the ending of the SDF's influenee
on the utilisation of funds provided under SDA auspiees. The fuure role of the SDF will be reviewed
in seetion 6.6. An issue of concern is the applieations backlog. The CU's mid-1995 summary pointed
to a waiting list of nearly 7,000 and a total amount of Z$800 millon. This huge overhang eould
absorb all new finanee for many years to come, whieh is plainly unrealistie. One way to deal with
the problem would be to eonduet a rapid evaluation of the oroposals so as to select a small number
with the best orospects of sueeess, then to interview the proposers to establish their present status.
Sinee in most eases the gap between submission and review will be at least one year and ofte n two,
a substantial number may already have found other employment, other sourees of projeet funding
or other means of survival. Priority for new loans would then go to those retrenehees stil genuinely
unemployed. The proposers of projeets not e~nsidered, in other words the great majority, would be
34. In March 1996, for instance, the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe announced a new microcredit facilty with British
donor support.
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informed - an improvement on the present situation of uncertainty - that their projeets wil be kept
, on file but that eonsideration for funding is unlikely in the near future.
6.3.2 New Microfinance Initiatives
6.3.2.1 If the SDF is to be established on a long term basis and to play a role in povert reduetion
programmes, it is likely that the Government wil wish to use it as a ehannel for new initiatives in the
field of small and mieroenterorise finanee. Already indieated under the 1994 PMP programme was
a new rural microfinanee facility modelled on Grameen Bank experienee.
6.3.2.2 Three strategie issues have emerged in considering the future role of the SDF in
mierofinanee initiatives. The first is orogramme overlao. As with the disposition of the retrenehee
eredit seheme, the SDF will need to consider earefully its positioning in relation to other
governmental, private sector and NGO mandates. The latter beeome partieularly important when
entering the field of mierofinance to eommunities and the informal sector. In general, the financial
NGO view is that demand is far greater than the resourees they can supply. In addition, even the
larger national NGOs have far from even nationwide coverage. Spaee thus exists for state-
supported initiatives in this field. It is essential, however, that they be carefully plan ned and
eoordinated with the established organisations already on the ground.
6.3.2.3 The second strategie issue is the ehoice between financial wholesaling and retailing. The
present seheme has an exelusively retail eharaeter and has resulted in the ereation of a new quasi-
finaneial institution in the form of the CU. Programme experienee has east doubt on the
effectiveness of this strategy and reeently the CU has been considering various options for
wholesaling SDF funds to third part implementing institutions, as originally envisaged in the ADB
and SDA programme documents. It is reeommended that as a matter of policy the SDF adopts an
exelusively wholesale finaneial strategy and excludes a retail funetion from any fuure eredit
sehemes it initiates or supports.
6.3.2.4 The third strategic issue is terms of eredit. The CU has for some time been considering the
wholesaling of SDF funds to existing credit institutions,primarily mieroeredit NGOS. As of Mareh
1996, however, negotiations with one leading NGO had made little progress in the previous six
months. The prineipal stìeking point was the terms of onlending: the CU wished to ensure that the
NGO lent to elients at a highly subsidised interest rate while the NGO, in eommon with most of its
sueeessful eounterparts, was unwilling to disturb its established policy of lending at near to
eommercial rates. Whatever the general case for and against eoneessionary retail eredit terms for
small enterprise lending, providing subsidised interest rates to the same elient base can prove highly
disruotive, whether through established institutions or a new faeility, leading both to unequal
eompetition between different sehemes and to redueed elient eonfidenee.
6.3.2.5 In general, the SDF is likely to aehieve more substantial long term results in terms of
eeonomie empowerment by investing in oreven traek records. leaving the NGOs to set their own
, lendina ooliey. Subsidised eredit may prove more effective at the wholesale than the retail stage,
partieularly by subsidising the high transaction eosts and other overheads of maintaining a strong
elient monitoring and extension service in the field. The SDF can assist frontline NGOs bot h by
making block grants 50 as to allow them to eolleet the interest at eommereial rates on unused
balanees and by offering a substantial discount on the wholesale terms whieh the NGOs can use
to strengthen their field operations.
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6.3.2.6 A UNDP-finaneed eonsultaney to the SDF in mid-1995(35) proposed that the SDF be
reorganised as an 'Apex Financing Organisation' for NGOs engaged in povert-foeussed lending
programmes, modelled on the Pall Karma-Shayak Foundation (PKSF) of Bangladesh. To the extent
that the Zimbabwe Government wishes to position the SDF as an agent in support of long term
poverty reduetion, this study endorses the main reeommendations of the eonsultaney, the
institutional implieations of whieh wil be taken up in seetion 6.6. Sueh reorganisation would require
a maior shift in the SDF's eredit orientation, in partieular:
. Exelusive targeting of the poor.
· Establishment of the SDF as an independent foundation with majority representation on
its board from NGOs and the voluntary sector.
· Provision of wholesale finanee to partner NGOs and a elose working relationship with
them in programme implementation.
6.3.2.7 While the UNDP eonsultaney report proposed a eoherent long term role for the SDF in
poverty reduetion, it failed to address the inherent eonfliet between SDA and povert reduction
obieetives whieh has eonfused the definition of the SDF's role from the outset. An AFO construeted
as a povert reduetion instrument would neeessarily exelude as non-poor many of those targeted
by an SDA programme as adverselyaffeeted by structural adjustment. Such SDA targeting can be
justified not simply on grounds of alleviating hardship but also on grounds of eeonomie effeieney
and, indireetly, povert alleviation sinee many retreiiehees have useful skils and experience for
reeyeling and, if launehed into small enterprise development, may create employment to the benefit
of the poor and more rapidly than formal sector sehemes. In Zimbabwe; the eommuter minibus and
hammer mill sub-sectors provide examples of this impaet.
6.3.2.8 The risk is that a SDA eredit programme may laek a delivery vehicle since most elients
would not qualify under programmes supported by an AFO with a povert reduetion mandate. As
an alternative to ereating a new SDA instrument sueh as the SDF, one oossible approaeh towards
intearating SDA and oovert reduetion strategies would be to wholesale eredit funds but with SDA
targeting:
· Speeial funds would be earmarked for SDA target groups, sueh as retrenchees.
· The funds would be wholesaled on negotiated terms to existing eredit institutions, for
example AFO partner organisations to assist retrenehees entering informal sector activities
(qualifying as poor) , and to enterprise promotion agencies to assist retrenchees starting
small businesses (qualifying as eommereially via ble projeets).
· Other options would also be available to retrenehees not entering self-employment, sueh
as a job plaeement service, retraining and temporary public works.
35. M.F. Kader, Report on Redesigning ofthe Micro-Iending Programme of the Social Development Fund (SDF),
Zimbabwe, 1995.
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6.4 Community Based Proieets
6.41 Grant funding to eommunity-based projects made a brief appearaneein the ,SDA
programme, though not in the ADB Appraisal Report, and features more prominently in the PMP
strateg y and programme. A elause in the SDF statement of objectives would provide 'finaneial,
teehnieal (and) managerial assistanee and adviee... for undertaking ineome generating activities
through Community.Based Organisations'. No initiatives have yet been taken and up to mid-1995
the subject had not apparently entered the agenda of the Advisory Board.
6.4.2 Because speeifie SDA programmes were narrowly targeted on retrenchees and on safety
net exemptions from new user eharges, they did not reaeh the majority of the pOOL Any new
initiative under SDF auspiees would therefore, like PMP, take shape within a lon g term oovert
reduetion framework. The question arises to what extent the SDF eould form part of povert
reduetion efforts. The PMP strategy assigns the SDF a rather extensive role firstlyas the general
funding ehannel and secondly, through the CU, as the vehiele for teehnical assistanee to
implementing organisations and the government partner in tripartite eontracts with eommunitiesand
exeeuting organisations.
6.4.3 Very little detail was provided on the possible modalities but the emphasis was on §
partieioatory approaeh and deeentralisation of initiative. By implieation, the PMP strategy would
require the CU to set up a faeility along the lines of a Soeial Action Fund, designed for quick
disbursement of small grants to community projeets. Arecent UNDP eonsultaney for MPSLSW36)
has prepared a detailed proposal for a community development programme within the PMP
framework whieh follows a deeentralised strategy. A programme management unit would be ereated
'within SDF' but the proposal is vague on speeifie struetures and functions, the relations between
central and district institutions are not entirely c1ear and the precise funding arrangements remain
to be speeified.
6.4.4 While the PMP strategy plaees weleome emphasis on a partieipatory approaeh, the
various roles it assigns to the CU and the delivery struetures it proposes to ereate are generally too
eomolex and eostly. If a SAF is established:
. The CU itself does not provide an appropriate instrument. It would be preferable to
establish an SAF as a smalL. autonomous aaeney outside the ministry environment and
aeeountable direetly to the SDF. The SAF's mandate should be foeussed on the task in
hand and not be diluted with other assignments.
. Projeet proposals should probably be centrally approved in order to avoid loeal politieal
pressures, ensure balaneed national coverage and speed up proeessing. But in line with
the emphasis on deeentralisation and community partieipation, loeal state and NGO
struetures should be involved as elosely as oossible. All projeets could, for example, be
required to pass initial Distriet Development Fund (DDF) evaluation.
. The DDF eould sign eontraets, eoordinate projeet implementation and extension serviees.
Loeal institutions should so far as possible take the lead in projeet implementation. In a
36. D.S. Gunby, Project Proposal for a Community DevelopmentProgramme in the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan,
1996,
Main Report: Chapter 6 Page 85
large seheme the SAF might need a small staff of distriet-based projeet offeers but in
general would work through established loeal struetures and extension cadres.,
6.45 The SDF eonstitution's restrietion of targeting to 'income generating projeets' may reduee
the outreaeh of a microprojeets programme in the rural areas, especially if defined in terms of cash
earnings. 'Income' can be more broadly defined to inelude non-cash returnsand indireet gains, sueh
as the inereased produetivity in eultivation gained from a vilage well by reducing women's walking
time to feteh water. But eommunities may sometimes set higher priority on gains in soeial
infrastrueture, sueh as an extra classroom, with paybaek in human eapital development rather than
immediate cash returns. In general, the setting of oriorities for SAF proieet funding is best left as far
as oossible to community deeision within a f1exible framework.
6.5 Analysis. Coordination and Monitoring
6.5.1 Compared to the SDF eonstitution, under PMP a mueh broader role in eoordination is'
envisaged for the CU, whieh would be tasked with coordinating, monitoring and evaluation of the
programme, researeh and training as well as administering a teehnieal cooperation programme.
6.5.2 In respect of monitoring and evaluation, the CU is to:
. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of PMP and the effeets of the ehanges in the
soeio-eeonomie and public policy environment on the welfare of vulnerable households and
eommunities.
. Contribute to the development of strategies and soeio-eeonomic polieies for the second
half of the 19905 and beyond.
6.5.3 In respeet of researeh, the CU is to:
. Improve data and analysis to develop a longer-term strategy on povert reduction, through
improving analysis of existing routine dataflows by produeing monthly reports.
. Periodieally update the results of the eomprehensive assessment study of povert to
provide up to date data and analysis neèded for developing longer-term strategies to
reduee povert. In this respeet, the Unit wil ensure household level monitoring by ineluding
appropriate questions in the Sentinel Site and other household surveys.
. Undertaken or sub-eontraet periodie researeh and evaluation of social safety nets and the
targeting of soeial assistanee programmes as an input into the policy formulation proeess.
6.5.4 In respeet of training the CU is to:
. Design and implement an in-service training seheme to provide training in programme
design and development to ensure that public policy in the soeial fields remain responsive
to the needs of the vulnerable and poor segments of the population.
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6.5.5 In respeet of overall eoordination, the CU is to:
· Assistministries, public and private institutions and NGOs involved in the delivery ofPMP
sub-programmes aeross the country by arranging international and national consultaneies
when required. To this end, it will establish a database of teehnical expertise available in
the country whieh will be tapped by the implementing organisations.
· Provide a eomprehensive institutional eapaeity-building programme to support the
implementation of PMP sub-programmes and to ensure the sustainability of those
initiatives in the post-PMP period.
· Liaise with existing teehnieal assistanee programmes that are providing assistanee in the
PMP-related areas, sueh as MLGRUD's 'Pilot Distriet Support Projeet.
· Enter into eontraetual agreements with these organisations implementing the sub-
programme initiatives, channeIling the budget to the implementing organisations.
6.5,6 The capaeity-building and contracting assignments would assign executive funetion to the
CU that are better loeated in other agencies. But otherwise the various functions are consistent with
the CU's prineipal mandate as an agency of monitoring and eoordination rather than implementation.
In the context of government-wide povert programming and of eoordinating initiatives aeross a
eomplex array of types and levels of government, eivie and eommereial institutions, the eoordination
mandate is eomplex and demanding.
6.6 Institutional Meehanisms
6.6.1 Drawing together the institutional implieations of the preeeding seetions, the prineipal
reeommendations are:
· That the safety nets sub-programmes be transferred to the DSW. Any fuure safety nets
would be implemented direetly through line seetions of ministries and regular budgets
rather than a speeial fund.
· That the eredit seheme be transferred on negotiated terms to established SSE financial
institutions, probably SEDCO and the AFC.
· That the SDF be eonverted ¡nto an independent foundation or AFO geared to long term
poverty reduetion but also eoverina SDA proieet-oriented funding.
· That community based projeets be implemented through a SAF and distriet and loeal
struetures.
· That policy eoordination, povert monitoring and teehnieal assistanee be loeated in the CU.
6.6.2 It has been proposed that the SDF be given greater autonomy by retaining only a eouple
of senior management positions within the ministry and allowing all other staff to be reeruited from
outside the eivil service on independent eontraets. It is considered that this hybrid solution will not
prove feasible, sinee the fund will eontinue to operate prineipally as an extension of the ministry
without adequate finaneial, legal or managerial autonomy.
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6.6.3 Sueh autonomy should extend to authoritv to hire and fire staff. determine their terms of
service. own assets in its own name. and have legal personality. Finaneial transfers from the
Treasury need to be on a plan ned basis and exeeuted tlirough block grants. Autonomy would also
establish the full aeeountabilty of the agency to government and other donors for its disbursements
and performanee.
6.6.4 Reeonstituting the SDF as a foundation or AFO would offer a more durable long term
institutional framework geared to povert reduetion strategies. the foundation could inelude the
following features:
· Its eonstitution would set povert reduetion as the orineioal goal and temporary assistanee
to the ooor and vulnerable grouos as a subsidiary aoal if consistent with other objeetives,
covering both structural adjustment stresses and other short-term adverse impaets sueh
as drought. (The limitation in the present SDF eonstitution to 'short-term effeets' would be
removed.)
· It would onlv fund oroiects at the small and miero leveis, in other words exeluding relief and
welfare assistanee and exeluding also public works exeept where eontraeted by loeal
eommunities. Training would be funded only in direet support of projeets. (Paras 2(c-e) of
the eonstitution would be serapped and para 2(b) narrowed).
· It would provide funds as eredit for small and mieroenterprises and as grants for
community and ineome-generating proieets, disbursed exelusively through partner
organisations. (Para 2a would be retained and para 2f broadened). Consideration of
individual projeets would be explieitly ru led out.
· Its governanee would be exereised through a partnershio of stakeholders. Ex officio
representation on the Board would come from government, parastatals, finaneial
institutions, NGOs, loeal civie organisations and individuals with expertise or eommitment.
· Its staffng would be smalL. of strong orofessional ealibre and aeeountable direetly to the
Board and its executive eommittee.
6.6.5 If funding is to be provided to rural mieroenterprise development, an indeoendent SDF
would be an aporooriate funding ehannel. Part of the funds eould be disbursed through existing
NGOs and CBOs as proposed in the PMP programme doeument. If a new facility is to be
established, its design and targeting should be cioselv eoordinated with existing mierofinanee
institutions 50 as to harmonise efforts.
6.6.6 If funding is to be provided to community projeets, it eould also be orovided throuah an
indeoendent SDF and disbursed through a small autonomous SAF whieh reports to a designated
ministry. A part of the funds might be disbursed direetly throuah implementina NGOs. The SAF
would have both a projeet proeessing and a programme eoordinating role.
6.6.7 The coordination of government-wid~ efforts on povert alleviation and reduetion is a major
and strategie responsibility. It would be aoprooriate for the CU to assume that responsibilty as its
exclusive task onee its present administrative tasks have been divested. The CU would serve as
Seeretariat to the national PMP Management Committee as proposed in the PMP strateg y
doeument and would shed ¡ts eonneetions with the SDF altogether. It would also have strengthened
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eapaeity to perform the monitoring. data-gathering. researeh and information funetions whieh the
ADB Appraisal Report eorreetly emphasised as important for programme development and
implementation but whieh have been somewhat negleeted hitherto. Partnershio with national
institutions sueh as the CSO and universitY applied researeh institutes is also an important part of
the eapaeity-building proeess: the ongoing Povert Forum convened by the Institute of Development
Studies is a good example.
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7. FOLLOW-UP ADB INTERVENTIONS
7.1 The third tranehe of the existing ADF loan faeility was disbursed in mid-1995. By that time
the SDF eredit seheme had utilsed more than suffeient funds to qualify to draw down the full
amount of the loan. If not already eompleted, every assistanee should be çiiven to faeilitating a rapid
disbursement in view of the faet that the ESAP programme period has now eoncluded, the stop-start
operations of LOG,AC have led to uneertainty amongst the SDF's elients and the lengthening
backlog of applieations has left large numbers without assistanee since the middle phase of ESAP.
In partieular, until the loan is fully disbursed the ADB should be prepared to strengthen its
supervision in order to assist in removinçi bottleneeks.
7.2 The ADB's mid-1995 supervision report and follow-up letter to the Zimbabwe Government
eonveying the mission's findings and reeommendations outlined a number of administrative reforms
and procedural improvements designed to improve the performanee of the SDF credit seheme. Most
were designed to aehieve early improvements during the remaining period of loan disbursements
but also to seeure the long term future of the eredit seheme as a revolving fund. This study has
eoneluded that the eredit seheme is not and is unlikely to beeome self-sustaininçi within ¡ts oresent
institutional form. It has made a number of reeommendations for alternative institutional
arrangements, ineluding the reeonstitution of the SDF as an independent funding body geared to
long term povert reduetion. In this context, the short term priority should be to faeiltate the soeedy
alloeation of the remaininçi eredit funds to clients in line with the original programme objeetives.
Although only a fraetion of the backlog can be eleared, those retrenchees who can be assisted with
the remaining funds were indueed to train, prepare projeets and submit proposals on the basis of
the existing terms of eredit whieh it would be inappropriate to ehange at this late stage.
7.3 At the same time a eomprehensive redesign effort will be needed in two prineipal areas:
olaeinçi the existinçi loan oortolio on a orofessional revolvinçi fund basis; and establishinçi the SDF
as an indeoendent foundation. From the point of view of the ADB the first initiative is more direetly
associated with the present loan sinee the revamped SDF would not have direet responsibility for
administering the loan portolio although it might, depending on the results of negotiations with the
financial institutions, retain formal ownership as the Governments stakeholder. Teehnieal assistanee
miçiht be reauired to assist the transfer of the seheme to the seleeted institutions but they and the
private finaneial institutions in general have eompetent loeal expertise to eall on for an exereise of
this kind. The key to seeuring a rapid rise in the repayment rate will be an immediate and vigorous
effort to bring the existing pool of borrowers under a well-run monitoring and extension service. The
longer that arrears areallowed to age without regular follow-up, the more diffeult it will beeome to
seeure the eooperation of the elients. The prineipal agent(s) and reeipient(s) of any technieal
assistanee would be the finaneial institutions taking over the SDF loa n portolio.
7.4 Establishing the SDF ona long term footing eould provide the basis for further assistanee
under AOF auspiees. A conclusion of this study is that no further eredit-based interventions
additional to the oresent ADF loan should be made through the oresent SDF institutional setup,
whether the partieular administrative and proeedural systems of the CU are reformed or not. There
are two main alternative options. First, it would be possible to eonelude loan agreements direetly
with small enterprise finaneial institutions for onlending to elients. Candidates are the small business
units of theeommereial banks, amongst whieh one launehed sueh a seheme in Mareh 1996 with
British donor support; and the parastatals SEDCO and the AFC. Sueh loans might be designed to
serve either SDA or poverty reduetion objeetives depending on which needs have greater priority
at the time. But betler seeurity for effeetive targeting, elient satisfaetion and eonformity to policy
guidelines may be gained by ehannellnçi the funds through a well established institution in whieh
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all maior stakeholders are represented. An independent SDF as outlined in seetion 6.3 eould fulfil
sueh an institutional role.
7.5 In general, it would be adv isa ble for any fuure microcredit intervention by the ADB geared
to SDA or povert reduetion objeetives to take aeeount of the following guidelines amongst others:
. If the primary objeetive is the relief of temporary hardships arising from a struetural
adjustment proeess, the relationship between the short-term eredit seheme and lon g term
povert reduction strategy should be elearly artieulated in the design of the seheme. This
ineludes a elear statement of the disposition of the seheme's institutional form,resources
and targeting once the adjustment proeess is eompleted.
. Exeept as a last resort the delivery of the seheme should be olaeed with one or more
orofessionally eomoetent finaneial institutions, whether NGOs, private sector or parastatal.
This is likely to require institutional strengthenina as oart of the support paekage.
Plaeement in a seetion of a ministry is partieularly inadvisable.
. The seheme's management and administration should be geared specifieally to its needs
and not shared with other unrelated Drogrammes.
. All eonditionalities should be elearly la id down in the loa n agreement, ineluding the
amounts of any eounterpart eontributions by the Zimbabwean Government and the
institutional form and proeedures to be adopted.
. Targeting should be explicitly agreed in advanee, whether broadly or narrbwly defined and
whether for SDA or povert reduetion purposes.
. The basic eharaeter of the loan seheme should be speeified, in partieular whether it is to
aim at the small formal sector or the informal sector, and then elearly related to the
targeting obieetives, sueh as rural/urban balanee, gender ratios, and so on.
. Aeeess to the eredit seheme should not be prineipally on an entitlement basis but should
conform to a prooerly established sereening proeess.
. Monitoring. reeovery and extension serviees should feature prominently in the design of
the seheme and performanee targets seL.
7.6 Four types of followup intervention, whieh might also be considered in eombinations, seem
possible in the present Zimbabwean context:
. Additionallending on SDA eriteria, should the Government proeeed with a further phase
of struetural adjustmenl. In this case one of the strongest adverse impaets is likely to be
retrenehments in the public sector.
. Lending to SSE startups along similar lines to the present seheme, as part of long term
efforts to taekle unemployment and diversify the entrepreneurial base.
. Informal sector mieroeredit geared explieitly theneeds of the poor and targeted primarily
on rural women.
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. The fourth is finanee for grants to eommunity-based and ineome generating proieets,
mainly in the rural areas.
Although the government would bear the eventual eost of sueh grant finanee, the first three types
of intervention, if well designed and professionally implemented, eould be expeeted to generate
satisfaetory if not fully self-sustaining rates of repayment.
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rable 1. Ex Officio Membership of the SDF Advisory Board
Constitution '
Organisation
Old New
Government:
Permanent Seeretary, MPSLSW ( ehair)
SDF Coordinator - ( chair)
Ministry of Finanee (several) 2
Ministry of Public Service, Labour & Soeial Welfare 4
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture & Water Development 1 1
Ministry of Health & Child Welfare 1 1
Ministry of Industry and Commeree 1 1
Ministry of Edueation and Culture 1 1
Miriistry of Higher Edueation 1 1
Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation & Cooperatives 1 1
Ministry of Local Government, Rural & Urban Development 1 1
Assoeiations:
Consumer Council of Zimbabwe 1 1
NGOs (National Association of NGOs) 1 1
Zimbabwe Association of Business Organisations 1 1
(Indigenous Business Development Council)
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 1 1
Zimbabwe Federation of Disabled People 1 1
(Zimbabwe Council of Disabled People)
Coopted:
Ministry of Information 1 1
ZANU (PF) Women's Affairs 1 1
Business Extension and Advisory Serviees 1
DERUDE 1 1
Source: SDF 1991 and 1995 Constitutions.
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rable 2. SDF Indicative Budget Estimates, 1994/95-1996/97
Millions of units Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total
(Z$ unless stated) FY 1994/95 FY 1995/96 FY 1996/97
PMP budget estimates (US$m):
Social safety nets:
- Edueation 6.0 7.0 7.0 20.0
- Health 8.0 9.0 8.0 25.0 '
- Food aid 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0
- Sub-total 15.0 17.0 17.0 49.0
Informal sector/ME programme * 15.5 20.5 21.5 57.5
Total 30.5 37.5 38.5 106.5
Sub-programme budgets:
Soeial safety nets:
- Edueation 47.1 51.6 55.8 154.5
- Health
in US$ 7.57 9.08 7.57 24.22
in Z$ 60.56 72.64 60.56 193.76
- Food aid
in US$ 1.2 2.0 2.0 5.2
in Z$ 9.6 16.0 16.0 41.6
- Sub-total 117.26 140.24 132.36 389.86
SSE loans 100 110 115 325
Total 217.26 250.24 247.36 714.86
SDF budget as stated 100 210 210 520
PMP:
in US$ 48.0 50.5 51.5 150
in Z$ 384 404 412 1200
* Includes non-Ioan sub-programmes.
Conversions at US$1=Z$8, the rate used in the government tables. Adding errors in source
eorreeted.
Sourees: Zimbabwe Government, PAAP Strategies, table B; MPSLSW, Implementàtíon of PAAP,
sub-programme summaries.
Note: Ineonsisteneies in the PMP doeuments, whieh sometimes use US dollars, sometimes
Zimbabwe dollars and oeeasionally both, complieate the issue somewhat. There were variations in
the totals for the 'estimated SDF budget, whieh in one plaee were stated as Z$220 million and
Z$230 millon for the second and third years. The total indieative eost of the SDF eomponents of
PMP was at Z$520 million somewhat below the aggregate of Z$715 million for the ETP and SWP
eomponents then already operational, a figure whieh ineludes donor finanee already eommitted or
to be sought.
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rable 3. SDF Indicative BudgetEstimates, 1994/95-1996/97: Domestie Resources
Millions of units Government eontributions
Amount Per cent
Sub-programme budgets:
Soeial safety nets:
- Education 78.6 50.9
- Health ..
in US$ 11.39 47.0
in Z$ 91.12
- Food aid
in US$ 2.58 49.6
in Z$ 20.6
- Sub-total 190.32 48.8
SSE loans 206.84 63.5
Total 397.16 55.6
Conversions at US$1=Z$8 (GOZ 1994a, table B). Adding errbrs in source correeted.
Sourees: Zimbabwe Government, PAAP Strategies, table B; MPSLSW, Implementation of PAAP,
sub-programme summaries.
rable 4. ADF Loan Allocation and Disbursement to the SDF to July 1995
Loan Dates Amounts
BUAm Z$m
Total amount June 1992 4.60
Disbursements:
- initial April 1993 0.89
- 1 st replenishment August 1994 0.72
- su b-total 1.61
Balanee At July 1995 2.99
Budgeted
- Zimbabwe Government To June 1995 270.0
Source: ADB, Supervision Report 1995.
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Table 5. Estimated Target Groups and Safety Net Budgetary Requirement, 1994/95-1996/97
SWP sub-programme Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
, 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97
Target group:
- school fees 265,000 300,000 300,000
- examination fees 30,000 30,000 40,000
- health eharges 200,000 200,000 200,000
- food subsidy 100,000 100,000 100,000
Estimated eosts (Z$m):
- school fees 34.5 39.0 39.0
- examination fees ' 12.6 12.6 16.8
- health eharges 60.6 72.6 60.6
- food subsidy 9.6 16.0 16.0
total 117.3 140.2 132.4
Average per beneficia ry (Z$/month):
- school fees 130 130 130
- examination fees 420 420 420
- health eharges 303 363 303
- food subsidy 160 160 160
Source: MPSLSW, Implementation of PAAP, s'ub-programme summaries.
Table 6. Cumulative SDF Expenditure on Education, Health and Food Money, 1992-end 1994
Categories Cases/payments Total co st Per benefieiary
Z$m Z$
School fees 363,087 59.7 164
Examination fees 68,815 11.49 167
Health 131,652 8.02 61
Food 294,092 1.17 4
Total 80.38
Source: CU; Advisory Board minutes.
Table 7. SDF Social Welfare Expenditure, January-September 1995
Categories Benefieiaries/ Total co st Per benefieiary/
payments Z$m payment
Z$
School fees 196,515 34.8 177
Examination fees 76,816 15.13 197
Health 181,637 26.03 143
Food 30,379 5.2 171
Total 81.16
Source: CU.
Note: The eumulated figures produeed by the CU for July and December 1994 are ineonsistent
internally and between different versions.
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Table 8. SDF Credit: Loans, Projects and Jobs Created, December 1992-January 1996
Loans Projeets Jobs
Z$m
To end of:
Jun 1993 3 78
Nov 1993
-.
-.
15.0 273 1157
Dec 1994 80.0 1097 4675
Dec 1995 148.7 1838 7263
Jan 1996 152.9 1889 7424
Period:
To Nov 1993 15.0 273 1157
Nov 1993-Dee 1994 65.0 824 3518
Jan-Dec 1995 68.7 741 2866
Jan 1996 4.2 51 161
Source: CU tables and minutes of Advisory Board meetings.
Table 9. SDF Credit: Loans, Projects and Jobs Created, October 1992-February 1996
Period Cumulative
Loans Projeets * Jobs Loans Projeets * Jobs
Z$m Z$m
To Feb 1996 172.7 2092 8138
Years:
1992 0.4 9 23 0.4 9 23
1993 15.1 268 891 15.5 277 914
1994 77.7 1002 4321 93.3 1279 5235
1995 72.9 738 2672 166.1 2017 7907
1996 6.6 75 231 172.7 2092 8138
Quarters:
1992/4 0.4 9 23 0.4 9 23
1993/1 0.5 13 21 0.9 22 44
1993/2 1.0 28 43 1.9 50 87
1993/3 5.1 91 270 7.0 141 357
1993/4 8.6 136 557 15.5 277 914
1994/1 15.3 230 1146 30.8 507 2060
1994/2 13.6 172 766 44.4 679 2826
1994/3 28.1 361 1510 72.5 1040 4336
1994/4 20.8 239 899 93.3 1279 5235
1995/1 21.5 222 863 114.8 1501 6098
1995/2 5.6 61 245 120.4 1562 6343
1995/3 13.1 129 510 133.5 1691 6853
1995/4 32.7 326 1054 166.2 2017 7907
1996/1 6.6 75 231 172.7 2092 8138
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
* Inelude 9 projeets in 1994 and 3 projeets in 1995 for whieh approved loan amounts were missing.
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rable 10. SDF Credit: Mean Loan Size and Job Ratios, October 1992-February 1996
Average loa n size Jobs per Cost per
projeet job '
Current Constant Current Constant constant
Priees priees * priees price Z$
Z$ Z$m US$ index *
To Feb 1996 83,047 66,453 9,248 115.2 4.2 16,000
Years:
1992 42,167 41,818 7,940 72.5 3.3 13,584
1993 56,529 54,918 8,734 95.2 4.2 13,647
1994 78,297 67,145 9,607 116.4 4.5 14,832
1995 99,178 71,027 11,455 123.2 3.8 18,488
1996 87,518 56,642 9,277 98.2 3.1 18,390
Quarters:
1992/4 42,167 41,818 7,940 72.5 3.3 13,450
1993/1 37,538 36,418 6,047 63.2 2.3 15,763
1993/2 37,133 36,642 5,815 63.6 3.1 12,393
1993/3 55,670 54,769 8,473 95.0 4.8 11,553
1993/4 62,913 60,545 9,317 105.0 4.1 14,591
1994/1 67,017 61,569 8,236 106.8 5.2 11,828
1994/2 79,596 70,592 9,957 122.4 4.7 15,002
1994/3 79,138 66,614 9,734 115.5 4,. 14,644
1994/4 86,880 70,786 10,417 122.8 4.0 17,927
1995/1 97,820 77,006 11,670 133.6 4.2 18,086
1995/2 91,642 68,454 10,805 118.7 4.3 15,617
1995/3 101,483 70,805 11,772 122.8 4.4 16,204
1995/4 100,597 67,552 10,965 117.2 3.3 19,902
1996/1 87,518 56,642 9,259 98.2 3.1 17,945
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
* Inelude 9 projeets in 1994 and 3 projeets in 1995 for whieh approved loa n amounts were missing.
rable 11. Distribution of Projects by Main Sector, October 1992-February 1996
Nuniber Per cent
Agrieulture 273 13.0
Agro-industry 515 24.6
Transport 467 22.3
Manufaeturing 347 16.6
Serviees 249 11.9
Retail 193 9.2
Construetion 33 1.6
Mining 15 0.7
Total 2,092 100
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
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Table 12. SDF: Sectoral Distribution of Projects, Jobs and Loans to September 1995
Sector Projeets Jobs Loans Distribution Per Cent
Approved Created Disbursed
(Z$ m) Projeets Jobs Loans
Manufaeturing 284 1943 22.9 19.0 31.7 19.4
..
Agrieulture 181 718 15.1 12.1 11.7 12.8
Transport 272 559 29.7 18.2 9.1 25.2
Mining 13 190 1.0 0.9 3.1 1.6
Sport 2 7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Construetion 42 496 3.5 2.8 8.1 3.0
Retail 192 708 14:7 12.9 11.5 12.5
Service 505 1509 30.7 33.9 24.6 26.1
Total 1491 6130 117.8 100 100 100
Source: CU.
Table 13. SDF: Project, Job and Loan Ratios to September 1995
Sector P rojeets Jobs Loans Per Projèet Loans
Approved Created Disbursed Per Job
(Z$ m) Loans Jobs (Z$)
(Z$)
Manufaeturing 284 1943 22.9 80,600 6.8 11,800
Agrieulture 181 718 15.1 83,400 4.0 21,000
.
Transport 272 559 29.7 109,200 2.1 53,100
Mining 13 190 1.0 76,900 14.6 5,300
Sport 2 7 0.2 100,000 3.5 28,600
Construetion 42 496 3.5 83,300 11.8 7,100
Retail 192 708 14.7 76,600 3.7 20,800
Service 505 1509 30.7 60,800 3.0 20,300
Total 1491 6130 117.8 79,000 4.1 19,200
Source: CU.
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Table 14. SDF: Manufacturing Projects to September 1995
Produetive Aetivity Projects Approved
Number Per Cent
Welding 68 23.9
Clothing 32 11.3
Leather 13 4.6
Furniture 13 4.6
Bakeries 7 2.5
Soap 7 2.5
Coffns 7 2.5
Foundry 5 1.8
Printing 5 1.8
Other 127 44.7
Total 284 100
Source: CU.
Table 15. Distribution of Se/ected Project Types, October 1992-February 1996
Projeets Loans Costl
projeet
No. % Z$m % Z$
General dealer 86 4.1 6.2 3.6 72,000
Minibus 422 20.2 48.6 28.1 115,000
Welding 80 3.8 6.0 3.4 75,000
Grinding mill 499 23.9 26.7 15.5 53,500
Pen fattening 116 5.5 12.0 6.9 103,500
Total 1,203 57.5 99.5 57.6 82,700
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
Table 16. Urban/Rural Distribution of Projects and Jobs, October 1992-February 1996
Projeets Indieated jobs
Number Per cent Number Per cent Per projeet
Urban 1,102 53 5,040 62 4.57
Rural 989 47 3,093 38 3.13
Total 2,091 100 8,133 100 3.89
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
Note: Urban/rural elassification is as entered in the database although some projeets appear to be
ineorreetly elassified. Jobs are per projeet proposals and not neeessarily ereated.
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Table 17. Distribution of Projects by Province and Population, October 1992-February 1996
Provinee Number Per cent Population Projeetsl
000 100,000
Harare 644 30.8 1,486 43.3
Mashonaland Central 138 6.6 857 16.1
Mashonaland East 272 13.0 1,034 26.3
Mashonaland West 193 9.2 1,113 17.3
Midlands 389 18.6 1,308 29.7
Maniealand 128 6.1 1,537 8.3
Masvingo 138 6.6 1,222 11.3
Bulawayo 132 6.3 622 21.2
Matabeleland North 28 1.3 641 4.4
Matabeleland South 27 1.3 592 4.6
Total 2,089 100 10,413 20.1
Source: CU projects database, revised.
Table 18. Distribution of Trainees by Province of Training
Number Per cent Population Projeets/
100,000
Harare 4,335 40.2 1 ,486 292
Mashonaland Central 259 2.4 857 30
Mashonaland East 762 7.1 1,034 74
Mashonaland West 533 4.9 1,113 48
Midlands 2,067 19.2 1,308 158
Maniealand 362 3.4 1,537 24
Masvingo 582 5.4 1,222 48
Bulawayo/Matabeleland North 1,508 14.0 1,263 84
Matabeleland South 363 3.4 592 61
Total 10,771 100 10,413 97
Source: CU projects database, revised.
Table 19. Borrowers Making Own Contributions, October 1992-February 1996
Projeets Per cent
Own contribution stated:
No 171 17
Yes 955 83
All cases 1,126 100
Mean eontributions (Z$):
Own 21,845 23
SDF 72,272 77
Total 94,617 100
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
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rable 20. Size of Own Contribution, October 1992-February 1996
Share of projeet co st P rojeets Per cent
::0% 955 85
::10% 636 56
::25% 188 17
::50% 43 4
::75% 8 1
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
rable 21. Small and Large Loans, October 1992-February 1996
Number Per cent
Smallloans:
.: Z$30,000 59 2.8
.: Z$20,000 28 1.3
.: Z$10,000 3 0.1
Large loans:
:: Z$120,000 71 3.4
:: Z$150,OOO 18 0.9
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
rable 22. Gender Distribution of Borrowers and rrainees, October 1992-February 1996
Borrowers Per cent Trainees Per cent Trainees
submitting
projeets
Per cent
To 18/08/95:
Men 1 ,424 90.1 11,023 85.1 12.9
Women 157 9.9 1,923 14.9 8.2
Total 1,581 100 12,946 100
To Feb. 1996:
Men 1,903 91,1
Women 186 8.9
Total 2089 100
Source: CU and CU projeets database, revised.
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Table 23. Age Distribution of Borrowers, October 1992-February 1996
Age band Number Per cent
-=30 282 14.2
30-39 731 36.7
40-49 630 31.6
50-59 324 16.3
::60 25 1.3
Total 1,992 100
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
Table 24. Level of Education of Borrowers, October 1992-February 1996
Edueation level Number Per cent
-JC 387 21.2
JC 422 23.1
O-leve Is 846 46.3
A-Ievels 68 3.7
Further qualifieation 104 5.7
Total 1827 100
Source: CU projects database, revised.
Table 25. Borrowers' Previous Employer, October 1992-February 1996
Sector Number Per cent
Government 519 25.0
Parastatal 388 18.7
Private sector 1,172 56.4
Total 2,079 100
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
Tables Page T12
rable 26. Mean Waiting rimes in Project Proeessing, October 1992-February 1996
Retrenehment to Submission to Retrenchment to
submission approval approval
To 'February 1996: 10.5 3.0 16.4
Years:
1992 - 2.3 3.0 4.7
1993 7.0 2.8 9.6
1994 9.9 3.8 13.8
1995 11.9 9.8 21.9
1996 11.3 14.5 25.6
Quarters:
1992/4 2.3 3.0 4.7
1993/1 2.3 4.6 7.5
1993/2 6.2 1.5 6.9
1993/3 7.1 2.1 9.0
1993/4 7.3 3.2 10.8
1994/1 9.0 3.3 12.4
1994/2 9.1 3.6 13.1
1994/3 10.3 3.5 13.8
1994/4 10.6 5.0 15.6
1995/1 12.0 5.0 17.2
1995/2 12.5 7.1 20.0
1995/3 13.1 10.5 23.7
1995/4 11.3 13.3 24.8
1996/1 11.3 14.5 25.6
Cases 1,469 1,549 1,985
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
Note: Because the number of eases differs, the eolumns are not direetly eomparable.
rable 27. Mean Grace and Repaymentrerms on SDF Loans, October 1992-February 1996
Graee period Repayment period
Months Years
To February 1996: 3.9 4.4
Years:
1992 4.1 5.1
1993 4.7 4.7
1994 3.7 4.4
1995 3.7 4.4
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
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Table 28. Sample Clients Repayment Record
Sample Numbers Ratios (%)
Sector Sample Current Repay- NeverCurrent Repay- Never
repay- ments repaid Size repay- ments repaid
ments in ments in
arrears arrears
Transport O 11 25 36 O 31 69
Agrieulture O 4 7 11 O 36 64
Construetion O 1 3 4 O 25 75
Manufaeturing O 13 10 23 O 57 43
Mining O 1 1 2 O 50 50
Retail O 5 15 20 O 25 75
Service O 11 35 46 O 24 76
Sport O O 1 1 O O 100
Total O 46 97 143 O 32 68
Source: Sample of CU projeet files.
Note: Out of a total population of 1491 approved projeets, a sample size of 143 elients files was
polled. The aeeuraey of the data is not entirely reliable as there are eases where a elient might be
up to date but due to ineffeient data eapture systems at SDF, the ledger eards will reeord non-
repayment or arrears. The sample was selected without proper adherenee to statistieal sampling
methods. Although the aetual sample units were randomly seleeted, the size of the sample units per
sector was predetermined arbitrarily. Therefore the sample should not be viewed as truly
representative of the population behaviour. The sample was elustered into seetors and data on the
repayment patterns for eaeh sample unit was eollected, mainly from the reeords kept in the elient
ledger cards.
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Table 29. Arrears Matrix Table, July 1994-September 1995
Z$ SDF Expected Loan Total Repay- Actually Rate Arrears to
Joans monthly balance interest to ment due collected (%) dåte
g ra nted repayments be
collected
1994:
July 5208896 86815 5122081 42099 128914 42156 86758
Aug 9398760 243461 14277380 117348 360809 42588 11.8 318221
Sept 6846288 357566 20766102 170680 528246 51740 9.8 476506
Oct 6865657 471993 2715766 223231 695224 77907 11.2 617317
Nov 9937813 637624 36459955 299671 937294 85482 9.1 851812
Dec 6084786 739037 41805705 343609 1082645 73393 6.8 1009252
1995:
Jan 8332205 877907 49260003 404877 1282783 56190 4.4 1226593
Feb 9548704 1037052 57771655 474836 1511887 62813 4.2 1449074
March 5224748 1124131 61872272 508539 1632670 121090 7.4 1511580
April 4221224 1194485 64899012 533417 1727901 97095 5.6 1630806
May 5395379 1284408 69009983 567205 1851613 163313 8.8 1688300
June 3648186 1345211 71312958 586134 1931345 152325 7.9 1779020
July 3042302 1395916 72959344 599666 1995582 148876 7.5 1846706
Aug 1294009 1417483 72835871 598651 2016134 209789 10.4 1806345
Sept 3424205 1474553 74785523 614676 2089228 196478 9.4 1892750
Total 88473162 13687639 6084638 19772277 1581235 8.0 18191042
Source: Sample of CU project files.
Note: The total accrued capital repayments do not include repayments of the loan amount granted between 1992 and June
1994 of Z$30 milion, Very few repayments were recorded prior to July 1994.
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Table 30. Nominal Repayments Schedule, No Defaults or Arrears
Annual Cumulative
Z$ milion
Loans Repay- Balanee Loans Repay- Balanee
ments ments
1992 0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.4 0.0 -0.4
1993 15.1 0.3 -14.8 15.5 0.3 -15.2
1994 77.7 9.9 -67.8 93.3 10.2 -83.1
1995 72.9 34.4 -38.5 166.1 44.6 -121.5
1996 6.6 53.9 47.3 172.7 98.4 -74.3
1997 53.1 53.1 172.7 153.0 -19.7
1998 49.9 49.9 172.7 202.9 30.2
1999 35.6 35.6 172.7 238.5 65.8
2000 10.5 10.5 172.7 249.0 76.3
2001 0.1 0.1 172.7 249.1 76.4
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
Table 31. Depreciated Repayments Schedule
Annual Cumulative
Z$ million
Repay- Constant Repay- Constant Capital +
ments priees * ments priees * interest #
1992 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1993 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1994 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
1995 5.0 3.3 5.1 3.3 3.5
1996 17.2 10.2 22.3 12.4 13.9
1997 26.9 13.9 49.2 23.9 28.4
1998 27.3 12.3 76.5 32.3 41.7
1999 24.9 9.8 101.4 37.3 52.9
2000 17.8 6.1 119.2 38.1 60.6
2001 5.3 1.6 124.5 34.6 64.1
Source: CU projeets database, revised.
* Base = Oetober 1992.
# Repayments pl us interest at inflation pl us 3 per cent on aecumulated deposits or new lending, at
constant priees. Repayments of prineipal on new lending excluded.
Assumptions: a) Capital funds already paid to SDF eredit seheme eonverted to grants; b) average
repayment rate = 50%; c) ave rage arrears = 1 year; d) average inflation = 15%; e) average interest
rate on deposits = inflation + 3%.
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ANNEX 1. CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND AS AMENDEO 1995
1.1 Establishment and Title of the Fund
A fund to be ealled the Soeial Development Fund (hereinafter referred to as the Fund) is hereby
established in terms of seetion 30 of the Audit and Exehequer Aet /Chapter 168/.
1.2 Obieetives of the Fund
The objeetives of the Fund shall be:
a) to provide eapital funds for approved small scale enterprises, eo-operatives, and public
works projeets whieh ereate employment for those who suffer from the short term effeets
of the Eeonomie Struetural Adjustment Programme (hereinafter referred to as the ESAP);
b) to provide training grants, ineluding in-plant exposure for persons retrenehed from both the
private and public sector as a result of the implementation of ESAP;
c) to provide grants for school fees for ehildren who come from sueh families, as may be
identified by the Department of Social Welfare as having been direetly affeeted by the
implementation of ESAP;
d) to provide grants for medical eare to persons identified by the Department of Soeial
Welfare as having been direetly affeeted by the implementation of ESAP;
e) to provide food subsidies to persons identified by the Department of Soeial Welfare as
having been affeeted by the short-term effects of ESAP;
f) to provide finaneial, teehnieal, managerial assistanee and adviee to those adversely
affeeted by the short term effeets of ESAP for undertaking ineome generating projeets
through 'Community Based Organisations.
1.3 Administration of the Fund
a) The Fund shall be administered by the Seeretary for Public Service, Labour and Soeial
Welfare (hereafter referred to ae the "Seeretary") who shall issue detailed instructions on
Aceounting and Administrative proeedures in aeeordanee with Treasury Instruetions.
b) all the moneys reeeived by the Fund shall be paid into a banking aeeount and no money
shall be withdrawn therefrom exeept by means of eheques signed by such persons as may
be authorised by the Seeretary;
c) any part of the funds not immediately required for purposes of the Fund shall be invested
in sueh a manner as may be direeted by Treasury from time to time.
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1.4 Assets of the Fund
The assets of the Fund shall consist of:
a) cash resourees and finaneial investments and;
b) fixed or iiovable propert donated to the Fund by donors or provided by government.
1.5 Ineome
The ineome of the Fund shall consist of:
a) moneys whieh may be appropriated by the legislature;
b) interest on loans and investments;
c) loans repayments;
d) any money donated, granted and aeeepted by the Advisory Board with the approval of
Treasury.
1.6 Exoenditure
a) sueh loans and grants for projeets and activities approved by the LOGAC;
b) such other payments considered ineidental to the objeets of the Fund sueh as bank
eharges/administrative expenses/legal feesfor loan eollections and loans which are
authorised for write-off by Treasury etc.;
c) meeting expenses of promoting and mobilising support for the Soeial Development Fund
Programme as may be approved by LOGAC;
d) meeting expenses associated with the activities of the Advisory Board sueh as travel and
subsistenee allowanees for non eivil servants members of the Board;
e) sueh other expenses as are ineidental to but not ineonsistent with the objeetives and
operations of the Fund and whieh will be subjeet toapproval of LOGAC.
1.7 Advisory Board
a) For purposes of advising the Secretary on the applieation of the Fund/ there shallbe an
Advisory Board consisting of:
I) a Deputy Seeretary from the Ministry of Public Service/ Labour and Soeial Welfare/
who shall be the Co-ordinator of the fund/ and the Chairman of the Board;
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ii) four offeers from the Ministry of Public Service/ Labour and Soeial Welfare nominated
by the Seeretary of that Ministry;
iii) two offieers from the Ministry of Finanee nominated by the Senior Seeretary for
Finanee;
iv) an offeer from the Ministry of Lands, Agrieulture and Water Development nominated
by the Seeretary for that Ministry;
v) an offeer from the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare nominated by the Seeretary
of that Ministry;
vi) an offeer from the Ministry of Industry and Commeree nominated by the Seeretary
of that Ministry;
vii) an offeer from the Ministry of Edueation and Culture nominated by the Seeretary of
that Ministry;
viii) an offeer from the Ministry of Higher Edueation, nominated by the Seeretary of that
Ministry;
ix) an offieer from the Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and
Cooperatives nominated by the Seeretary of that Ministry;
x) an offeer from the Ministry of Loeal Government, Rural and Urban Development
nominated by the Seeretary for that Ministry;
xi) a representative from the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe;
xii) a representative from non-governmental organisations;
xiii) a representative from the Zimbabwe Association of Business Organisations;
xiv) a representative from the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions; and
xv) a representative from the Zimbabwe Federation of Disabled Persons;
xvi) any other member eo-opted by the Chairman.
b) ten members shall form a quorum.
1.8 Funetions of the Advisory Board
The funetions of the Advisory Board shall be:
a) to advise the Seeretary on issues of policy affeeting the applieation of the Fund;
b) to make any reeommendations to the Seeretary regarding any matters affeeting the Fund.
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1.9 Administration of Proieets
The Seeretary shall appoint a Loans and Grants Alloeation Committee (LOGAC) consisting of:
a) members from the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare one ofwhom shall
be the Chairman;
b) members from the Ministry of Finanee;
c) a member from Ministry of Lands, Agrieulture and Water Development;
d) a member from Ministry of Mines;
e) a member from National Eeonomie Planning Commission;
f) any other member eo-opted by the Chairman.
1.10 Funetions of the LOGAC
The funetions of LOGAC shall be:
a) to determine the amount of resourees to be alloeated as loan funding for employment
generating projeets, and to apportion thereafter sueh resourees to speeifie programmes'
and to determine the terms and conditions of sueh loans;
b) to determine the financial resourees that will be made available as grants, their alloeation
between different eligible institutions and the conditions and requirements governing the
grants;
c) to determine the institutions that should be eligible for loans and grants.
1.11 Aceounts
The Secretary shall submit to the Comptroller and Auditor General an Ineome and Expenditure
Aeeount and a Balanee Sheet of the Fund in aeeordanee with the requirements of the Audit and
Exehequer Aet /Chapter 168/, within three months of the end of the financial year.
1.12 Dissolution of the Fund
In the event of the dissolution of the Fund or its amalgamation with any other Fund, association or
body, no moneys or assets of the Fund shall be transferredlo or amalgamated with any sueh Fund
association or body exeept as may be direeted by Treasury.
1.13 Amendments of the Constitution
No amendments or replaeement of this eonstitution shall be made exeept by the Treasury.
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ANNEX 2. INTEGRATION OF THE CU AND MIU DATABASES: A TECHNICAL NOTE
2.1 Introduetion
2.1.1 Two eomprehensive eolleetions of data are maintained at the SDF Coordinating Unit (CU):
a eomputerised database eontaining basic information on eaeh projeet for whieh a loa n was
approved; and individual files eontaining all doeumentation speeific to a particular approved projeet.
2.1.2 The CU database overlaps a previous database maintained by the Monitoring and
Implementation Unit (MIU) of the Ministry of Finanee up to early 1995. For the purposes of this study
they were reeoneiled and combined to build a single integrated projeets database whieh provided
a prineipal source of projeet data for analysis. The more reeentproject records were alsö cross-
eheeked where possible against the ineomplete deeision reeords of the SDF's Loans and Grants
Alloeation Committee (LOGAC).
2.2 Aims. Aoproaeh and Methodology
2.2.1 In order to assist the analysis of the performanee of the SDF the team requested and was
given aeeess to computerised data on projeets approved for SDF funding. The prineipal aim was
to generate a systematie data set for assessing the soeial and eeonomie impaet of SDF projeet
lending and the financial eharaeteristics of SDF loans. It was also agreed that the exereise would
provide a preliminary teehnieal review of the status of the data set for the use of the Coordinating
Unit in planning the pending introduetion of a eomputerised aeeounting system with links to projeet
information.
2.2.2 This short note gives information on the existing eomputerised data, deseribes the
preparation of a revised projeets data set and provides teehnieal notes to the database files and
spreadsheets supplied on diskette to the CU.
2.2.3 Two distinet projeet databases have been eompiled during the lifetime of the SDF eredit
programme, the first by the MIU and the second by the CU. The periods covered by eaeh match the
assignment of responsibility for ehairing LOGAC, whieh the Ministry of Finanee exercised through '
the MIU until early 1995 when it was transferred to the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Soeial
Welfare. As part of the handover the MIU provided a eomplete printout of its projeet database but
not the source eomputerised files. In eonsequenee the CU designed a new database and keyed in
most of the MIU data from seratch, updated information on existing projeets and entered new
projeets.
2.2.4 The MIU database is organised in a single large spreadsheet, originally in Lotus format and
lately imported into Exeel. The CU database is implemented in dBase IV. In order to prepare the
data for analysis it was neeessary first to unify the two data sets as far as possible. The MIU
spreadsheet was supplied eomplete exeept for the names and addresses of SDF borrowers while
the CU data file was duplieated in its entirety. Both were imported into MS Excel for editing and
integration. The output takes the form of unified spreadsheet files in Exeel format, eonverted also
to Lotus .WK1 format with a header row suitable for importing into dBase.
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2.3 Status of the Existina Proieet Databases
2.3.1 The data strueture of the two databases is similar but not identieal. The MIU spreadsheet
as supplied has 23 fields of whieh one is blank. There are presumably at least two additional fields
eontåining the names and addresses of the loan applieants, information whieh was removed from
the version supplied to the team on grounds of confidentiality. The CU data file has 25 fields of
whieh also one is blank; the file contains the eomplete contents of the database.
2.3.2 Apart from the missing names and addresses in the MIU file, there are several differenees
between the two data struetures which are summarised in table A2. 1:
Tab/e A2.1. Differences between the CU and MIU Data Sets
Field In MIU file In CU file
Marital status Yes No
Disability No Yes
Date of submission Yes No
Total project eost Yes No
Own eontribution Yes No
Graee period Yes No
Repayment period Yes No
Urban/ruralloeation of projeet Yes No
Distriet loeation of projeet No Yes
2.3.3 The most signifieant absenees in the CU database are of more detailed information on
approved loans in the CU database, preventing projeetions of potential fuure ineome and an
assessment of the proportion of borrowers' own eontributions. The MIU database laeks disability
status and distriet loeations of projeets. A comparison of the data struetures appears in table A2.2.
2.3.4 While most equivalent fields in the two databases share the same definitions there are also
several differenees, mainly in the coding employed (see table A2.2):
· The two databases have different sequenee projeet numbers with the result that although
the number provides a unique projeet ID in eaeh set, the projeets in the MIU database
have different unique identifiers in the CU seL.
· For the applieants level of edueational attainment, the laeks the 'degree' and 'postgrad'
eategories given in the MIU file while the latter's lowest eategory 'Form 2 and below' does
not match the CU's 'JC' and 'Below JC'.
· For 'Name of eonsultant the MIU has an 'Other' eategory whieh supposedly eovers all
unnamed consultants whereas the CU lists all consultants by name.
· Under 'Eeonomie sector' the CU merges the MIU's 'Agro-industry' eategory mostly into
'Services' and has 'Retail' for 'Trading' and 'Sport' in plaee of 'Entertainment.
· For 'Loan status' the MIU's 'Approved and funded' eategory is merged into the CU's
'Approved eategory.
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2.3.5 Turning to the contents of the respeetive databases, it is immediately apparent that there
is a large measure of overlap. When the projeets are matehed up the great majority in the MIU file
have also been separately entered into the CU file. Nevertheless just under 10 per cent of the
approximately 1400 MIU projeets having approved loan status are missing from the CU database.
There eould be good reasons for the absences, ineluding a subsequent change in the loan status
or an updating or eorreetion of the previous projeet information. However, the faet that this group
of projeets is missing altogether from the file suggests that they were never entered rather than
ehanged in status.
2.3.6 There are overall some 1,400 projeets reeorded in the MIU file which either had approved
status by the time that data entry eeased in January 1995 or were later aeeorded approved status.
The CU database eontained reeords for approximately 2,100 approved projeets up to early February
1996 when LOGAC meetings were suspended. This total is some 200 more than the number
offeially reeorded by the CU to the end of January 1996. It is probable that the CU reeord is updated
inerementally from the deeisions of each LOGAC meeting. The diserepaney between the two data '
sets needs further investigation. On balanee, the database may prove the more eomplete of the two.
2.3.7 It is important for database administration and data eonsisteney that eaeh reeord be
assigned a unique identifier. In the MIU spreadsheet eaeh new reeord was entered on the next row
and the previous projeets number ineremented by 1. This simple deviee ensured that neither gaps
between numbers nor duplieate numbers appeared in the file. It did, however, have the result that
in a minority of eases projeets that were deferred or otherwise failed to seeure loan approval
remained in the file, whieh is thus a reeord of projeets submitted to LOGAC rather than of approved
p rojeets , although the great majority of those submitted were in faet approved. It is not quite c1ear
whether all submitted projeets were aetually keyed in: the 'status' field does have a eode for
rejeetions but very few projeets fall under this eategory.
2.3.8 In the CU database the pieture is more confused. A number of duplieates were found: 40
projeets had the same reeord numbers as other distinet projeets and 29 projeets were replieated in
two reeords. These may not be exaet numbers because in a few eases the data differenees between
almost identieal reeords might be interpreted either as mistakes in data entry or as deriving from two
separate projects, making the determination of their status a borderline case. Nonetheless the faet
that a significant bateh of duplieates were found points to the need for a rigorous review of the data
aeeuraey and eonsisteney of the existing reeords as well as a redefinition of the key (projeet
number) field to enforee the assignment of unique identifiers to eaeh new projeet entered into the
database.
2.3.9 A eomparison of the contents of the two databases reveals a fairly reasonable level of
eorrespondenee between the respeetive reeords for the same projeets but many differenees of
detail, whieh appear to arise in most eases from either mistakes in data entry or minor differences
in the interpretation of the raw data. The match between numerieal data sueh as age of applieant
is, for example, very good whereas text fields sueh as projeet loeation and projeet type have many
small variations.
2.3.10 While most differenees can be reeoneiled from the context of the matehed pair of reeords,
in several fields diserepaneies can be signifieant:
. The names and addresses of the applieants: eould not be eheeked for reasons indieated
above.
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· Loan approval status: approved in the great majority of eases but for a small number of
projeets it is uneertain, particularly where projeets are 'approved' in the MIU file butnot in
the CU file, where loa n amounts and other details are missing for approved loans and also
where loan and other details are eomplete but 'approved' status is missing from either one
or the other file. The loan status of about 50 projeets in the CU database appears to be
either untertain or deferred.
· SDF loan amounts: in a surprisingly large number of ca ses the amounts of loans already
marked as approved in the MIU file differ from those entered in the CU database. The
number of sueh discrepaneies is well over 200 out of 1400 reeords, redueing to about 170
after eorreetion of obvious data entry errors sueh as too many or too few zeros. In some
ca ses they eould be atlributable to later inereases in the loa n amount or to second loans:
in over 100 cases the CU amount is higher than the MIU amount, totallng Z$2.2m. But in
nearly 70 eases, totalling Z$0.8m, the CU amount is less and in the absenee of a loan
review proeedure the most probable explanations are either data entry errors or differing
interpretations of the projeet doeumentation.
· Project loeations: the MIU details are mueh less preeise, giving provinee and distriet, area
or town, whereas the CU database has loeal addresses in the 'Village' field as well as
distriets and provinces. However, eheeking on map loeations exposed quite a number of
apparent errors in assigning loeal a'ddresses to distriets and even provinces.
2.3.11 Brief additional eomments on the eompleteness, quality and consistency of data in the two
databases are given in table 1.
2.4 Intearation of the MIU and CU Databases
2.4.1 The two files were first eonverted to Exeel spreadsheet format and their data struetures
revised to an identieal set of fields. The individual records were then matehed line by line to verify
eorrespondenee between the two databases. Duplieate reeords were removed and duplieate projeet
identifers were renumbered to ensure unique identifiers for every reeord. The MIU projeet numbers
were employed as the base numbering seheme for matehed MIU and CU reeords. Where new
numbers were needed, in partieular for duplieate CU numbers, vaeant MIU numbers were assigned.
For the post-MI U run of CU reeords the data entry sequenee of the dBase file was used sinee like
the MIU spreadsheet it followed fairly elosely the chronologieal sequenee of loan deeisions.
2.4.2 The loan deeision status of projeets was then reviewed by eomparing the two data files and
also eheeking the paper meeting reeords of LOGAC deeisions. Reeords having loa 
n rejeetions or
no approval status, together with an absenee of projeet information, were deleted; they were few
in number. Reeords having deferred status were transferred to a separate file together with a few
whose approval status appeared uneertain. They numbered 48. All remaining 2092 reeords passed
two test eriteria: they had approved loan status and a loan amount was stated.
2.4.:3 The integration of the two fies proeeeded on the basis that:
· Where matehed reeords existed in eaeh database, the CU record was taken in preferenee,
any data gaps were updated from the equivalent MIU field and the additional MIU fields
missing from the CU data strueture were grafted in;
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. Where a MIU projeet with approved loa n status did not have a CU equivalent, it was
transferred to the integrated file;
. All CU reeords not having a matehed MIU equivalent were ineluded.
2.4.4 All recordsin the integrated SDF data file were then cheeked against the MIU and CU files
for gaps and ineonsisteneies and wherever possible these were upgraded from the reeord's context
or from identifying likelyerrors in data entry. Having improved thë quality of the data as far as the
context allowed, the following additional ste ps were taken:
. The many naming ineonsisteneies were harmonised to a uniform style, in partieular the
names of organisations, abbreviations of the names, the plaeenames of towns, areas and
distriets, and the speiling of data categories, for example in the projeet aetivity field.
. Numerieal eodes were devised for the eategories of all conventions in fields using only the
text names of such sehemes, the purpose being to faeilitate systematie c1assifieation and
sorting of the database reeords. Definitions of the additional eodes are given in table 2.
. Several result fields were added, for instanee a ealeulation of the period between date of
submission and date of loan dedsion. A eomplete list of fields and headers appears in
table 4.
. In a eouple of fields data was added from external sources, for instanee in the 'Distriet field
where projeet loeations were eheeked against maps to verify and gap-fil administrative
distriet names.
2.4.5 At the end of this exereise the output was an integrated database table of 2092 projeets
with approved loan status pl us seeondary fies of deferred and duplieate projects. It must be
stressed that it was in many eases not possible within the limitations of this desk-based eomparative
proeedure to verify the data contents of partieular fields and reeords, whieh can only be done by
painstaking eross-eheeking with the projeet files. Earlier in this note several data fields were
indieated, partieularly for loan status and amount of approved loan, where sueh validation will be
important to undertake for SDF management purposes.
2.5 Uses and Reeommendations
2.5.1 The integrated data file whieh is the main output of the exereise described above provides
in a single data set the reeords of all SDF projeets with approved loa n status. The data contents
have been error-checked, valídated and extended within the neeessary limitations of the exercise.
2.5.2 The file can be viewed either by importing it into a database programme sueh as dBase
IV or by viewing the spreadsheet direetly in Exeel 5. Used as a spreadsheet, it will be fairly simple
to generate statistieal reports, for example the number of projeets approved by eeonomic sector and
month. Virtually any seleetion offields can be ~ombined in a report and more eomplex report formats
can be designed.
2.5.3 The spreadsheet eould be used as a backup for the main CU database. It can be used to
generate reports on the SDF projeets although it must be remembered that there are now many
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differenees of detail between the original data file and the integrated spreadsheel. It also provides
an easily aeeessible tool for analysing the data, for instanee to establish patterns in the regional
distribution of projeets.
2.5.4 While some of the data problems in the MIU and CU databases do not matter mueh, it will
be important to review thoroughly the most important fields aeross the entire data set before reliable
results can be generated. These fields comprise:
· Projeet number, espeeially removing duplieates.
. Approval status
. Amount of approved loa n
. Projeet loeation
2.5.5 In addition it would assist the financial management of the projeet portolio to restore
several of the MIU fields omitted from the CU data strueture, notably the graee period and the
repayment period.
2.5.6 The recommended upgrading of the CU database has largely been done already in the
integrated database. However, the judgements made in reeoneiling and correeting the original data
need to be validated against the file reeords of the individual projects.
2.5.7 Other projeet information may well be needed to assist projeet monitoring and follow-up
on repayments but it would probably be preferable to use aspecialist projeet management softare
paekage for this purpose alongside the plan ned introduetion of a eomputerised aeeounting system.
2.6 Installing the Files
2.6.1 The database has been produeed in Exeel and Lotus .WK1 formats, the latter being
suitable for import ¡nto database applieations using programs sueh as dBase IV. The main data file
appears in two data struetures:
· A standard file ETP3.XLS eontaining the results of the integration;
· An extended file ETP2.XLS eontaining in addition for ease of eomparison several of the
matching source fields from the two databases, sueh as the projeet aetivity field where
there are many differenees of detaiL.
2.6.2 The single Exeel spreadsheet eontains several separate sheets, one for eaeh data seL. The
main approved projeets data set is in the 'Combined' sheet and the seeondary files are in the
'Deferred' and 'Duplieate' sheets. The 'Codes' sheet eompares the eodes employed in the source
databases field by field and the 'Fields' sheet eontains short definitions of all the fields in the
'Combined' sheet (see also tables A2.3 and A2.4).
2.6.3 Also provided in ETP1.XLS is the working spreadsheet from whieh the result files were
generated. It eontains the original MIU and CU data files together with intermediate working sheets.
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2.6.4 The Exeel5 XLS and Lotus 123 Rel.2 .WK1 files are supplied in eompressed ZIP files on
diskette. To unzip and view the files, run the following proeedure:
For the sinale diskette eontaining the .WK1 database files:
1. Make a new direetory on the C: drive.
2. Copy the entire contents of the diskette to that direetory.
3. Change to the directory and exeeute: PKUNZIP ETP2DB.ZIP.
4. Import eaeh of the three .WK1 files into separate dBase data files.
For the multiole diskettes containina the .XLS soreadsheet files:
1. Make a new direetory on the C: drive.
2. Put in the diskette with the highest number in the top right-hand corner.
3. Change to the A: drive and exeeute: PKUNZIP ETP.ZIP C:\c:di reetory::.
4. Run Exeel 5 and seleet the XLS file of ehoiee.
2.6.5 The .WK1 fies can be imported direetly into dBase. They have dBase eompatible data
headers and for those fields eontaining original CU data the identical fieldnames have been retained.
2.6.6 The following printouts from the integrated SDF spreadsheet aceompany the data files on
diskette.
· The header rows of the integrated SDF spreadsheet giving the column letters, the text
headers and the column numbers for the spreadsheet together with their MIU and CU
database equivalents where matching.
· Field deseriptions (see also table 5).
· Data eodes (see also table 4).
· Projeets with approved loan status: the pages run down and then across, making up 4
marked bloeks of eolumns with the projeet number to the left.
· Deferred and duplieate projeets.
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Table A2.2. Notes on Data Completeness, Qualiy and Consistency
MIU CU Field Notes
field no. field
no.
1 23 Projeet no. Two different number series. Duplieate numbers and reeords in the CU file.
1 Name of applicant Complete in the CUfile.
19-22 Address of applieant Complete in the CU file.
5 2 Edueation MIU 100% eomplete, CU over 90%.
2 6 Age MIU 100% eomplete, CU over 95%.
3 7 Sex Both 100% eomplete.
4 Marital status MIU about 95% eomplete.
7 8 Previous employer Both over 95% eomplete.
,
6 9 Type of employer Both over 95% eomplete.
8 10 Date of retrenehment Both over 90% eomplete.
11 Disability CU 100% eomplete.
16 3 Consultant CU close to 100%, fairly frequent misspeIlng of names/aeronyms; MIU
over 95% eomplete, some names lost by merger into the 'Other' eategory.
10 12 Projeet aetivity Both 100% eomplete; many differences of detail and a few of substanee
between the databases.
9 13 Eeonomie seetor Both 100% eomplete; some internal ineonsisteneiès in the CU reeords with
the same aetivity elassified to different seetors.
15 14 Jobs ereated Both 100% eomplete.
15 Date of submission CU about 80% eomplete.
22 4 Loan status Both 100% eomplete; some differenees between the !wo.
23 17 Date approved Both 100% eomplete.
17 Total projeet eost MIU=aggregate.
.
19 Own eontribution MIU about 75% eomplete. ,
18 18 Loan approved MIU 90% and CU 100% eomplete; signifieant number of differenees
between the two.
21 Graee period MIU 95% eomplete.
20 Repayment period MIU 95% eomplete.
14 Urban/rural MIU 100% eomplete; definition unelear; substantial number of apparent
differenees with the stated projeet loeation,
12 25 Province MIU 90% and CU 100% eomplete; map discrepancies.
24 District CU 100% complete; distriets mixed in with towns and rural areas, little
eonsisteney in type of area given.
13 5 Village MIU 95% and CU nearly 100% eomplete; MIU has similar inconsisteney to
MIU districts; CU sometimes la eks full detaiIs, espeeially for town
addresses; a few rural addresses appear to be postal rather than loeations.
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Table A2.3. MIU and CU Data Codes
Field no. Field Miu codes CU codes
MIU CU Codes Oescription Codes , Oescription
5 2 Education 1 Form 2 and below -JC Below JC
2 o leve i JC JC
3 Alevel O o leve I 
4 Oegree A Alevel
5 Postgrad A+ Above Alevel
3 7 Sex 1 Male M Male
2 Female F Female
4 Marital status O Single
1 Married
6 9 Type of employer 1 Public sector GOVT Government
2 Private sector PVT Private sector
3 Parastatal PAR Pa rastata I 
11 Oisabilty D Oisabled
ND Not disabled
9 13 Economic sector 1 Agriculture Agriculture
2 Agro Industry
3 Transport Transport
4 Manufacturing Manufacturing
5 Services Services
6 Trading Retail
7 Entertainment Sport '
8 Construction Construction
9 Mining Mining
22 4 Loan status O Rejected R Rejected
1 Oeferred D Oeferred
2 Approved A Approved
3 Approved and funded
14 Urban/rural O Rural
1 Urban
12 25 Province 1 Harare
2 Manicaland
3 Mashonaland Central
4 Mashonaland East
5 Mashonaland West
6 Masvingo
7 Matabeleland North
8 Matabeleland South
9 Midlands
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rable A2.4. Additional Codes Introduced into the Integrated Data File
Field Categories
No. Header Code Oescription
7 Economic 1-9 Follows the MIU codes except that 7. 'Entertainment, for which there are very
secto r few projects, is merged with,5. 'Services'.
10 Business Sector + A 3-digit sequence number adding 2 digits to the sector code, thus 609 =
activity 2 digits 'General dealer'. The 2 digits are assigned in order of occurrence in the list.
14 Province 0-9 Follows the MIU codes except that O. Bulawayo is split from Matabeleland
North, following the 1992 census.
16 District Province A 3-digit sequence number adding 2 digits to the province code, thus 506 =
+ 2 digits Kadoma Urban in Mashonaland West. The district names follow the 1992
census.
20 Growth Point G Growth Points indicated as such in the Vii age field. Other type of location
codes can be added as desired.
21 Urban/rural U/R Indicating the status of the project location.
24 Consultants 1-15 Follows the MIU codes except that 14 is expanded to indicate the specific
names given in the CU file, thus 14d = World Vision.
32 Approval ROA Follows the CU codes.
status
33 Status/Uncerta LX X = Approval status not validated. L = Loan amount missing.
in
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rable A2.5. Fieldnames and Headers in the Integrated Database File
DB field * Col Spreadsheet header Additional notes
PJT_REV 1 Project number/Revised Revised to ensure a unique project number for each record
PROJECTNO 2 Project number/CU database As in the CU database
PJT_MIU 3 Project number/MIU database As in the MIU database
DEF 4 Duplicates Records for which duplicates have been reconciled
RCD_SRC 5 Record source Base data from the MIU or CU database
APP _NAME 6 Name of applicant From the CU database
SEC_REV 7 Economic sector/Code/Revised Revised sector code
SEC_MIU 8 Economic sector/Code/MIU From the MIU database
SECTOR 9 Economic sector/Description Revised
p _ CODE 10 Business activity/Code New code
p _TYPE_REV 11 Business activity/Description/Revised Revised project activity description
PROJ_ TYPE 12 Business activity/Description/CU CU project activity description
P _ TYPE_MIU 13 Business activity/Description/MIU MIU project activity description
PROV_CODE 14 Province/Code New code
PROVINCE 15 Province/Name Revised
DIS_CODE 16 DistricUCode New code
DISTRICT 17 DistricUName Revised
SUBURB 18 Town, suburb, area Name if needed
VILLAGE 19 Village, street, plot From the CU database
GP 20 Growth Point If so described in the Village field
UR_REV 21 Urban-Rural/Revised Project location, revised
UR_MIU 22 Urban-Rural/MIU From the MIU database
NO_OF _JOBS 23 Number of jobs Jobs created
CNSL T _ CODE 24 ConsultanUCode Integrated
CONSUL TING 25 ConsultanUName Name of organisation
INVT_TOTAL 26 Total project investment SDF + Own funds
INVT _SDF 27 Approved SDF loan/Revised By LOGAC
INVT_OWN 28 Borrower's investment Own funds
AMT _APPVD 29 Approved SDF loan/CU From the CU database
INV_DIFF 30 Loan difference Between the CU and MIU databases
STATUS_MIU 31 Final loa n decision/MIU From the MIU database
STATUS 32 Final loa n decision/Revised From the two databases and LOGAC records
STATUS_U 33 Final loa n decision/Uncertain Data missing, conflicting, decision deferred etc
LOANS_NO 34 Number of loans Approved for this borrower
GRACE 35 Grace period In months
RPMT 36 Repayment period In years
D_RETRENCH 37 Date of retrenchment Letter of retrenchment
DATE_SUBMI 38 Date of submission Of loan application
DATEJIRST 39 Date first considered Loan application by LOGAC
DATE_APPR 40 Date approved Loan application by LOGAC
PERIOD_A 41 Gap/Retrenchment-submission Days from retrenchment to submission of application
PERIOD_B 42 Gap/Retrenchment-approval Days from retrenchment to approval of application
PERIOD_C 43 Gap/S ubmission-approval Days from submission to approval of application
PERIOD_D 44 Age Of applicant
AGE 45 Sex M/F
SEX 46 Marital status Married/single
MARITAL 47 Education Level achieved
EDUCA TION 48 Disability status Disabled/ Not disabled
DISABILITY 49 Type of employer Public sector/Parastatal/Private sector
T_O_EMPLYR 50 Name of employer
EMPLOYER 51 Address of applicant
ADDRESS1 52 Address of applicant
ADDRESS2 53 Address of applicant
ADDRESS3 54 Address of applicant
ADDRESS4 5,5
. Fieldname designed for importing into dBase.
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ANNEX 3. NOTES ON SELECTED MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN ZIMBABWE
The activities of three organisations with national coverage, the Credit Guarantee Company,
SEDCO and Zambuko Trust, are reviewed(11.
3.1 The Credit Guarantee Companv (CGC)
3.1.1 The Credit Guarantee Company (CGC) was established jointly by the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe and the five eommereial banks to eneourage lending to small businesses and expanded
its operations from 1988(2J. The Governments aim was to inerease the share of lending to small
businesses in the eommereial banks, whieh had hitherto invested very little in MSE development.
The Reserve Bank guarantees 50 percent of the value of loans to men and 65 percent on loans to
women(3), in both eases exelusively on loans made by the partner banks. The CGC itself has no
assets: it is owned by the banks and aets as an agency for loan proeessing, employing mainly staff
seeonded from the banks.
3.1.2 CGC loans are in prineiple eommereial bank loans whieh are seeured by a guarantee from
CGC. Qualifying applieations are referred by the banks to the CGC for evaluation. The CGC staff
appraisals then go for deeision to the Advanees Committee and if approved the loans are disbursed
through the banks. The proeessing eyele aims at a decision within 40 days but that target has been
found to streteh in some eases to a number of months.
3.1.3 Under its regular guarantee programme the CGC has a eap of Z$0.5 millon, although this
has sometimes been exeeeded, and an average loan size of around Z$0.2 milion. By late 1995 the
client base eomprised 93 under the CIDA seheme and 660 in the regular seheme. The terms of
lending were 1 per cent above prime rate with loose requirements for eollateral.
3.1.4 The CGC's role underwent a major ehange in 1994. The government had initially targeted
the small enterprise sector with a Z$100 million faeility in the early 1990s. These funds were
ehannelled through eommercial banks. It is alleged that the eommercial banks used this faeility as
an opportunity to ele¡;r long-standing loan obligations by the small enterprise sector. The funds were '
approved by the banks for the purposes of covering existing debts in the banks' books, hence the
objeetive of financing small companies was defeated.
3.1.5 In early 1994, the Government approved a further Z$400 million whieh was disbursed
instead through CGC on very eoneessional terms. Interest rates were set at only 5 percent per year
in an environment where inflation was then running at about 18 per cent and the nominal
eommereìal interest rate closer to 25 percent, the Reserve Bank eharging 3 per cent and the
eommercial banks eharging a 2 per cent commission rate. The government guarantee was raised
to 75 per cent. Under the new facility the CGC primarily targeted SMEs and set variable terms by
sector:
· Manufaeturing: Z$410,000, graee 12 months, repayment over 5 years;
1. Recent research by Peter Fidler for the World Bank, in March 1996 still in working draft form, wil when published
provide detailed information and analysis on Zimbabwe's small scale and informal sectors. This section draws
in part on his preliminary findings.
2. Its predecessor was founded in 1978.
3. The additional15 percent was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIOA).
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· Transport: Z$240,OOO, graee 6 months, repayment over 2 years;
· Commerce: Z$160,000, graee 9 months, repayment over 2 years.
3.1.6 The average loa n size has been approximately Z$164,500. Not surprisingly, demand at
sueh generous terms was high. By late 1995 the CGC had reeeived more than 7,000 applieations
worth Z$1.8 bilion and had approved 2,298 of them. Although the average amount was much higher
than the SDF, the number of applieations reeeived and proeessed by late 1995 were, roughly
equivalent over a timespan about half the length. The diversion of applieations and pressure of work
foreed the CGC to suspend its regular lending programme temporarily. The repayment rate on the
eoneessionalloans was not expeeted to be high.
3.2 The Small Enterprises Development Corporation lSEDCO)
3.2.1 In 1983, the Government established the Small Enterprise Development Corporation
(SEDCO) as a development finanee institution for small and mieroenterprises. SEDCO lends on
terms below eommereial interest rates (25 percent nominal interest rate) but whieh have mostly
been positive in real terms. The upper size limits in late 1995 were 50 employees and assets under
Z$0.5 million.
3.2.2 As of December 1993, SEDCO had 1,89210ans outstanding valued at Z$128 millon in
principal and aeerued interest, giving an average loan size of Z$67,700. In Mareh 1995, the number
of borrwers was put at 1,900 and the portolio at about Z$145 millon. During FY 1994, SEDCO
approved 18610ans amounting to Z$23.3 millon, an average loan size of Z$125,OOO. The slow pace
of proeessing has refleeted in part the limited capita I resourees at its disposal.
Table A3.1. SEDGO's Loan Portoilo: SectoralDistribution and Term Structure
Clients (%) Loans (%)
Sector (at Dec. 1993):
Commerce 57 31
Industry 21 26
Serviees 18 37
Three seetors 96 94
Duration (at Feb. 1995):
-=3 years 13 3
3-5 years 77 79
::5years 10 18
Source: World Bank, IGR, p.3.
3.2.3 A seetoral breakdown of SEDCO's elients reveals that more than half were in eommeree
but that the unit value of loans was higher in industry and mueh higher in serviees (see table A3.1).
As of February 1995, most of SEDCO's loans were of medium term duration and only 3 percent of
SEDCO's portolio hads been lent out on a short-termbasis (under 3 years), although these made
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up 13 per cent of elients. Agender breakdown reveals that only 11 per cent of borrwers were
women.
3.2.4 SEDCO has developed a fairly detailed projeet proeessing system whieh includes site
visits: It has also implemented a computerised monitoring system to manage information and traek
arrears.
3.2.5 SEDCO also provides teehnieal assistanee to ¡ts clients. Reeently SEDCO started to
separate its technieal assistanee side of operations from its financial serviees, following a
Government statement in 1995 that the two functions would be split into distinet institutions.
3.2.6 SEDCO has been hampered by repayment problems. While the number of elients deelared
to be in arrears as of Mareh 1995 was only 19.4 percent, its portolio at risk rate (Ioans more than
90 days pa st due date) was 62.2 percent. It is estimated that the repayment performanee of
SEDCO's c1ients is even poorer than these statisties would indicate given SEDCO's praetice of
reseheduling loans. A study was reported to have indieated that at the end of 1993 arrears of
prineipal and interest amounted to Z$78 millon out of a total portolio of Z$128 million, or 61 per
cent. Sueh losses have eompromised SEDCO's ability to use loa n repayments fully to projeet itself
on a path toward financial sustainability and it has depended heavily on new capital injeetions to
maintain its lending programmes. However, it has also been noted that many elients have in the past
repaid fully afterloan maturity.
3.2.7 A reeent World Bank evaluation report(4J on its US$8.5 millon loan to SEDCO for SSE
lending eame out with a moderately positive assessment. The programme, whieh ran from 1986 to
1994, made loans to 246 enterprises, approximately half the originally intended outreaeh. Of these,
SEDCO estimated that 70 per cent were performing well. Of those loans stil on its books at the end
of February 1995, 55 per cent were either not repaying or paying later than three months in arrears.
However, the effeieney of the reeovery unit is said to have improved lately. The Government has
also strenghtened SEDCO's legal powers to enforee debt reeoveries on its own behalf.
3.2.8 In 1994 SEDCO launehed a separate mierifinanee seheme targeted on the informal sector.
The repayment rate for this seheme were stated in early 1995 to be mueh higher at 90 per cent. In
an interview in November 1995, the General Manager of SEDCO stated that 1,377 people in
approximately 459 groups had been assisted by its miero-finaneè seheme started in 1994. Total
loans amounted to Z$1.8 million, thus averaging 2$1,307 per loan. The formalloan eeilng was
Z$2,000 per person repayable within 12 months. The seheme was based on group lending
prineiples with a minimum of three per group. Most of the loans have gone to Harare (286) and
Bulawayo (47) and the seheme is thus heavily town oriented, although it aims at nationwide
eoverage(S).
3.2.9 Over-eentralisation and institutional ineffcieney have imposed heavy drags on SEDCO's
performanee. It was estimated in late 1995 that for every SEDCO staff member, the institution made
only 10 loans. Some 45 per cent of its statt were based at head offee with a preponderanee of
senior grades. In some eases found amongst a sample of borrowers in 1994, the waiting time was12
4. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Zimbabwe: Small Scale Enterprise Project (Loan 2533-Zim),
(Washington, June 1995).
5. People's Voice, 5-11 November 1995. Detailsare scarce since SEDCO declined to make available data on its
client base.
Annexes Page A19
to 18 months from applicaton to disbursement.iS1. However, operational effeieney is said to have
reeently shown a 'notieeable improvement,
3.2.10 It appears that despite the restrictive small business environment of the 1980s and the
turbulent eeonomie ehanges of the early 19905, SEDCO's loans had good results for many
borrowers. A 1994 traeking study of 18 borrowersi71 reported generally 'very positive results. This
data as well as aneedotal evidenee suggests that SEDCO has had an imporant impaet on individual
businesses as well as on the degree to whieh indigenous businesses have developed in Zimbabwe'.
Aetual job ereation was at 1,095 mueh less than the 'over 5,000' indicated on loa n appleations, but
the co st per job was relative ly low at Z$34,929.
3.2.11 Government support of SEDCO in terms of providing eommitted capital was limited.
Following a reeent Government deeision, the organisation has been reviwing options for attraeting
equity eapital and thus diversifying its sourees of finanee.
3.2.12 The diffieulties of the eeonomie. and institutional environment within whieh SEDCO has '
operated have been identified as major faetors affeeting its performanee and those of its borrowers,
amongst them:
. Distortions and monopolies favouring larger eompanies and parastatals before ESAP;
· A restrietive small business regulatory environment whieh has as yet been only partially
reformed;
· The more volatile eeonomie environment of reeent years in whieh disasters sueh as the
1992 drought have eonieided with expanded opportunities arising from ESAP;
· Continuing high real interest rates influenced by the fiseal deficit.
3.2.13 SEDCO has also been affeeted by the parallei Government interventions into its SSE field
of operations, in partieulat through the subsidised eredit provided through the CGC and the SDF.
Bothhavedisbursed larger amounts in loans overmueh short time periods. '
3.3 Zambuko Trust
3.3.1 Zambuko Trust was started in 1991 by a group of ehureh and business leaders. Zambuko's
major thrust is to provide loans of between Z$2000 to Z$5000 to mieroenterprises. Opportunities
International, an NGO based in Chicago, USA, is the main sponsor of Zambuko's activities with
finaneial and teehnieal support. Additional funds have come from the Australian government and the
Ford Foundation. Zambuko started in Harare and it has now established full branehes in Bulawayo,
Gweru and Mutare as well as satellite offees in Chitungwiza, Kwekwe and Esigodini. ,
6. R. Bradburd & B. Levy, Zimbabwe's New Entrepreneurs: an Emerging Success Story?, (Washington, OG: World
Bank, 1995. Dratt paper). A number of instances were cited in the survey where by the time a loan was
disbursed, the co st of the equipment the loa n was intended to cover had increased to the point where the loan
was no longer sufficient to purchase the equipment.
7. Bradburg & Levy, summarised in World Bank, IGR, pA,
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3.3.2 In late 1995 the distribution of c1ients was as follows:
Harare 1600
Bulawayo 1150
Gweru 550
Mutare 500
Totàl 3800
3.3.3 Zambuko explieitly targets the informal sector and has amongst its objeetives the aim to
assist mieroenterprises to grow into the small formal sector. Its seetoral coverage is broadly defined
and extends aeross agrieulture, manufacturing, services and trade. Borrowers are predominantly
urban and in the service or household-based manufaeturing seetors.
3.3.4 Features of Zambuko's lending track reeord (see table A3.2) are:
. During its first three years, aeeording to Zambuko's management, it has created about
2,500 new jobs and sustained another 4,700 existing jobs.
. During 1995 it planned to make 3460 loans with a value of about Z$6 millonisi. In FY
1994/95 aetuallending was about 2,800 loans worth Z$4.3 millon.
. Over its four years of operation to February 1996, Zambuko lent Z$8.9 million in 5,761
loans, ereating or sustaining 7,532 jobs. Its mean loan size was very small at Z$1,553; its
job ereation was just over one per projeet; and its co st per job ratio was Z$1 ,188.
rable A2.2. Lending Operations By Zambuko Trust, March 1992-February 1996
Period to: Dec Dec Aug Aug Feb Total
1992 1993 .. 1994 .. 1995 1996
Length (months): 10 12 8 12 6 48
Loans:
Number 269 449 1,193 2,786 1,064 5,761
Total (Z$OOO) 449 528 1,670 4,257 2,045 8,949
Jobs ereated 299 863 936 3,744 1,690 7,532
Monthly average:
Number 27 37 149 232 177 120
Loans (Z$OOO) 45 44 209 355 341 186
Jobs 30 72 117 312 282 157
Means:
Loan size (Z$) 1,669 1,177 1,400 1,528 1,922 1,553
CosUjob (Z$) 1,502 612 1,784 1,137 1,210 1,188
Jobs/loan 1.1 1.9 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.3
.. The ratios for these years suggest ineonsistent timespans amongst the aggregates.
Source: Zambuko Trust.
8. Interview with Tawanda Sibanda, branch manager, Harare, in The Worker, November 1995.
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3.3.5 The usual eeiling on initialloans per projeet is Z$5,OOO although the spread ranges from
Z$300 up to Z$25,OOO. Only about 2 per cent of loans are above the Z$5,OOO limit, however. The
loans are granted for both working capital and smallassets. They are set for periods usually
between 6 to 12 months with a range of 1-18 months; the elient ehooses his/her preferred loan
period. Repayments are effeeted on a monthly basis and interest rates on the loa n is presently at
32 per cent and there are other charges levied such as proeessing fee and applieation fee. The
annual effeetive interest rate has been caleulated at over 50 per cent. The elient is required to pay
10 per cent of the loan prineipal amount as a guarantee on loan disbursement, whieh is refunded
when the client has fully repaid the loan. There is no graee period on the repayments.
3.3.6 For eollateral, Zambuko normally requires some moveable assets of value to be speeified
(TV, fridge etc) and a guarantor earning at least four times the value of the repayment instalments.
If the loa n is to a group, some form of joint liability is arranged.
3.3.7 Zambuko does not usually fund start-ups and businesses should have been in existenee
for at least six months before they can qualify for a loan. Before a loan is granted, elients have to
undergo an obligatory 4 hour initial training session, where a full diseussion of the loan eontraet is
eonducted. There is a Iittle bit of management training. Zambuko also offers optional eourses to its
c1ients at a nominal fee.
3.3.8 Zambuko has a deeentralised loan approval system. The loa 
n offieer makes the loa n
appraisal and reeommends approval to the braneh manager for loans up to Z$5,OOO. Loans in
exeess of Z$5000 are referred to Head Offiee. The Head Offee strueture has four executive
managers and the Braneh eomplement consists of the Braneh Manager, Loan Offieers, Client
Development Ç)ffeer and a Finanee Clerk. Loan Offeers undertake most of the work whieh ineludes
reeruitment of elients, appraisal and monitoring of c1ients pertormanee. Zambuko is eomputerised
and eaeh loa n offeer looks after an average of 250 elients. It has adopted a policy of eneouraging
applieants to mobilise another 15-20 other potential borrowers in the same area so as to reduee
transaction eosts.
3.3.9 Zambuko uses a tight elient monitoring and follow up system. Initially a week after
disbursement, a clent is visited. This organisation has a default rate of 5 per cent on its total
portfolio. Effeetive management, deeentralisation of loan approvais, use of eharaeter based
appraisal teehniques, proper loan approval and monitoring and in partieular use of loan offeers to
keep regular traek of elients and appropriate loan sizes for the type of borrowers are the major
faetors eontributing to the sueeess of Zambuko.
3.3,10 Zambuko has reeently had to face a number of diffieulties. Chief amongst the m has been
starvation of new capital to keep pace with the heavy demand for eredit. The Harare braneh
manager coneeded publiely in November 1995 that his braneh had been foreed to suspend
aeeepting new applications six months previously in order to clear an existing backlog of 1,600
approved projects dating back to January 1995. Disbursement of new donor funds had been
delayed by a failure to provide 1994 audited aeeounts on time, caused by shortage of skilled sta ff
in the aeeounts department. That staffng problem had now been sorted out, but the eurrent backlog
of projeets required at least Z$1 million to el~ar91.
9, Interview with Tawanda Sibanda, November 1995.
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3.3.11 Nevertheless, Zambuko has aehieved remarkable progress during its short Iife and its
finaneial serviees have been in heavy demand despite their non-eoneessional charaeter. It has a
strong commitment to ensuring equal aeeess for women, who form about 70 per cent of clients.
Despite a relative ly high arrears rate, some 95 per cent of its elients eventually pay back in fulL. It
eurrently eovers about 60 per cent of its operating eosts from interest and fees and offers good
prospeets for lon g term sustainability.
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ANNEX 4. SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS WITH SDF CLiENTS
This is a brief summary of the results of the interviews eondueted with elients during one of the two
field surveys condueted for the study. The aim of the interviews was to ascertain the elients' ability
to repay their loans and to determine the level of operations for the funded projects. The names of
the clients have been suppressed to proteet eonfidentiality.
ResDondent A. Bulawayo
Operates a clothes making business and employs about 4 people in Bulawayo. This projeet got a
loan from SDF and ha"s been operating for one year and five months. The projeet has realised an
average ineome of Z$10,OOO per month and the estimated net profit per month is Z$5,OOO. The
monthly instalment for the SDF loan is only Z$1,500, whieh can easily be met from operations. The
client has not made any repayment to the SDF loan. The client elaims he has not received any
information about his repayments and does not know how mueh he is supposed to pay and at what
time and where he is supposed to make his repayments. A review of the SDF files on the elient
reveals that not one reminder had been sent to the elient on his arrears.
ResDondent B. Bulawayo
Operates a manufaeturing projeet involving textile ehemieals, detergents, perfumes, lotions and air
fresheners. The c1ient seeured a loan of Z$80,OOO from SDF and has been operating for one year
and seven months. The venture employs 43 people. The average revenue realised per month is
Z$900,000 and the profit before tax is about Z$400,OOO per month. The elient took out another loan
of Z$300,OOO from SEDCO in December 1994 and Jepayments on the SEDCO loa n are eight
months ahead of sehedule but he has not made a single repayment to SDF, the reasons being that
he has not been requested to do so.
ResDondent C. Bulawayo
Operates a clothes manufacturing company and obtained a loan of Z$63,000. He started operations
in January 1995. His sales are about Z$8,000 per month. He has already started repaying the loan.
ResDondent D. Gweru
Operates a garage in Gweru. He obtained a loan of Z$68,OOO. There are no reeords kept by the
elient and he has not started repaying the loan.
Respondent E. Gweru
Started a business repairing eleetrieal goods and retailing eleetrieal parts and alarms and has been,
operating for almost a year now. The business turnover is about Z$30,OOO per month. He has not
made any repayment to the SDF loan. Asked why not, he said he was not aware of the amount of
his repayment obligation.
ResDondent F. Gweru
Operates a bookbinding business. He obtained a loan of Z$38,000 in November 1993. This projeet
has not made a single repayment to SDF. The elient has a genuine marketing problem and needs
working capital to improve his business.
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Respondent G. Gweru
Operates apaper maehine agency and distribution. He obtained a loan of Z$94,000. The projeets
average sales are Z$550,OOO per month. He is not making any repayments because there is no
communieation from SDF.
Res Don dent H. Kwekwe
This is a partnership in oil proeessing. They borrowed Z$150,OOO from SDF. The projeet is operating
three shifts and employs nine people. This projeet has working eapital problems.
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ANNEX 5. TERMS OF REFERENCE
5.1 Terms of Reference for Consultanev Services to Evaluate Soeial Development Funds in
Afriea
5. 1. 1 Background
5.1.1.1 The struetural adjustment proeess in Afriea, while ereating favourable conditions for growth,
has at the same time brought about adverse soeial and eeonomie eonsequenees on the welfare of
the poor and vulnerable groups - at least in the short run. In response to this, a Social Dimensions
of Adjustment (SDA) program, eo-sponsored by the Afriean Development Bank, UNDP and the
World Bank, was launched in 1987 to mitigate the negative effeets of adjustment. The Bank Group
has also direetly assisted regional Member eountries (RMCs) in establishing programs and projects
aimed at alleviating the soeial eosts of struetural adjustment programs on poor and vulnerable
groups. The first one of sueh interventions was in Guinea where social eoneerns were integrated
in the design of the adjustment program through the SDA projeet eomponent. Over the years, SDA
projeets have evolved into explieit povert reduetion projeets with eredit delivery eomponents. Sueh
projeets have come to be known as Social Development (or Action) Funds. These initiatives,
designed as eomponents of struetural adjustment programs, involve providing assistanee to the
poor1J in undertaking ineome generating activities through training, eapaeity building, and extension
of smallloans for miero-enterprises. In addition to Guineas, SDF programs have been designed for
several other RMCs, ineluding Burundi, Central Afriean Republie, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra
Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
5.1.1.2 It is a well aeknowledged faet that a large proportion of the Afriean population today is poor
and engaged in micro-entrepreneurship as subsistenee or small produeers whose major
preoeeupation is produetion for subsistenee. These miero entrepreneurs operate mainly outside the
formal eeonomy and have little or no aecess to formal lending sourees. Moreover, under the eurrent
set-up of lending institutions, it is often not eost-effeetive for formal eommereiallenders to extend
eredit to miero-entrepreneurs because of the high costs and risks involved in administering small
loans to usually sparsely plaeed borrowers.
5.1.1.3 However, in spite of their 'invisibility' in the mainstream formal eeonomy, miero-
entrepreneurs have a very important role to play in the eeonomy and in the overall development
proeess. It is estimated that the informal sector aecoimts for about 60 percent of the urban labour
force in low ineomeAfriea and eontributes, in many eountries, as mueh as 20 percent of GDP. there
is, therefore, an urgent need to faeilitate the development of this sector of the eeonomy by opening
up ehannels of targeted assistanee to miero-enterpríses. A eredit delivery meehanism, sueh as
SDFs, would constitute one of sueh ehannels of assistanee to the poor and vulnerable groups
engaged in miero-entrepreneurship. SDFs are seen as appropriate instruments for providing the
poor and other vulnerable groups aeeess to produetive resourees to enable them to actively
partieipate in the development proeess.
5.1.1.4 Although SDFs were initially eonceived as a short term instrument for mitigating the
negative effeets of adjustment measures on the poor and other vulnerable groups, they are now
being seen (either in their present form or in a modified way) as finaneially and soeially viable
1. Including other vulnerable groups such as those out of gainful employment as a result of the economic reform
proeess.
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models for aehieving sustained reduetions in povert within the overall framework of the most
effective ways of ameliorating povert within the overall framework of economic development in
Africa. It has also been argued that SDFs eould be one of the most effeetive ways of ameliotating
poverty at the grassroots level by empowering the poor and enabling them to partieipate in
meaningful eeonomie aetivities(2). The unanimity about this eoneept can be seen in the growing
prominenee of the use of miero-enterprise financing as an integral part of development financing.
The newly launehedConsultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), anehored at the World Bank
and eo-sponsored by ten (10) donors ineluding the Bank, is seen as one sueh initiative. It is within
this framework of intervention that the ADB's own program of assistanee to the poor (in the form of
miero-enterprise financing) is expeeted to foeus under ADF VIi.
5.1.1.5 However, before undertaking an expanded program of intervention, it is important that the
experienees of SDFs so far are evaluated and vitallessons ineorporated in future intervention
sehemes. It is within this spirit that in September 1993 in Oslo Norway, the Povert Working Group
of the Speeial Program of Assistanee for Afriea (SPA), requested the ADB to undertake the
evaluation of SDFs. By September 1994, a methodologieal framework had already been prepared
and was presented to the Povert Working Group of the SPA. On the basis of this framework, a pilot
study wil be undertaken to test the methodology. The findings of this pilot study wil be finalized and
presented to the next Povert Working Group of the SPA ~eheduled for 19-21 September 1995 in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Following eomments of the Working Group and the Bank, a eomprehensive
evaluation of SDFs will be undertaken
5. 1.2 Study Objectives
5.1.2.1 The objeetive of this pilot phase is to test the methodology of evaluating the SDF program
using two seleeted case studies in two RMCs (Malawi and Zimbabwe). The study will attempt to
identify weaknesses and strengths of the SDF programs and propose ways for improving the
performanee of the programs. This partieular study will lead a eomprehensive evaluation of the
SDFs with a view of improving the understanding of the funetioning of the programs and the impaet
they have had on the intended benefieiaries. Sueh an understanding would also eontribute to
improvements in the design and implementation of fuure SDF (or similar) programs.
5.1.3 Tasks
5.1.3.1 The evaluation study wil be undertaken by a team of consultants eomprising at least two
(2) Afriean (Le; at least one in eaeh RMC to be studied) and two (2) Norwegian consultants withthe
relevant experience in the following diseiplines and skill mix:
a) eeonomies,
b) finanee/miero eredit
c) institutional development, ineluding legal aspeets,
d) soeiology/anthropology, and
e) miero enterprise/business administration.
2. For further detaiIs, see Deng, L.A., Paverly Reduction: Lessans and Experiences from Sub-Saharan Africa,
(Abidjan: ADB, 1995).
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5.1.3.2 The team leader (or lead consultant) wil have the overall responsibility for preparing the
doeument, with relevant input from eaeh consultant. Two eountries: Malawi, and Zimbabwe will
serve as case studies for the entire study. In eaeh country, aetual researeh wil be earried out by at
least two eonsultants, one of whieh will be an Afriean.
5.1.3.3 This study (assignment) will be under the overall joint supervision of the Chief, Country
Eeonomies Division of the Country Programs Department - South Region, and the Chief of the
Environment and Soeial Policy Division of the Central Projeets Department. Speeifie duties of the
consultants will include, but not limited to, the following(31: "
a) reviewing the SDF program in its totality to identify the successes that can be replieated,
and the problems, and suggest ways of overeoming the problems;
b) reviewing the various Povert Alleviation Action Plans in the RMCs, and determining how
best they can be integrated with the eurrent SDF programs;
c) determining how to aeeelerate utilization of SDF resourees, and the strueture and form of
the Bank's follow-up intervention;
d) preparation of a eonsolidated report at the end of the exercise that will inelude details
(about the four case studies in the RMCs) as outlined in the suggested methodology in the
annex;
e) presentation of the report at a seminar within the Bank and subsequently assist the Bank's
mission to present a revised doeument at a meeting of the Povert Working Group of the
SPA seheduled for 19-21 September 1995 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and
f) undertaking any other neeessary activities in order to eomplete the study.
5. 1.4 Methodology
5.1.4.1 The questionnaire and interview methods with program managers and the intended
beneficiaries will be used in addition to eolleeting and analysing program budgets, balanee sheets
and ineome and expense statements. The specifie information to be sought is indieated in the
suggested methodology in the annex.
5. 1.5 Output
5.1.5.1 The primary output expeeted is a eonsolidated evaluation report of the SDF programs
based on a review of the soeial development funds in Malawi, and Zimbabwe.
3. The detailed tasks are indicated in the suggested methodology in the altached annex.
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5. 1.6 Schedule of Activities
5.1.6.1 A breakdown of the working days required to complete the various stag es of the evaluation
study is given as follows:
I)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
Workplan and mission preparation at ADB
Field visits in the two RMCs
Preparation of the draft report
Diseussion of the report within ADB
Finalisation of the report
Presentation of the report to the SPA working group
Total Number of Days
2 days
14 days
4 days
1 day
4 days
3 days
28 days
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5.2 Suggested Methodology for the Proposed Study to Evaluate Soeial Development Funds
by
Douglas H. Graham
The consulting team should engage in a study to evaluate the experienee of the Soeial Development
Funds (Mieroenterprise Programs) in seleeted Anglophone and Francophone African eountries. The
field work should foeus on mieroenterprise programs that provide both finaneial and non-finaneial
serviees to miero-entrepreneurs. The evaluation study of these mieroenterprise programs would
entail three prineipal eomponents. These are: (1) an examination of the program's products; (2) an
examination of the program's technology; and (3) an examination of the program's organizational
strueture and institutional performance. Questionnaires and interviews with program managers and
elient-benefieiaries should be drawn upon in addition to eolleeting and analysing program budgets,
balanee sheets and ineome and expense statements where feasible. Eaeh eomponent would
examine the following issues:
1. Program Products
1. Identify the prineipal types of produets or seivices the program offers. Doeument the nature
of the various finaneial and non-finaneial serviees supplied and the relative importanee of
each.
a) Determine reeent trends in loan expansion (or decline) and if loan terms, amounts,
disbursement and repayment sehedules are consistent with the cash f10w
requirements of program elientele-entrepreneurs.
b) Reeord borrowers' evaluation of program loan serviees and the role they play in their
business in eomparison to other, informalloan serviees in their eommunities.
c) Doeument the availability of grouo loans and the charaeteristie terms and conditions
of these loans.
d) Reeord seleeted group member evaluation of the contribution of group loans serviees
to the operation of their businesses and the degree to whieh peer group pressure and
group sanctions operate to generate suffeient group solidarity to ensure loan eontraet
monitoring and enforeement among members.
e) Doeument the availability of deoosit and savings instruments (where applieable) and
the range of deposit terms, interest rates and withdrawal rights eharaeteristic of these
produets and the reeent trends for deposit growth.
f) Reeord depositor-saver evaluation of programs savings-deposit serviees and role
they play in allowing the elient entrepreneurs to manage their surplus Iiquidity
eompared to using informal savings vehieles.
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g) Doeument the non-finaneial serviees offered by the program to their elientele or
eonstitueneies, e.g teehnieal assistanee, market information serviees, book-keeping
andmanagerial training, etc., determine the relative importanee of eaeh type of non-
financial serviees.
h) Reeord the evaluation of these non-financial serviees by program benefieiaries and
, how they eompare to alternative sources of assistanee or information.
2. Program Technology
1. Examine the Operational Meehanisms (technology) the Program Utilizes to Disseminate
its Produets and Serviees
A Doeument the information management system employed by the program. What kind
of information is eollected? For whom is it eollected (internal eonstitueney and/or
external donors)? What purpose does it service for deeision-making purposes? and
how is it eolleeted?
a) Colleet balanee sheets and/or ineome and expense statements and loan arrears
information for lending programs.
b) Determine what non-financialinformation is reeorded: e.g. number of elients, gender,
type of oeeupational eonstitueneies served, loeation, and various elient-Ievel data.
Determine how co sti Y this data eolleetion is and who uses it for what purposes.
Evaluate eost-effeetiveness of this data eolleetion.
B Prieing policy
a) Doeument ruling interest rates on loan and deposit serviees; for loan rates determine
if these rates cover all eosts of lending including administrative eosts (associated with
lending and deposit mobilization); arealistie allowance for loan losses: and the eost
of funds pl us reserve aeeumulation for future expansion or an unexpeeted decline in
loan reeovery.
C. Risk management proeedures
a) Identify the degree to whieh program management matches the term strueture of
assets and Iiabilities (for deposit based programs) to reduee the risks of finaneial
disequilibrium between loan term and deposit term struetures.
b) Doeument liquidity (Le reserve) management proeedures (for deposit based
programs).
c) Doeument the degree of loan portolio diversifieation by type ofaetivity and type of
c1ient financed.
d) Determine the degree of whieh loa n deeisions are made with a doeumented
understanding of an arrears risk profile for prospeetive borrowers (Le ereditworthiness
eriteria).
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D. The design of ineentive struetures
a) Identify the staff remuneration policy and whether pertormanee based remuneration
proeedures play any role in staff remuneration.
b) Determine the seope of group lending in the total portolio and the manner and
degree to whieh peer group pressure and sanctions operate to improve loa n
monitoring and eontraet enforeement in the program.
E. Cost effeetive profile for non-finaneial serviees
a) Identify the dissemination methods and eosts of supplying non-financial serviees, e.g
teehnieal assistanee, market information serviees, book-keeping and management
training etc.
b) Establish the dissemination eost per elient-beneficiary and the eost per staff member
involved for eaeh type of non-finaneial service offered.
3. Current Organizational Structure, Evaluation of Portolio Program Penormance, and
Vision for Future Governanee Rules
1. Organizational Strueture
a) Identify whether program is only a loa n program or both a loan and deposit based
organization.
b) Identify and evaluate upward linkages to a possible apex organization or government
agency and elarify the role and funetions of these upstream organizations in the
operation of the program (e.g supply ehannel for funds, teehnical assistanee,
regulator role, reporting hierarehy to donor, establishing loan polieies, etc.).
c) Explore and evaluate the degree to whieh the prineipal-agent hierarehieal relationship
between the program and any second level institutional (or government agency) is
designed to eneourage program sustainability.
d) Examine organizational strueture within the program itself and the ineentive for
employees and management to aet in the interest of program sustainability (Le.
performanee based remuneration meehanisms).
2. Evaluation of Portolio and Program Performanee
Program pertormanee indieators should logieally be linked to explieit program objeetives
established by the donor. In mieroenterprise programs these would eharaeteristieally
inelude some taraet group orientation (however defined, e.g gender, type or level of
business aetivity, loeation, number of employees, etc.) and some set of indieators
underscoring the potential for program sustainability (e.g. loa n arrears rates, high rate of
return on assets, etc.). The following iIustrate several possible pertormanee indieators for
both the finaneial and non-finanCial eomponents or a mieroenterprise program:
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A. Program sustainability indieators
a) First determine the established procedures for reporting and reeording arrears
(temporary delinqueney) and default (Ioans with no likely reeovery). Then estimate
the arrears(and default) rates on a loans due basis. namely, plaeing in the
denominator of the arrears (default) ratio only the volume of loans for whieh loa n
repayments are due.
b) Estimate an arrears matrix that highlights the aging of arrears and the cross
elassifieation of loa n and borrower eharaeteristies by status of loa n repayment (paid
up to date, in arrears, in default).
c) Estimate net ineome (interesttrevenue minus program costs) per unit volume of loans
outstanding, two net ineome measures can be used here, the first only including
finaneial eosts direetly associated with loa n aetivity and, the second, including all non-
finaneial teehnieal assistanee and training eosts. The differenee between the two
offers an insight into the eost burden of the non-financial serviees ineorporated into
the program.
d) Separate arrears and net ineome estimates could also be generated for an individual
loan portolio and a grouD loan portolio insofar as a program has both loa n serviees.
The findings eould hel p address the issue of whether the alleged eost savings of
group loans is evident once eorreeted for arrears.
B. Non-finaneial program performanee indieators
a) Doeument the number of elientele served with loan and deposit serviees (for deposit-
based programs), and the growth in these numbers over time in the program.
b) Identify degree to whieh target group elientele established through program's
objeetives have been the true benefieiaries of program serviees (both finaneial and
non-financial serviees).
c) Estimate the co st of delivering non-finaneial serviees to the targeted c1ientele
establishing, as indieated earlier, the eost per c1ient services and the eost per relevant
staff member for eaeh type of service rendered.
d) Compare the estimated eosts per c1ient to the presumed benefits of these services
to the c1ient. Subjeetive judgements of the elient-benefieiaries eould be recorded
eoneerning the relative importanee of these serviees (on a seale of 1 to 5) in having
eontributed substantially to:
I) an inerease in the number of employees;
ii) an inerease in output and/or profits;
iii) penetrating new produet markets (or expanding the same elientele base); ,
iv) seeuring new and eheaper suppliers;
v) adopting new technologies; and
vi) aehieving more effeient management.
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3. Vis ion for Future Governanee Rules
The evaluation should identify the degree to whieh the program has looked beyond its
current operation into the future. The questions here would be as follows:
A. Strateg y to seeure long run program sustainability
a) What path of institutional evolution is antieipated (and planned) for the program to
establish a domestieally based source of funding' to replaee donor funds for the
future?
b) Does the program envision its improved, more eredit worthy elientele graduating into
the portfolios of formal sector banks (thereby defining sustainability in terms of
c1ients); or does the program envision graduating itself into a more sustainable form?
c) What institutional form does the program antieipate? Graduating into a unit bank with
equity eapital from loeal merehants, or from a broader base of elientele borrowers
combined with deposit liabilities from the public?
d) Or does the program envis ion a mutualist form of organization in whieh the elients are
owners?
4. Conclusion
Not all mieroenterprise programs in the proposed study wil have all the information
(or produets or serviees) outlined above. Nevertheless the range of issues
surrounding the eonceptualization and doeumentation of the produet design, program
teehnologies and organizational form was deliberately east in broad terms to
hopefully allow for some degree of uniformity of evaluation aeross all programs.
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5.3 Soeeifie Tasks: Zimbabwe
5.3.1 Your task wil involve the following:
a) review the SDF in its totality to identify the weaknesses and design ways to reetify them.
Speeifically you wil review the strueture, the administrative system, the staffng, the
funding, the logistie support and the funetioning of the programme;
b) review the Povert Alleviation Action Plan and determination how best it can be integrated
into the eurrent programme;
c) based on the weaknesses already identified, you wil design a system for projeet follow up
and monitoring, a system for loa n repayments a computer system for data entry and
retrieval, and a computer system for the aeeounting system;
d) based on your findings, propose the structure and form for the Bank's follow up
intervention;
e) assist the management of the SDF in any other area in whieh it may require your
assistanee; and
f) prepare a detailed report on all of the above tasks to eomplete the exereise.
5.3.2 Your assignment will involve a miss ion to Zimbabwe, during whieh time youwill eollect
neeessary materials to prepare a detailed report. You will at the end ofthat miss ion have a wrap-up
meeting, and leave a eomprehensive Aid Memoir with the Government. Thereafter, you wil come
to Abidjan to finalize the report, and present it to a working group.
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ANNEX 6. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES
6.1 Notes
6.1.1 Two pilot field surveys of SDF borrowers were undertaken for the study. The samples were
small and mostly eoncentrated in the urban areas. Seleetion was partly random and only eurrently
operating businesses were included.
6.1.2 In field survey 1 the questionnaire was administered in face to face interviews which were
eondueted mainly in Shona to faeiltate elearer eommunieation with the respondents. The sample
of 20 benefieiaries was randomly seleeted although an attempt was made to ensure that they were
drawn from different enterprise seetors. Not more than three respondents were seleeted randomly
from eaeh of the enterprise seetors. The intention of covering, albeit thinly, a broad spectrum of
seetors was to assess similarities and differenees in client pereeptions as well as to aequire an
overview of the general trends in performance and prospeets of the small enterprises of the
beneficiaries. Urban respondents were seleeted from Harare and rural respondents from Marondera
Distriet.
6.1.3 Respondents' enterprises were engaged ina broad range of productive activities:
a) poultry
b) leather making
c) metal work and welding
d) vehiele repair
e) hammer milling
f) eloth manufaeturing
g) timber manufaeturing and distribution
h) construetion equipment
I) engineering and foundry work and
k) services.
6.1.4 For field survey 2 a sample of 29 was drawn randomly from the larger stratified sample
used for the arrears analysis (see below). Initially the projeet files of the seleeted benefieiaries at
the SDF offee were reviewed before the interviews were eondueted. A mixture of face to face and
telephone interviews were then eondueted on the basis of a prepared questionnaire. The questions
were read out to the interviewee and the responses were reeorded in the proeess.
6.1.5 In both cases the seleetion method ensured areasonable spread of projeet types. It also
restrieted the elient population to businesses whieh were operational at the time of survey. This was
a neeessary step in view of the laek of information on file regarding the eurrent status of SDF-funded
projeets and the likelihood that a number were no longer aetive. It was also considered that fuller
data and more useful results would be gained, given the limited seope of the exercise, from eurrently
operational businesses.
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6.2 Field Survey 1: Questionnaire for Benefieiaries of SDF Programme
A. ACCESS TO SDF
1. When were you retrenehed?
2. What reasons were given for your retrenehment?
3a. What job did you hold before retrenehment?
3b. What was your monthly pay?
4. How mueh did you reeeive by way of benefits?
5. How did you get to know of the SDF?
6. Through whieh agency did you register with SDF?
7. What reeeption did you reeeive from the Department of Employment?
8. What was the Department mainly interested in when you registered?
9. How long did it take between registering and beginning your training?
10. Where were you trained?
11. Whieh consultaney organisation trained you?
12. What do you remember most of the topies taught to you?
13. What do you remember least of the topies taught to you?
14. What do you think of the methods of training used?
a) good
b) average
c) poor
15. Do you think the training in projet preparation was suffeient?
16. If not, what should have been included?
17. Were any partieular projeets encouraged?
18. If so, in whieh seetors?
19. What was the role of the consultants in your ehoiee of projeet?
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a) major
b) minor
c) none
20. Was a figure suggested eoneerning areasonable amount of loan?
21. If so, what figure was suggested?
22. Did the consultant organisation provide a satisfaetory service?
23. In what respeet? (please elaborate)
B. CURRENT BUSINESS OPERATIONS
24. How long did it take to hear about the results of your loa n applieation from the date of
submission?
25. What was the loan amount you
a) applied for
b) aetually reeeived?
26. How mueh did you eontribute in
a) cash
b) kind?
27. What line of business ae you in?
28. How many workers do you employ?
29. What is your output (in units) per month?
30. What is the value of your output per month?
31. Do you do your own book-keeping?
32. If not, who does the books for you?
33. Is the projeet generating enough cash flow to service your loan on due date?
34. Do you have an interest and loan repayment sehedule?
35. When do you start your repayments?
36. How much are your repayments per mo nth?
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37. Do you make your repayments to
a) SDF offees
b) into a bank aeeount?
38. Has SDF approached you in eonnection with your repayments?
39. Are there penalties for
a) late payments
b) default or non-payment?
40. If yes, please state them.
41. Are your business operations profitable?
42. Whatever answer, please elaborate.
43. How do you see your business
a) 1 year from now
b) 5 years from now?
C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT
44. What do you think of the SDF programme?
45. Is it satisfaetorily assisting the poor?
46. Is it satisfactorily assisting those retrenehed?
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6.3 Field Survey 2: Questionnaire for Benefieiaries of SDF Programme
1. What is the nature of your business?
SECTOR MAIN ACTIVITY
* Manufaeturing
* Agrieulture
* Transport
* Construetion
* Mining
* Wholesale & Retail Trade
* Other (Specify)
2. How many people do you employ?
FULL TIME PART-TIME
* Female
* Male
3. What motivated you to start your business?
* Retrenchment / SDF training course
* Making profi, inereasing Ineome
* Relatives in this line of business
* Other (speeify)
4. What amount of loa n did you reeeive from SDF? Z$
5. How mueh do you still owe SDF? Z$
6. Do you repay your loan regularly? Yes / No
7. If the answer to above is no, what are the problems?
8. Do you have any other loans from other institutions?
* Commereial Banks.
* Other Institutions
9. Speeify the other eredit institution where you have a eredit.
10. Are the repayment sehedules regularly met to these institutions?
11. If not wliat are the problems?
Annexes Page A40
12. What do you consider to be your training needs?
*General Business Management
*Finanee and Reeord Keeping
*Marketing
*Other (Speeify)
13. Do you consider SDF training in the above areas adequate?
14. How do you intend to augment your training requirements?
15. Do you have a business bank aeeount?
* Current Aeeount
* Savings Aeeount
* Other
16. How do you buy your inputs?
* Cash
* Aeeount
17. How do you market your produets?
* Direet sales
* Wholesaling
* Other
18. What are your eonstraints in marketing?
* Government Ageneies
* General Public
* Other Companies
19. What form of eompetition do you face?
* Large Companies
* Other start-u ps
* Existing mieroenterprises
20. What would you say are your eonstraints?
* Aeeess to raw materials
a) domestie
b) foreign
* Aeeess to finanee
* High interest rates
* Business regulatory and bureaucratie issues
* Labour
* Equipment
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* Demand for your produets
* Competition from other suppliers
* Infrastructure and support serviees (transport, water, telephones etc)
21. Do you seil on eredit to your elients? Yes / No
22. Do you buy on eredit? Yes / No
23. Do you buy on eredit from your suppliers
24a Whieh other organisations have you approaehed for loa n finanee?
* Commercial Banks
* Government Institutions sueh as SEDCO, Credit Guarantee Company
24b Did you get it? What are the repayment terms?
Institutions Amount Required Amount Approved Repayment Terms
25. Do you know of other organisations assisting small businesses?
26. What is your turnover per month?
27. How has your business turnover performed sinee you started your operations?
* Improved
* Remained the same
* Deelined
28. What is the highest level of edueation aehieved?
* University Graduate
* 'O' Levels with further skiIIs training
* Post 'O' Levels with further training
* Below 'O' Levels with basic skiIIs training
* No skils training
29. Did you have direet experience in this line of business before starting operations?
* More than five years experienee
* More than three years experienee
* No experience at alL.
30. Explain what you consider to be the risk faetors in your business.
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31. Do you operate as a registered company?
32. Are you registered with the Department of Taxes?
33. Do you operate from rented or own premises?
34. Do you pay water / electricity eharges?
35. Sinee you started business, how many more people have you employed?
36. Have you purchased more new or seeond-hand equipment sinee you started your
business?
37. Are there opportunities to grow in your business line beyond what you have aehieved now?
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ANNEX 7. PERSONS AND ORGANISATIONS CONSUL TED
Loeation: all in Harare unless otherwise stated.
Mr John Alufayi, General Manager, Zambuko Trust.
Mrs Awore, Resident Representative, UNDP.
Mr Eamon Cassidy, Eeonomie Adviser, Overseas Development Administration (UK).
Mr A Diseh, Economist, World Bank Zimbabwe Offee.
Mr Peter Fidler, Consultant, World Bank Zimbabwe Offee.
Mr D. Gumbo, Executive Direetor, ENDA Zimbabwe.
Mr AG. Hatendi, Deputy Direetor, Credit Guarantee Corporation.
Mr Kasere, Deputy Direetor, Department of Soeial Welfare, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and
Soeial Welfare.
Ms Judith Kateera, Prineipal Economist, Monitoring and Implementation Unit, Ministry of Finanee.
Mrs Madzimbamuto, National Treasurer, Women in Business Association.
Mr A Magwada, Projeets Offeer, SDF, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Soeial Welfare.
Mrs Magwenhi, Assistant Seeretary, Ministry of Finanee.
Mrs Mapondera, President, Zimbabwe Women Finanee Trust.
Mr Marimo, Senior Manager, Barelays Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd (Highfield Braneh).
Ms Eugenia Masikeni, Eeonomist, Monitoring and Implementation Unit, Ministry of Finanee.
Mr Matisha, Employment Offeer, Department of Employment and Employment Development,
Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Soeial Welfare.
Mr Matiza, Soeial Welfare Offeer, Department of Social Welfare, Ministry of Public Service, Labour
and Soeial Welfare.
Mr John Manyanya, Deputy Seeretary, Monitoring and Implementation Unit, Ministry of Finance.
Mrs Rose Mazula, Assistant Direetor, Zimbabwelnvestment Centre.
Mr S. Mhishi, SDF Coordinator, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Soeial Welfare.
Mr Mhishi, Direetor, Credit Guarantee Corporation.
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Mr D. Moyo, Soeial Worker, Parirenyatwa Hospital, Harare.
Ms Bett Mtero, National Executive Direetor, Association of Women's Clubs.
Mr A. K. Mtshani, General Manager, Small Enterprises Development Corporation.
Mr R. Muchada, Development Manager, Small Enterprises Development Corporation.
Mr S. Muehati, Manager, Credit Guarantee Company (Pvt) Ltd.
Mr N. Mudzengerere, Assitant Seeretary-General, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.
Ms Doris T. Mugwara, Direetor, Business Extension and Advisory Service.
Mr Paul T. Mundangepfupfu, Programme Manager, EC Mieroprojeets Programme.
Ms Sibongile Ndlovu, Training Manager, Zimbabwe Women Finanee Trust.
Mr Tabeth Ndoro, Manager, Self Help Development Foundation.
Mr L. Neehitoro, Projeets Offeer, SDF, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare.
Mr Denis Nkala, Programme Offeer, UNDP.
Mr A. Nzuma, Cooperatives Manager, Small Business Serviees Division, Zimbabwe Banking
Corporation.
Mr Oliseyi Obalatu, Superintendent, Parirenyatwa Hospital, Harare.
Mr Pamaeheehe, Direetor, Monitoring and Implementation Unit, Ministry of Finanee.
Mr Patriek Sagwete, Senior Business Advisor, Business Extension and Advisory Service.
Mr L. Shoko, Employment Offeer, Department of Employment and Employment Development,
Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Soeial Welfare, Marondera. ii
I
Mr M. Sibanda, Permanent Seeretary, Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Soeial Welfare.
Mr Sibanda, Underseeretary, Ministry of Finanee.
Mrs Si banda, Administrator, Dondolo.
Mr D. Simba & Mr K. Chibota, Zambuko Trust.
